Bold Vision, The Key Is How to Elicit 'North Korea's Response'

'Bold Initiative' First Public Seminar... Discussion on Improvement Plans
Kim Tae-hyo "Continued North Korea Deterrence Until Dialogue Succeeds"
Experts "Problem Is Little Room for North Korea to Respond"

[Asia Economy Reporter Jang Hee-jun] Amid heightened military tensions on the Korean Peninsula due to provocations by North Korea, the first public debate on the Yoon Seok-yeol administration's denuclearization roadmap, the 'Bold Initiative,' took place. Opening the discussion, Kim Tae-hyo, the First Deputy Director of the National Security Office, emphasized a comprehensive approach to North Korea deterrence based on the so-called '3D' strategy?Deterrence, Dissuasion, and Dialogue?revealing a tougher stance compared to the previous administration.

However, concerns were raised that the key to the actual implementation of the Bold Initiative lies in 'North Korea's response,' and that preparations for this were insufficient. Experts pointed out the ambiguity surrounding North Korea's willingness to respond to inter-Korean policies and advised that the government should prepare detailed plans on what role it would play if the situation shifts to a dialogue phase.

Bold Initiative, a Denuclearization Roadmap Based on Deterrence

Kim Tae-hyo, First Deputy Director of the National Security Office Photo by Yonhap News

On the afternoon of the 21st, the Ministry of Unification held a 'Public Seminar for the Implementation of the Bold Initiative' at the Korea Press Center in Jung-gu, Seoul.

At the keynote presentation, Kim Tae-hyo, the First Deputy Director of the National Security Office, stated that national consensus must be unified to deter North Korea's nuclear development, and emphasized the need to continuously pursue deterrence and dissuasion until 'meaningful dialogue' with North Korea is achieved.

The government is currently pursuing a comprehensive approach centered on a strong ROK-US alliance to deter (Deterrence) North Korea's nuclear threat, dissuade (Dissuasion) nuclear development through sanctions and pressure, and lead denuclearization through diplomacy and dialogue (Diplomacy). The plan aims to create an environment where North Korea can voluntarily return to denuclearization negotiations. Regarding this, Deputy Director Kim said, "Among the three elements, deterrence and dissuasion have been operating from the start," adding, "It would be ideal if all three proceed simultaneously, but if not, deterrence and dissuasion must continue until dialogue is realized."

Specifically, he suggested accelerating the establishment of a Korean-style three-axis system. Practical measures mentioned included strengthening the kill chain and implementing agreements on massive retaliation in case of nuclear provocations.

He stressed, "We must prepare preemptive posture measures upon signs of nuclear or missile activity, and if missiles are launched, strengthen the kill chain to detect and intercept them," adding, "If nuclear provocations occur, we must be able to implement the ROK-US agreement that massive retaliation would lead to the end of the North Korean regime."

Furthermore, he reiterated, "I believe the likelihood of North Korea voluntarily and easily initiating denuclearization talks is low," and emphasized the need to resume dissuasion diplomacy to prevent North Korea's political and military objectives from materializing.

The Bold Initiative is evaluated as being based on strong deterrence against North Korea's nuclear and missile threats, with somewhat tougher principles such as 'zero tolerance for any armed provocations,' compared to the Moon Jae-in administration's North Korea policy, which emphasized 'peace.' However, there are also calls to supplement the plan with more detailed and specific measures to encourage North Korea's response.

In the same vein, Deputy Director Kim's remarks on the day provided concrete strategies only for deterrence and dissuasion, but did not elaborate on how to bring North Korea back to negotiations for the practical implementation of North Korea policy. The lack of measures addressing the very low possibility of North Korea returning to dialogue was pointed out as a limitation.

"North Korea's Main Concern is Improving US Relations... Limited Room for Response"

Kim Jong-un, General Secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea [Photo by Yonhap News]

Experts also pointed out that the most challenging aspect of the Bold Initiative is the adjective 'bold,' criticizing the approach of 'exchanging' North Korea's denuclearization for economic cooperation. Professor Jeon Jae-sung of Seoul National University, who moderated the discussion, diagnosed that "North Korea's response is crucial, but inter-Korean relations are very difficult due to North Korea's missile tests and other provocations."

The point that drew the most criticism during the discussion was 'improvement of US-North Korea relations.'

Earlier that morning, the Ministry of Unification released North Korea policy materials that used the term 'US-North Korea relations' instead of 'North Korea-US relations,' which was used during the Moon Jae-in administration. This is interpreted as reflecting the current administration's emphasis on the ROK-US alliance and the strained inter-Korean relations. In response, Lee Joo-tae, Director of the Unification Policy Office at the Ministry of Unification, explained, "The Bold Initiative is a plan that encompasses not only economic support but also political and military measures," adding, "We will provide diplomatic support to facilitate the establishment and normalization of US-North Korea relations through improvements in US-North Korea ties."

However, experts pointed out that North Korea's desire to improve relations with the US leaves little room for positive response. As a direction for improvement and supplementation for concrete implementation, opinions were raised that the government should first clarify what role it will play between the US and North Korea.

Lee Sang-hyun, Director of the Sejong Institute, remarked, "North Korea's top priority is the cessation of US hostility toward North Korea, and Kim Yo-jong, the Workers' Party Vice Department Director, has stated that they will not exchange their nuclear weapons for 'economic cooperation.' The issue of regime security is not something South Korea can resolve; it is something the US must handle. Therefore, unless North Korea responds first, it will be difficult for the Bold Initiative to take its first step."

Professor Kim Jae-chun of Sogang University also pointed out, "At the early stage of denuclearization negotiations, simply saying that economic cooperation will be provided if North Korea comes to the table will not make North Korea think South Korea is 'bold.' For this initiative to be bold, South Korea must play some bridging role between the US and North Korea."

He added, "Since 2017, North Korea has come to denuclearization talks because the Moon Jae-in administration sent a message that it would act as a bridge between the US and North Korea, so when dialogue can be resumed, South Korea must be prepared to play a role for the Bold Initiative to truly be 'bold.'"

This content was produced with the assistance of AI translation services.