Stalled North America Negotiations Must Build a Peace Regime to Break the 'North Korean Nuclear Negotiation Vicious Cycle'

Jeon Bong-geun, Director of the Institute for Foreign Affairs and National Security, "'Establishing a Peace Regime' is the Only Realistic Denuclearization Policy Option"
Emphasizing the Importance of National Consensus and Consistent Policy

[Asia Economy Reporter Lim Cheol-young] Amid the deadlock in North Korea-U.S. negotiations following the Hanoi North Korea-U.S. summit ending in a 'No deal,' there are calls to break the vicious cycle of repeated 'North Korea nuclear crisis - comprehensive settlement - collapse of nuclear agreement.' Each time the North Korea nuclear crisis worsens and the nuclear agreement collapses, mutual distrust between North Korea and the U.S. and between the two Koreas deepens, while pessimism about denuclearization and skepticism about nuclear negotiations spread in South Korea and the U.S., and North Korea tends to accelerate its nuclear development, indicating the need to break away from this pattern based on experience.

According to the Institute for Foreign Affairs and National Security on the 11th, Director (Acting) Jeon Bong-geun argued in his report titled "D?j? vu of the North Korea Nuclear Crisis and Strategy to Break the Vicious Cycle of North Korea Nuclear Negotiations" that "the longer North Korea's denuclearization is delayed, the more its nuclear capabilities increase, and accordingly, the compensation for denuclearization also increases. The longer the delay, the greater the political, economic, and diplomatic losses due to the 'North Korea nuclear discount,' and the longer the damage period," emphasizing the need for an early nuclear agreement through active North Korea nuclear negotiations.

He particularly pointed out that as the vicious cycle of North Korea nuclear negotiations repeats, mutual distrust accumulates, making peaceful resolution through negotiations increasingly difficult. North Korea's nuclear capability tends to double every eight years, and in 10 to 20 years, North Korea's nuclear weapons could exceed 100, making denuclearization irreversible. As evidence, Director Jeon cited a series of cases including the construction of the Yongbyon nuclear facility in the late 1980s, North Korea's declaration of withdrawal from the NPT in 1993, unauthorized removal of spent fuel rods and withdrawal from the IAEA in the 1990s, and the successful re-launch of the Unha-3 rocket in 2012.

He also identified the establishment of a peace regime as the only realistic policy option for denuclearization. North Korea nuclear policy can be broadly categorized into five: ▲ sanctions and strategic patience ▲ deterrence through strengthening deterrent power ▲ coexistence with North Korea's nuclear weapons ▲ forced denuclearization through regime change, military action, or covert operations ▲ and establishment of a peace regime. The Moon Jae-in administration chose and is pursuing the peace regime among these five options.

Director Jeon stated, "The peace regime is preferred by the progressive camp and dialogue advocates, aligning with the South Korean government's principles for resolving the North Korea nuclear issue, such as improving inter-Korean relations, peaceful resolution of the nuclear issue, and peace settlement," adding, "Despite its drawbacks, considering that other options carry too high a risk of war or excessive costs making them nearly impossible to realize, the peace regime option still has value to pursue."

He added, "However, despite the peace regime option, it is necessary to simultaneously apply strong sanctions and inducements to force North Korea to choose denuclearization, and as Plan B, continue strengthening the ROK-U.S. alliance and South Korea's own defense capabilities."

He also proposed a phased strategy of first establishing a political peace regime and then completing an international legal peace regime when conditions permit. This involves institutionalizing and normalizing the '3-NO' and '4-NO' declarations proclaimed by the South Korean and U.S. governments as principles of North Korea policy to stabilize inter-Korean relations first, sequentially proceeding with the signing of the 'Basic Inter-Korean Agreement,' initiating North Korea-U.S. diplomatic relations negotiations at the next North Korea-U.S. summit, and establishing a Northeast Asia joint security system to reinforce bilateral relations improvement.

Director Jeon forecasted, "The Moon administration is pursuing denuclearization and peace settlement based on the 'three principles for resolving the Korean Peninsula issue'?no war, mutual security guarantees, and joint prosperity?and through these three principles, it is expected to promote the end of hostile relations and normalization of bilateral relations."

He also emphasized the importance of national consensus. Director Jeon identified so-called 'intra-Korean conflicts' as the biggest obstacle in resolving inter-Korean relations and the North Korea nuclear issue, calling for additional efforts from the government and political circles.

He stated, "Among small and medium-sized countries without the diplomatic leeway of great powers, it is rare to find a case like South Korea, which shows serious internal divisions in foreign policy and even requests foreign countries to criticize the opposing camp or support itself," emphasizing, "The government should strengthen 'public diplomacy,' and the political circles should minimize mutual conflicts in diplomacy and security and strive to create national consensus to establish a political practice that can pursue consistent policies."

This content was produced with the assistance of AI translation services.