KHNP Spends 100 Billion Won Per Unit on Faulty Nuclear Power Plant Parts

An Endless Cycle of “Delivery, Patchwork, Replacement, Patchwork” for 13 Years
Doosan Handles Supply, Repair, and Verification Alone
Jo Incheol: “Local Residents' Anxiety Grows... Measures Needed to Prevent Recurrence”

Jo Incheol, member of the Democratic Party of Korea.

It has been confirmed that repeated defects and welding issues have occurred over the past decade in the reactor heads, a core component of the Hanbit Nuclear Power Plant, raising growing concerns about nuclear safety.

According to Jo Incheol, member of the Democratic Party of Korea (representing Gwangju Seo-gu Gap), the reactor head, which serves as the “lid” of the reactor, contains penetration nozzles that control nuclear fission. If defects occur, they can lead to serious accidents such as radioactive leaks or explosions, necessitating thorough management.

Continuous problems have arisen with components manufactured by Doosan Enerbility (formerly Doosan Heavy Industries & Construction), which has exclusively supplied reactor heads to Hanbit, Hanul, and other nuclear power plants. In 2012, cracks were discovered in the penetration nozzles of Hanbit Unit 3 due to the vulnerability of the existing material to corrosion, leading to replacement with a reinforced material in 2015. However, in 2020, welding defects were revealed in Hanbit Unit 5, and it was later uncovered that Doosan, the contractor, had welded with the wrong material and falsely reported it.

In July of this year, a 1mm hole was discovered just before operation in the newly manufactured and replaced reactor head of Hanbit Unit 5, causing a coolant leak. This defect occurred in the new product, which had been replaced at a cost of over 100 billion won, and was found to be a flaw in the base material of the penetration nozzle itself, not in the weld. This has heightened anxiety among local residents. In particular, this stands in stark contrast to the reactor heads of Hanbit Units 1 and 2, supplied by Westinghouse in the United States in the 1980s, which have been used for 40 years without any issues.

Jo Incheol stated, “The localization of technology itself is a positive trend, but a structure that relies on a single company needs to be reviewed from a long-term perspective,” and added, “We must establish measures to diversify the supply chain.”

He also emphasized the need to “enhance the transparency and reliability of the verification process through a safety assessment system centered on a third-party institution,” pointing out that the current structure allows the same company to handle supply, repair, and verification.

Jo further added, “Since defect cases have been repeated over a period of 10 years, rigorous inspections and institutional improvements are necessary to prevent recurrence.”

This content was produced with the assistance of AI translation services.