[Lee Jong-gil's Autumn Return] Why Did the Military Open Fire on That Day in May?

Professor Noh Young-gi's 'Their 5·18'

Professor Noh Young-gi of Chosun University wrote 'Their 5.18,' which traces the Gwangju Democratization Movement of May 18 according to causal relationships. It is not a report centered on the main actors of the May 18 Democratization Movement. Instead, it reconstructs Gwangju 40 years ago from a military perspective. By analyzing and reviewing extensive military materials such as those from the Security Command, it criticizes various distortions and disparagements.

The still-raised theory of North Korean military infiltration also comes under scrutiny. The starting point is the so-called 'North Korean invasion theory' intelligence obtained by Kim Young-sun, the 2nd Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, from the Japanese Cabinet Intelligence Office on May 10, 1980. At that time, he reported the following to Jeon Du-hwan, acting director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

"North Korea anticipated that the Korean government would execute Kim Jae-kyu around mid-April 1980, and expected that protests and demonstrations would occur upon Kim Jae-kyu's execution, adjusting the critical timing for invasion accordingly. They initially expected the invasion to occur around mid-April, but as Kim Jae-kyu's execution was delayed, they postponed it. However, as student and worker unrest intensified in May 1980, they decided to carry out the invasion between May 15 and May 20, when the unrest in Korea was expected to peak."

The Army Headquarters Intelligence Staff judged this as merely raising the general possibility of a North Korean invasion. In the 'Analysis of the North Korean Invasion Theory,' it stated, "North Korean military movements are at a normal activity level with no unusual signs of war. The obtained intelligence is dubious and is evaluated as a general speculation on North Korea's invasion plans based on our domestic situation."

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The United States, which was closely monitoring North Korea's movements, also found no unusual signs and regarded the intelligence as baseless. Since the 'October 26 Incident,' the U.S. had repeatedly warned North Korea through presidential and ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command statements not to provoke and affirmed that the ROK-U.S. alliance was intact.

After receiving the assessments from the U.S. and the Army Headquarters Intelligence Staff, the Army Headquarters leadership evaluated the 'North Korean invasion theory' as lacking evidence. However, the issue continued to be raised at the Martial Law Command meetings. On May 12, Lieutenant General Hwang Young-si, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army and Deputy Commander of the Martial Law Command, expressed irritation at the suspicion that Japan's intelligence might have ulterior motives during the Martial Law Command General Staff meeting. He also indirectly criticized the Central Intelligence Agency's behavior of repeatedly reporting incorrect intelligence, even involving Japan.

However, the Central Intelligence Agency's attempt?more precisely, the new military regime's attempt, which assumed a plan for seizing power?did not stop. 'Their 5.18' describes it as follows:

"On May 12, an emergency interim cabinet meeting was convened, and Jeon Du-hwan, Security Commander and acting director of the Central Intelligence Agency, along with the head of the CIA department, reported the 'Analysis of the North Korean Invasion Theory.' As a result, it was stated that 'taking advantage of the recent domestic unrest, North Korea's provocations and infiltration are expected,' and an order was issued to all military and police nationwide to enter a state of emergency alert. On May 17 at 11:40 a.m., a nationwide major commanders meeting was held in the Ministry of National Defense's Conference Room 1. (…) Choi Sung-taek, Director of Intelligence at the Joint Chiefs of Staff and a member of the new military regime, announced that the possibility of a North Korean invasion was high and that the domestic protests were spreading, declaring it a crisis situation. Following this, Defense Minister Joo Young-bok declared the meeting open with the words, 'I present this proposal here with the intention that some measures must be taken, to submit it to the cabinet meeting and obtain the president's approval for implementation.' His tone was not to induce discussion but to suggest a conclusion had already been reached."

Army Base Commander Ahn Jong-hoon opposed military intervention, stating that if military mobilization were to occur, it should follow public opinion and that the military should intervene only at the last moment. However, his remarks were quickly drowned out by opposition from other military commanders who were the backbone of the new military regime. When the Defense Minister asked if there were any objections, he nodded in resignation.

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In January 1995, Ahn Jong-hoon testified to the prosecution about the atmosphere of that meeting. Regarding Choi Sung-taek, Director of Intelligence at the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who said, "Student protests are expanding and becoming more radical, and North Korea is concentrating troops at the armistice line, preparing to invade at any time," he said the following.

"When I opposed, I thought he spoke strongly to prevent other opposing remarks and to push the atmosphere toward supporting the nationwide expansion of martial law. If Jeon Du-hwan attached blank signatures of all major military commanders to the national situation countermeasure plan, I believe the new military regime deceived Prime Minister Shin Hyun-hwak to glorify their regime."

The nationwide major commanders meeting and the president's special statement claimed that society had become chaotic due to the threat of North Korean invasion and the protests by politicians, students, and workers who followed suit, arguing for the nationwide expansion of martial law.

'Their 5.18' categorically calls this a 'public deception.' As evidence, it cites North Korea's proposal in December 1979 for a unified North-South team for the 1980 Moscow Olympics. The government counter-proposed holding a North-South Prime Ministerial meeting at the North-South Coordination Committee on January 24, 1980. Consequently, ten working-level meetings were held from February 6 to August 20, 1980.

Both sides exchanged opinions even on May 6 and May 22, around the time of the May 18 Democratization Movement. While telling the public that martial law was being expanded nationwide due to the threat of North Korean invasion, they were conducting working-level contacts with North Korea, the very party behind and involved in that threat. The author strongly criticizes this.

"Before the nationwide major commanders meeting and the cabinet meeting were held, Jeon Du-hwan was already planning military mobilization, mentioning a 'decisive moment,' and preparations for troop deployment were underway even before the government's announcement. The new military regime, which seized military command through the December 12 military coup, was already preparing to seize power."

This content was produced with the assistance of AI translation services.