“Iran Uranium Enrichment Ban, 5 Years? 20 Years?... It Must Be Permanent” - Brookings Institution

Regarding the duration of Iran's future uranium enrichment ban, it has been reported that while the United States wanted a 20-year period, Iran insisted on just 5 years. There have been arguments that adopting a temporary restriction would be a repetition of past mistakes, and that even if limited low-level enrichment is permitted, the ban on high-level enrichment must be permanent.

Michael O'Hanlon, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, made this point in his article titled "Avoid any temporary deal on Iran’s nukes," published on the institution’s website on April 20 (local time).

According to O'Hanlon, the "temporary restrictions" agreed upon during the Obama administration were based on the premise that, after a certain period, Iran could become a more moderate, less extreme, and less belligerent country. However, he argues that it is not possible to believe that the moderation of the Iranian regime can be achieved within such a limited period.

O'Hanlon is the Director of Research for the Brookings Institution's Foreign Policy program and head of the Strobe Talbott Center on Security, Strategy, and Technology, which deals with security, strategy, and technology.

Below is the full translated text of his article.

According to media reports, the remaining officials of the Trump administration and the Iranian government disagreed last week over the duration of Iran's future uranium enrichment ban. The United States wanted 20 years, while the Islamic Republic of Iran insisted on just 5 years.

However, this approach fundamentally misunderstands the situation and the cost of the options involved. It risks repeating the mistakes of the Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA—Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) from the era of former President Barack Obama. While the JCPOA was better than no agreement at all, it ultimately fell short. The biggest problem was that many of its key provisions were temporary. While the specifics of Iran's future uranium enrichment restrictions can be somewhat flexible, the restrictions themselves must be permanent.

President Donald Trump appeared to reject the 20-year proposal after it was reported in the media. However, it is unclear whether the Trump administration will continue to pursue the idea of a permanent agreement. It should. In the short term, however, there could be some flexibility in allowing Iran limited, low-level enrichment. This could serve as the foundation for a more sound agreement—one that both sides could claim as a "victory."

To be fair, Secretary of State John Kerry, during Obama's second term, at least negotiated an agreement that bought time. Iran was limited to about 5,000 old centrifuges for 10 years and could only produce low-enriched uranium, far below weapons-grade, for 15 years. Instead of withdrawing from the agreement in 2018, Trump could have tried to extend its deadlines.

However, the very notion of restricting the dangerous nuclear activities of a country like Iran for only a specific, temporary period is fundamentally flawed. There are three main reasons for this.

First, the international community’s basic agreement to limit nuclear proliferation is permanent. This is codified in the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which both Iran and the United States have joined. The NPT was not intended to delay nuclear proliferation by 10 or 20 years. Its purpose was to permanently limit the number of nuclear-armed nations and, eventually, to reduce the global nuclear stockpile. This logic was very solid and, in fact, effective. In 1963, President John F. Kennedy predicted that by the 1970s, dozens of countries might possess nuclear weapons, yet even now, the number of nuclear-armed countries remains at nine.

Second, temporary restrictions are based on the premise that, after a certain period, Iran could become a more moderate, less extreme, and less belligerent country. However, the Obama administration should not have held such expectations between 2013 and 2015. And today, we must be even more aware of how dangerous it is to believe that the moderation of the Iranian regime will occur at any predictable point in time.

Third, accepting temporary restrictions sends an undesirable message that Iran may eventually pursue nuclear weapons. This message could reach hardliners in Iran who want such options and could be interpreted as confirmation of their stance, or even as a green light to pursue nuclear ambitions in the future. In addition, regional countries such as Saudi Arabia could also perceive that if Iran retains a nuclear option, they too may need one.

In the process of seeking compromise, it may be possible to allow Iran a very limited degree of enrichment even today. Of course, this must be verifiable. This is precisely where the Trump camp could show flexibility. Such an approach could lead to a nuclear agreement that would also help end the war.

However, for limited enrichment to be permitted, a strong system of monitoring and inspection must be restored, bringing all elements of Iran's nuclear program back under the accounting and oversight framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). A permanent agreement is only meaningful if there is a high degree of confidence in Iran’s compliance.

However, it is entirely unreasonable to set time- or calendar-based limits on Iran’s enrichment activities and expect that, after easing those restrictions, the future regime in Tehran will be easier to manage and less threatening. To borrow the words of Colin Powell, that would not be a strategy—it would merely be hope.

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