34 Public Officials Referred for Frugal Investigation in 'Osong Disaster'... Comprehensive Failures in Supervision, Communication, and Response

34 Public Officials and 2 Civilians Referred for Investigation
Mass Disciplinary Actions Against 63 People from 5 Agencies
Accountability Held for 5 Agencies Including Happy City Administration
Both Preemptive Measures and Post-Response Inadequate

The government, which conducted an inspection related to the ‘Osong Underpass Disaster’ where 14 people died due to heavy rain, has decided to request investigations into 18 additional officials from four organizations: Chungcheongbuk-do, Cheongju City, the Public Agency for Public Administration and Construction Management (Happiness Agency), and the Chungbuk Fire Headquarters. Except for two individuals related to the Miho River temporary embankment construction site, all are public officials. Including the 18 public officials previously referred for investigation, a total of 34 government officials will face prosecution for dereliction of duty related to the ‘Osong Disaster.’

On the 28th, the Office for Government Policy Coordination (OGPC) announced the ‘Inspection Results of the Osong Gungpyeong2 Underpass Flooding Accident,’ which contained these details. The OGPC conducted a rigorous inspection for ten days from the 17th to the 26th, starting two days after the accident, to identify the cause of the Gungpyeong2 underpass flooding accident and determine responsibility.

The OGPC focused on the fact that these local governments failed to properly supervise the poorly constructed temporary embankment on the Miho River, increasing the risk of the accident, and that despite heavy rain warnings and 112 emergency calls on the day, they failed to implement timely traffic control. Additionally, the police and firefighters either did not respond to the calls or, even if they did, failed to promptly relay the emergency situation to related agencies, which exacerbated the damage.

[Image source=Yonhap News]

34 Public Officials and 2 Civilians Referred for Investigation... 63 Disciplinary Actions Across 5 Agencies

In the inspection conducted from the 21st to the 24th, the OGPC had already referred 18 individuals from the Chungbuk Police Agency, Chungcheongbuk-do, and the Happiness Agency for investigation. Including these individuals, the total number of those referred for investigation is 36. Among them, 2 are civilians, and 12 are senior officials responsible for the incident. By agency, Chungcheongbuk-do has the highest number of individuals referred for investigation with 9, followed by the Happiness Agency (8), Chungbuk Police Agency and Cheongju City (6 each), and Chungbuk Fire Headquarters (5). The remaining 2 are civilians related to the construction site. Separately from the investigation referrals, the OGPC plans to notify the affiliated agencies of 63 public officials from five organizations (Happiness Agency, Chungcheongbuk-do, Chungbuk Police Agency, Cheongju City, Chungbuk Fire Headquarters) found to have negligence and impose disciplinary measures.

The OGPC identified the main causes of the ‘Osong Tragedy’ as largely ‘insufficient prior preparation’ and ‘inadequate post-accident response.’ First, the unauthorized removal of the existing embankment under the Miho River Bridge and ① the construction of a substandard temporary embankment, ② failure to properly monitor and supervise it were major factors. The response on the day was also insufficient. Heavy rain and flood warnings were issued, and reports were made. However, the ③ agencies related to the Gungpyeong2 underpass and the surrounding Miho River failed to recognize the severity of the situation and did not respond actively.

Responsibility of Five Agencies Including Happiness Agency Determined... Both Prior Preparation and Post-Response Were Inadequate

Among the major findings by agency, the OGPC viewed the prior response of the Happiness Agency, which commissioned the ‘Osong-Cheongju (Section 2) Road Expansion Project,’ as inadequate. The OGPC judged that the Happiness Agency failed to properly manage and supervise the construction company and supervisors who violated the river occupation permit and unauthorized removal of the existing embankment to install a substandard temporary embankment. Even after the embankment collapse, they failed to promptly relay the situation to related agencies.

Chungcheongbuk-do, the entity responsible for managing the Gungpyeong2 underpass and holding traffic control authority, was also judged to have worsened the accident by failing to conduct timely monitoring and traffic control. Despite receiving reports of the Miho River flooding risk, they did not take emergency response measures.

The Chungbuk Police Agency did not actually dispatch personnel to the scene despite 112 emergency calls and only recorded the dispatch in the system. Cheongju City was found to have taken no necessary measures despite receiving notifications of the Miho River flooding threat. The Chungbuk Fire Headquarters was the only agency to dispatch to the flooding site following 119 emergency calls but was judged to have failed to take necessary actions such as promptly deploying available personnel and equipment.

OGPC Chief Announces Comprehensive Review of Local Government Disaster Response Systems for Flooding and Other Disasters

[Image source=Yonhap News]

The OGPC announced that it will prepare comprehensive improvement plans for the disaster response system to prevent recurrence of disasters causing casualties such as flooding and landslides. During a briefing held at the Government Complex Seoul on the morning of the same day, Visit Byung-gyu, head of the OGPC, stated, “We will strengthen disaster response governance and establish control standards to eradicate casualties in underpasses,” adding, “We will also conduct a comprehensive review of the disaster response systems and preparedness of central administrative agencies and local governments.”

Specifically, the OGPC is discussing expanding and mandating the installation of underpass entry blocking facilities, increasing river maintenance such as dredging for safety-centered water management, and a full review of the landslide-prone area management system.

This content was produced with the assistance of AI translation services.