[Defense Column] Cheer Up! Cheonghae Unit

[Ahn Young-ho, Senior Vice Chairman of the Global Defense Research Forum · (Ret.) Lieutenant General, Republic of Korea Army] On January 15, 2009, US Airways Flight 1549, carrying 155 passengers, made an emergency landing on the Hudson River due to engine failure caused by a bird strike. The aviation accident investigation team claimed, based on computer simulation results, that a normal landing at a nearby airport was possible. Captain (pilot) Sully Sullenberger III proved that the investigation's conclusion?asserting a normal landing was possible based solely on computer simulations?was merely a mechanical and simplistic replay that ignored the complex situational judgments at the time, thereby validating his decision to make the emergency landing on the Hudson River.

Most of the crew members of the Munmu the Great ship, deployed on the other side of the globe as part of the Cheonghae Unit, tested positive for COVID-19, leading to significant public criticism of the military. At a time when the entire nation is deeply concerned about the spread of COVID-19, it is only natural that the public, who love the military, feel disappointment and anger that a military unit, which should be most thorough in quarantine measures, experienced a mass infection far away at sea. Our military must deeply internalize the public's criticism and once again review and supplement quarantine and follow-up systems to ensure that such an incident never recurs, dedicating all efforts to this cause.

Analyzing the sequence of events related to the incident reveals points of regret. Had different actions been taken at certain times, the accident might have been prevented. However, if one regards only the regrettable points identified after reviewing the incident as causes of the accident, might there not be similarities to the aviation accident investigation team's conclusion that blamed the pilot solely based on simulation results in the Hudson River emergency landing? In this regard, I would like to present my opinions on several controversial facts, having recently served as the operational commander of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

First, there is the question of why the crew members of the Munmu the Great ship, deployed to the Cheonghae Unit, were not prioritized for vaccination. The Munmu the Great departed Jinhae Port on February 8, 2021, while vaccines arrived in Korea on February 24, and vaccinations began on February 26. As is well known, the government's vaccination priority was given to elderly residents in group facilities, chronic patients, seniors over 65, and healthcare workers, so military personnel vaccinations were expected around the end of June, with actual vaccinations starting two months earlier, in late April.

Some have questioned whether the departure timing could have been adjusted to vaccinate the crew beforehand. However, since military vaccinations were scheduled for June at that time, extending the rotation of the maritime operational unit by 4 to 5 months was not feasible. Even a 1 to 2-month extension would have caused problems not only for the Munmu the Great and its replacement ship but also for the latter's return, maintenance period, and deployment to domestic operations, thereby affecting overall naval operations.

Second, there is the question of whether vaccinations could have been administered overseas during the Cheonghae Unit's mission. The Hanbit Unit and Dongmyeong Unit, deployed as UN peacekeeping forces, receive vaccines supplied by the UN and get vaccinated accordingly. However, the Cheonghae Unit is not a UN-affiliated unit and must receive vaccines supplied by its own country. In the Somali waters, many countries' vessels operate under the Combined Maritime Forces command, and their circumstances are similar.

Accordingly, the Ministry of National Defense considered vaccinating the ARC Unit (stationed in the United Arab Emirates) and the Cheonghae Unit overseas, prioritizing the ARC Unit, which was scheduled to return in November, over the Cheonghae Unit, scheduled to return in August. Discussions were held with relevant agencies and the ARC Unit about receiving vaccines first from the host country and later supplying an equivalent amount of Korean vaccines. However, circumstances were unfavorable. At that time, Korea had not completed vaccinations for the elderly, so priority was given to vaccinating vulnerable elderly and medical personnel domestically rather than young personnel overseas who were completely isolated and strictly quarantined. Especially for the Cheonghae Unit, which was completely isolated at sea and considered at low risk of infection, vaccination was likely not considered a priority.

Third, there is the question of why symptomatic cases were not reported immediately but were delayed. At the end of June, the Munmu the Great docked at a port in the Gulf of Guinea, West Africa, to load fuel and supplies. Typically, after 2 to 3 weeks of maritime operations, ships dock for 2 to 3 days to load fuel and supplies, and crew members disembark to rest near the port. However, since last year, no disembarkation has occurred; crew members have remained on board while fuel and supplies were loaded. Fuel and supplies are transported from the dock to the ship via ladder-type rails, and crew members carry them to the ship's lower storage.

During this process, contact with civilian contractors supplying fuel and provisions is possible. According to officials at the time, to prevent contact with outsiders, a no-entry line was established 5 to 6 meters from the ship's entrance to control access. Additionally, anticipating virus contamination on supplies, crew members wearing protective suits sprayed disinfectant on the dock for primary disinfection, then performed secondary disinfection on board before moving supplies to storage. Several days later, a cook who had not boarded the ship but only transported food in the lower storage showed symptoms, which were initially perceived as common cold or flu symptoms occurring occasionally during ship duty.

