[The Unfinished War, 6 Months of COVID-19] January Outbreak, Shincheonji, Masks... The Decisive Moments

There Were Still Heroes
COVID-19, The Critical Moment
Unknown Infectious Disease Arrives in Wuhan
World's First 6-Hour Testing Introduced
Super-Spreader from Shincheonji Confirmed
Patient Surge and Mask Shortage Erupt
Successful Patient Distribution to Living Treatment Centers
School Reopening Amid Normalized Social Distancing

On the morning of the 20th, medical staff are preparing diagnostic tests at the COVID-19 screening clinic set up at the Seo-gu Public Health Center in Gwangju.

[Asia Economy reporters Choi Dae-yeol and Cho Hyun-ui] On January 20, just days before the Lunar New Year holiday, Jung Eun-kyung, Director of the Korea Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (KCDC), held an unscheduled briefing. At that time, it was announced that a patient with an unknown cause of pneumonia, which was spreading in Wuhan, Hubei Province, China, had been confirmed for the first time in South Korea. This marked the beginning of the novel coronavirus infection (COVID-19) crisis. Six months after Director Jung’s first briefing, our lives have undergone such a great transformation that returning to pre-COVID times seems impossible. We review the decisive moments of the six-month COVID-19 situation in South Korea.

January 31: World’s First Introduction of 6-Hour Testing Method

In the early stages of the crisis, it took about two days to determine if someone was infected with COVID-19. This was because the virus information released by the Chinese government and previously used coronavirus testing methods required amplification processes and manual comparison of the virus’s genetic information. Meanwhile, the risk of transmission was high. The introduction of the 6-hour testing method, the world’s first, was a crucial turning point in this regard. It drastically reduced the time needed to confirm infection status. This diagnostic test, called real-time RT-PCR, remains the only method officially recognized by the South Korean government to determine infection. Based on the virus’s genetic information and experimental methods suggested by the World Health Organization (WHO), South Korean health authorities and diagnostic reagent manufacturers devised an appropriate testing method and were able to operate the diagnostic system early on.

On February 27th, a health official is posting an administrative order notifying the closure of the facility on the entrance door of the Shincheonji Bedro Jiseongjeon (Gwangju Church) in Buk-gu, Gwangju.

February 18: Identification of 'Super-Spreader' Shincheonji Patient

Until mid-February, about a month after the first patient was confirmed, new confirmed cases were appearing at a rate of about one per day. However, on February 18, the 31st patient, the first case in the Yeongnam region, was confirmed, revealing a completely different pattern. This patient, a member of the Shincheonji Church of Jesus, was not only the first patient found in Daegu and Gyeongbuk but had already spread widely in the community weeks earlier. Unaware of the infection, the patient actively participated in church services and community activities. The nature of Shincheonji activities, which involve sitting close together in confined spaces for extended worship, contributed to the rapid increase in infections. The health authorities referred to this as a 'super-spreader event.' To date, a total of 5,213 confirmed cases have been linked to Shincheonji, accounting for 37.9% of the country’s cumulative cases. Lee Man-hee, the founder of the church, was recently investigated by prosecutors on charges of obstructing quarantine efforts.

February 26: Mask Shortage Crisis

As confirmed cases increased, a mask shortage crisis erupted. Long lines formed at supermarkets and pharmacies, and it was difficult to obtain masks online even by paying extra. In response to public outcry, the government shifted masks and other quarantine supplies to a public supply system in late February. Manufacturers reported daily production volumes, and exports were restricted. Consumers were allowed to purchase only two masks each, based on their birth year. The daily mask supply, which was around 3 to 4 million in early March, increased to nearly 10 million after about two months. The public mask system returned to a market supply system on the 12th.

In early March, citizens lined up in front of a pharmacy near Jongno 5-ga, Seoul, to purchase masks.

March 2: Introduction of Residential Treatment Centers

In late February, as patients surged mainly from Shincheonji, hospital beds in Daegu and Gyeongbuk became insufficient. Hundreds of patients were confirmed daily, and some died waiting at home after being diagnosed due to lack of hospital beds. Experienced medical staff, considering that mild cases required little treatment, recommended isolating and treating patients in general facilities rather than highly specialized negative pressure isolation rooms. In early March, the first residential treatment center was established at the Central Education and Training Institute in Daegu.

May 6: Social Distancing Becomes Part of Daily Life

Companies implemented remote work, and schools did not reopen for in-person classes. Social distancing, a fundamental and effective preventive measure that has been used in Western countries since the early 20th century, was adopted to curb the spread of infection. However, it has the downside of disrupting normal social functions. Against this backdrop, the government introduced 'everyday life distancing,' also known as the daily quarantine system. Aiming to harmonize daily life with quarantine measures, health authorities transitioned from social distancing, which had been in place for about a month and a half, to everyday life distancing. In multi-use facilities, people wear masks and maintain distance, but if infections spread beyond a certain scale, stricter distancing measures are reinstated. Since the transition to everyday life distancing in early May, except for some regions experiencing cluster infections, the country has maintained level 1 everyday life distancing nationwide.

Jung Eun-kyung, head of the Central Disease Control Headquarters (Director of the Korea Disease Control and Prevention Agency), is presiding over the Central Disease Control Headquarters full meeting on the afternoon of the 16th at the Situation Assessment Room of the Korea Disease Control and Prevention Agency in Cheongju, Chungbuk, discussing the domestic occurrence status of COVID-19 and confirmed patient-related matters.

June 3: Strengthening the Disease Control Tower

The central disease control tower, the Central Disaster and Safety Countermeasures Headquarters, is led by Jung Eun-kyung, Director of the KCDC. Public support for her has grown as her past actions, including disciplinary measures during the MERS outbreak, became known. After MERS, the KCDC was elevated to vice-ministerial status, and with COVID-19, plans to establish it as a separate agency were formalized. This was a pledge from both ruling and opposition parties during the April general election, and the government officially proposed an amendment to the Government Organization Act early last month. Director Jung is the leading candidate to become the first head of the new agency.

This content was produced with the assistance of AI translation services.