[Reporter’s Notebook] Who Is Responsible for the ‘End’ of Chaotic Fair Trade Investigations?

Abolishing Exclusive Complaint Rights and Restructuring Investigative Authority
The Essence of Fair Trade Investigations Is 'Seeing the Case Through to the End'
Administrative Investigations Alone Cannot Meet Criminal Trial Standards
Collab

"Administrative investigations by the Korea Fair Trade Commission are 'voluntary investigations' that require the consent of the parties involved. This presents a clear practical limitation—if companies deliberately conceal or destroy evidence, it becomes very difficult to collect it."

Although the interests of fair trade case attorneys, prosecutors, and former Fair Trade Commission officials may differ, they all agree on this point. When looking at the ongoing discussions in political circles and investigative agencies regarding the adjustment of investigative authority over fair trade, it is apparent that these debates are disconnected from what is actually happening on the ground. The focus is solely on 'who will initiate the investigation.' In reality, the core issue of 'who will see a criminal case through to the end and secure a conviction in court' has been pushed aside.

Fair trade crimes are fundamentally different from ordinary criminal cases. The Korea Fair Trade Commission determines illegal acts at the corporate level by analyzing market structures and restrictions on competition. In contrast, criminal trials require filling in the gaps by proving who took the lead and exactly how far up the chain of command reports and approvals went.

It is nearly impossible to fully establish these complex structures with only the initial investigations conducted by administrative bodies that lack judicial control training or by investigative agencies without advanced economic expertise. This is why 'supplementary investigations'—which are absolutely necessary—involve compulsory investigations, forensic analysis, and testimony analysis to reconstruct individual responsibility and decision-making chains. If this process is omitted, the prosecution’s case can easily be shaken during intense courtroom battles.

The bigger problem is that gaps in criminal investigations often lead to losses in administrative litigation. Unless criminal investigations thoroughly establish evidence of higher-level involvement and collusion, even penalty surcharges imposed by the Korea Fair Trade Commission are frequently overturned in court by major law firms acting as a shield for corporations. Prosecutors are currently sharing evidence obtained through compulsory investigations with the Fair Trade Commission to help uphold administrative dispositions and defend against lawsuits. If investigative authority is fragmented and this intricate cooperation breaks down, the result is a lack of evidence to prove crimes, effectively granting companies a pass. There are also concerns that growing discord between agencies will only enlarge the complex legal defense market.

Despite this, the current political debate remains oddly simplistic, focusing only on whether to abolish the exclusive right to file complaints or where to transfer investigative authority. This is not about protecting the authority of a particular investigative agency or the prosecution. Rather, it means at least maintaining a minimal system in which the Fair Trade Commission’s expert economic analysis and the investigative agencies’ meticulous supplementary investigations operate in tandem like interlocking gears.

If the agency that opens an investigation and the one responsible for proving the case in court operate separately, executives of companies that have committed crimes will easily find loopholes to escape. With too many captains at the helm but no one to steer the ship to port, the ship will sink. If the system is inadequate and the main perpetrators of market disruption are missed, innocent consumers and citizens will ultimately bear all the costs.

This content was produced with the assistance of AI translation services.