Electronic Warfare Targeted Communications Satellites Over the Korean Peninsula in 2014
Potential for Satellite Attacks During Encounters Above the Peninsula

There are calls for the satellites owned by the South Korean military to be prepared for electronic warfare. The military is currently implementing Project 425, which involves the development of a total of five satellites: high-performance synthetic aperture radar (SAR) satellites and optical/infrared (EO/IR) satellites. Following this, the military will also embark on a microsatellite project. It is being assessed that North Korea is already preparing electronic warfare specifically targeting these satellites.


North Korea Now Targets Military Satellites [Yang Nakkyu's Defence Club Column] View original image

After Project 425, the South Korean military plans to launch approximately 40 small and microsized reconnaissance satellites using solid-fuel space launch vehicles. Once these satellites are operational in the late 2020s, the South Korean military will be able to conduct reconnaissance of North Korea and other regions on the Korean Peninsula at 30-minute intervals. The defense contractors participating in this project are Korea Aerospace Industries (KAI) and Hanwha Systems. In December this year, each company is scheduled to launch one verification satellite.


Securing Core Civil-Military Infrastructure through Low-Earth Orbit Satellite Launches


Small and microsized reconnaissance satellites refer to low-earth orbit (LEO) satellites. These satellites enable rapid and stable communications even in areas where terrestrial networks cannot reach, making them highly valuable for disaster response, national defense, maritime, and aviation fields. They are regarded as essential infrastructure for strengthening national communications and securing future growth engines. Recently, global corporations and major foreign countries have been fiercely competing to dominate the LEO satellite communications market, heightening its importance for national security and communications sovereignty.


The problem is that reconnaissance satellites are vulnerable to electronic warfare. Methods for attacking satellites can be divided into soft-kill and hard-kill approaches. The soft-kill approach involves interfering with or disrupting the normal operation of satellites without physical collision, and can be used to disturb certain functions. This method not only avoids international condemnation but can also be used in conjunction with stealth weapons.


North Korea Continues Electronic Warfare Targeting Satellites from More Than 10 Locations


North Korea has been disrupting not only satellite navigation systems (GPS) but also communications satellites using soft-kill methods. According to the Central Radio Management Service, North Korea conducted electronic warfare targeting communications satellites for 14 days in May 2014. The regions from which North Korea emits radio waves to disrupt GPS and communications satellites are diverse, including Kaesong, Haeju, Kangryeong, Chongdan, Pyeonggang, and more—totaling over 10 locations. From October 2024 to January 13 this year, North Korea continued its radio jamming activities. During this period, 5,130 aircraft and 1,004 ships were reported to have been affected.


North Korean leader Kim Jong Un reportedly led the Satellite Reconnaissance Launch Preparation Committee project on site, according to the Korean Central News Agency. Yonhap News

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un reportedly led the Satellite Reconnaissance Launch Preparation Committee project on site, according to the Korean Central News Agency. Yonhap News

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Hard-kill methods are also possible. This involves physically damaging or destroying target satellites, most commonly through the use of interceptor missiles launched from the ground or from aircraft. Interceptor missiles deployed by fighter jets can be lethal to low-earth orbit satellites. To date, the countries that have successfully conducted anti-satellite missile tests are the United States, Russia, China, and India.


The Risk of North Korea's Satellites Turning into Killer Satellites Despite Lack of Technology


The most realistic attack method available to North Korea is the use of killer satellites that remain in orbit and, upon receiving orders, attack enemy satellites. Typical examples include self-destruct satellites (space mines) that tail enemy satellites and destroy themselves to take out the target, and parasitic satellites that fly in close proximity to enemy satellites and destroy them in emergencies. However, hard-kill methods do not end with the destruction of the targeted satellite; they also generate large amounts of debris that can inflict significant damage on other satellites.


In fact, North Korea's reconnaissance satellite MALLIGYONG-1 once passed within 50 kilometers of South Korea's military reconnaissance satellite KORSAT7. In space, a 50-kilometer distance is close enough for satellites to image each other, and for laser attacks or frequency interference/disruption to occur. Generally, interference with enemy satellites is considered a preliminary stage of high-intensity military provocations, such as war. The timing of encounters between the two satellites can be irregular, depending on their orbital periods and the Earth's rotation—it can be ten days, a single day, or any interval in between.


South and North Korean Satellites Encounter at Least Once over the Korean Peninsula


Considering that there are about 10 South Korean satellites orbiting at an altitude similar to MALLIGYONG-1 (500 to 550 kilometers), it means that South and North Korean satellites pass within 50 kilometers of each other at least once a day. According to tracking data from SpaceMap, a domestic space software company that tracks satellites worldwide, MALLIGYONG-1 passes over South Korea twice daily. Notably, the time MALLIGYONG-1 can capture images of Seoul is estimated to be between 112 and 116 seconds.



Professor Byun Kangil of Ulsan National Institute of Science and Technology said, "It is technically feasible to jam communications satellites from the ground," adding, "Satellite communication equipment should be equipped with array antennas, like Starlink, rather than dish antennas, to enable anti-jamming functions."


This content was produced with the assistance of AI translation services.

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