[Initial Perspective] Essential Conditions to Enhance the Effectiveness of Independent Sanctions Against North Korea

[Asia Economy Reporter Yoo In-ho] North Korea successfully conducted a hydrogen bomb test for intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) deployment at the Punggye-ri nuclear test site in Kilju County, North Hamgyong Province, in September 2017. It was the 6th nuclear test.

It was the first nuclear test in one year since the 5th nuclear test in September 2016, and also the first nuclear test after the inauguration of the Moon Jae-in administration and the Donald Trump U.S. administration. At that time, President Moon convened an emergency full meeting of the National Security Council (NSC).

The international community, including the United States, responded immediately. A few days later, the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted “UN Security Council Resolution 2375” on sanctions against North Korea.

It did not end there. On November 6, 2017, the government designated 18 individuals involved in North Korea’s development of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles as sanction targets, and on December 11 of the following month, 20 organizations and 12 individuals were designated as sanction targets. This was done by additionally designating 20 North Korean organizations such as financial institutions and shipping companies included in the U.S. sanctions list, as well as 12 North Korean individuals, as targets of South Korean sanctions.

This was the last unilateral sanction imposed by our government. For the following four years and six months, the government did not use the unilateral sanction card at all.

However, about a month after President Yoon Suk-yeol’s inauguration, our government is reviewing measures linked not only to unilateral sanctions but also to allied countries such as the United States, Japan, and the EU.

The reason our government has taken out the unilateral sanction card is that North Korea’s allies, such as China and Russia, oppose additional sanctions by the UN Security Council.

Despite several recent missile launches by North Korea, China and Russia are advocating for easing rather than additional sanctions.

Ahead of North Korea’s 7th nuclear test, South Korea and the United States hold a firm stance on unilateral sanctions. Unilateral sanctions are a card to tighten the sanction net and close gaps in multilateral sanctions such as Security Council resolutions.

Depending on their content, they can also have the effect of pressuring China and Russia, who tolerate North Korea’s sanction evasion.

In particular, if China refuses additional UN Security Council sanctions against North Korea, the biggest question is whether the U.S. will take out the “secondary boycott” card targeting China.

A secondary boycott sanctions third-country companies, banks, and governments that trade with the sanctioned country without considering the legality of the transactions.

A representative example is the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control adding Russian banks, Far Eastern Bank and Sputnik Bank, to the sanctions list on the 27th of last month.

The U.S. has not yet imposed secondary boycott sanctions on China, but if North Korea conducts a nuclear test, it may draw the sword. U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said at a press conference during the South Korea-U.S. foreign ministers’ meeting on the 13th, “We have imposed sanctions on individuals and organizations in Russia and China that assist North Korea’s nuclear missile program,” and “We will continue to do so.”

South Korea’s unilateral sanction plan is likely to be aligned with the United States for the time being.

In the past, when the U.S. designated individuals and organizations for unilateral sanctions against North Korea, South Korea, Japan, and the European Union often imposed sanctions together to enhance the effect.

However, considering North Korea’s continuous military provocations since the unilateral sanctions in 2017, the direct effect is not significant. Unlike the U.S. unilateral sanctions, which have powerful international influence due to the dollar’s status as the global reserve currency, South Korea’s unilateral sanctions have more symbolic effects such as expressing the government’s will.

The government has reluctantly taken out the unilateral sanction card after four and a half years. We hope that this unilateral sanction card will be a thorough and flawless sanction plan that pressures North Korea to abandon strengthening its defense capabilities and advancing nuclear weapons, and come to the negotiating table.

This content was produced with the assistance of AI translation services.