Even the next day, when additional crew in the galley showed similar symptoms, COVID-19 was not suspected, and a military doctor prescribed treatment for a cold. When more crew members sharing the same living quarters as the cook showed cold symptoms 2 to 3 days later, suspicion grew, and rapid COVID-19 test kits were used, but all results were negative. Crew members had never disembarked since departure, had no contact with outsiders during fuel and supply loading, and thorough quarantine measures such as supply disinfection and mask-wearing were enforced, so COVID-19 infection was not anticipated at that time.

Later, when similar symptoms appeared in other compartments, the situation was taken seriously, reported to higher command, and PCR tests were requested. However, due to the ship's enclosed nature and internal air circulation, an unfortunate situation occurred where the infectious disease spread rapidly among most crew members. The above was compiled based on opinions received from military personnel. While it is understandable that COVID-19 infection was not initially recognized, there remains regret that even mild symptoms should have prompted suspicion of COVID-19 from the start and proactive measures.

Fourth, there is the question of whether delayed timely action led to a higher infection rate in the Cheonghae Unit compared to foreign vessels. Reported mass infection cases on foreign vessels include the US aircraft carrier USS Roosevelt, with about 900 infections among 4,800 crew members; the British aircraft carrier HMS Queen Elizabeth, with about 100 infections among 1,400 crew; and the French aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle, with about 550 infections among 1,500 crew.

Mass infection cases on other combat ships were much milder because they returned immediately or disembarked at nearby ports to end the outbreak before it worsened. However, aircraft carrier strike groups operate in open seas for extended periods, making large-scale infections inevitable. At that time, the Cheonghae Unit was sailing in the Gulf of Guinea off West Africa for operations, and when infections were recognized, there were no nearby ports with large docking facilities, so they had to remain at sea for extended periods, similar to foreign aircraft carrier infection cases.

The higher infection rate in our Cheonghae Unit compared to foreign aircraft carriers is presumed to be due to the onboard medical system. Aircraft carrier strike groups have hospital-level medical facilities and medical personnel onboard, operating dozens of inpatient rooms. This is incomparable to the Munmu the Great, which carries only minimal military doctors and medical staff.

Additionally, the ship's internal air circulation system differs. A 4,000-ton destroyer circulates air through a single passage for all compartments, making it vulnerable to infectious disease spread, unlike the 100,000-ton aircraft carrier's air circulation system.

Moreover, the increase in onboard personnel due to operational requirements likely contributed to the spread of infection. When the destroyer was deployed to the Cheonghae Unit, the basic crew was significantly augmented with personnel needed for open sea operations, leaving no spare space in compartments.

An article in a daily newspaper titled "Spitting Blood and Mucus, We Endured, the Nation Abandoned Us" included lengthy content such as "The situation inside the (Munmu the Great) where COVID-19 spread was hell and chaos. After experiencing this, I thought I could no longer serve as a soldier in Korea." It evokes images of a battlefield field hospital in utter chaos. The article was based on a single informant's report.

To verify the actual situation, I confirmed through multiple channels that the ship remained generally stable even after confirmed cases appeared, and asymptomatic crew members carried out their duties orderly. The military doctor at the time said that one person coughed heavily, causing minor bleeding in the bronchial mucosa, mixing a small amount of blood in saliva, which might have been described as "spitting blood and mucus." Another crew member testified that they heard about blood-tinged saliva but never saw it. Everyone expressed indignation that describing the ship's situation as "hell" was grossly exaggerated. However, this does not mean the article is false. The informant certainly felt that way. The problem lies in the "overgeneralization" of one person's perspective to evaluate the entire situation.

Some expressed that "the unit abandoned the ship and returned," which deeply wounds the pride of Cheonghae Unit members. Crew members value their ship more than their lives and never abandon it under any circumstances. Even when the policy to return by air was decided, asymptomatic or mildly symptomatic crew members expressed willingness to stay and return with the ship, but for the safety of replacement crew, they reluctantly decided to disembark.

The Munmu the Great unit completed its Cheonghae Unit mission. Completing the mission means the operation was successful. The unexpected COVID-19 infection during the mission was part of the battlefield friction that can occur during operations. Even after the COVID-19 confirmation, the unit carried out its duties orderly, overcoming battlefield friction. The Munmu the Great crew deserves to take pride in this.

Professional Go players carefully consider each move during a match. After the game ends and they review it, they can identify which moves were mistakes. Moves that caused defeat are only known after the game ends; if they had known during the game, they would never have played them. Could the Cheonghae Unit's mass infection incident be viewed similarly?

That said, this does not mean the Cheonghae Unit command, the Ministry of National Defense, or related departments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff bear no responsibility. Even with thorough quarantine, it should have been anticipated that once breached, infection would spread rapidly due to the confined ship environment, and countermeasures should have been prepared. However, blaming the military leadership for negligence or incompetence in this incident is inappropriate.

The military is a collective that performs missions composed of the nation's precious sons and daughters. These individuals did not join the military by their own choice but by the nation's call. Therefore, the military's efforts to care for the nation's sons and daughters can never be excessive.

This content was produced with the assistance of AI translation services.