34.5% Increase in Administrative Law Corruption-Inducing Factors in 2019... "Expansion of Corruption Impact Assessment"

335 Cases of Corruption-Inducing Factors Found in Central Administrative Agencies' New and Revised Laws... 34.5% Increase from Previous Year
"Expanded Corruption Impact Assessment on 'Everyday Laws' Such as Sale Price Review and Employment Support Services"

[Asia Economy Reporter Moon Chaeseok] Last year, 335 corruption-inducing factors were found in the enactment and revision of laws by central administrative agencies, showing a 34.5% increase compared to the previous year.

On the 18th, the Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission (ACRC) announced that after conducting corruption impact assessments on 1,644 related laws, corruption-inducing factors surged compared to 249 cases in 2018. The ACRC recommended improvements to 113 laws and the agencies responsible for 335 corruption-inducing factors.

Last year, the evaluation was strengthened to include factors that could undermine public trust and fairness, resulting in an increase in improvement recommendations compared to 2018.

The corruption impact assessment is a government legislative procedure conducted by the ACRC since 2006. It is a mandatory process when enacting or revising laws. From the drafting stage, corruption-inducing factors are systematically analyzed and evaluated, and agencies are advised to make improvements in advance as a corruption control mechanism.

The main areas for improvement recommended by the ACRC last year were ▲ concretization and objectification of discretionary regulations (101 cases, 30.1%) ▲ establishment of measures to prevent conflicts of interest in official duties (67 cases, 20%) ▲ proper adjustment of sanction regulations (54 cases, 16.1%), among others.

One notable case involved the interpretation of the Enforcement Decree of the Housing Act, where retired executives of construction companies were appointed as members of the price review committee, posing a risk that construction companies could influence the calculation of sale prices.

The reasons for non-disclosure of the price review committee meetings were vaguely defined, and the committee had broad authority to decide on disclosure or non-disclosure, effectively allowing the meetings to be operated in private.

As a result, the law was revised to fundamentally prevent retired construction company executives from being appointed as review committee members, blocking the possibility of construction companies influencing the sale price calculation.

For the price review committee meetings, disclosure was established as the principle, with only matters that could infringe on fairness, such as personal information, to be operated as non-disclosure items.

In the Act on Promotion of Employment and Support for Livelihood Stability of Job Seekers, it was unclear whether all application requirements must be met to apply for employment services or if partial fulfillment was sufficient, raising concerns that administrative agencies might arbitrarily judge eligibility.

While the law allowed administrative agencies to separately set age and income requirements considering employment conditions, there was no provision for disclosure of these separately set qualifications, resulting in a lack of transparency in the employment service application process.

Therefore, the law was amended to clearly specify the qualification requirements necessary for applying for employment services. Additionally, separately set qualifications were to be disclosed to prospective applicants to enhance transparency.

In the Enforcement Rules of the Construction Machinery Management Act, when introducing the inspection agency evaluation committee system for tower crane inspection agencies, there were no regulations on the term and reappointment limits for private evaluation committee members, allowing unlimited reappointments.

This posed a risk of corruption such as illegal lobbying targeting specific committee members.

Despite the possibility that evaluation committee members with conflicts of interest with inspection agencies could be appointed, there were no restrictions.

Consequently, regulations limiting the term and reappointment of private evaluation committee members were established to prevent long-term reappointment of specific members. Criteria for disqualification, avoidance, and recusal were set to prevent appointment of members with special interests with inspection agents.

Im Yoonju, Director of the Anti-Corruption Bureau at the ACRC, stated, "Going forward, we will actively promote corruption impact assessments not only for laws but also for internal regulations of public enterprises and quasi-governmental institutions that can directly or indirectly affect the public."

This content was produced with the assistance of AI translation services.