Two Concrete Support Measures for Ukraine
Defense Weapons Over Offensive Weapons, Dispatch Over Deployment
Measures Considering Possibility of Participation or Escalation
Following the deployment of North Korean troops to Russia, the government is concretizing support measures for Ukraine as their participation in the conflict becomes more certain. Conscious of escalation and international relations, the government appears to be leaning towards indirect support through defensive weapons rather than offensive ones, and personnel dispatch rather than troop deployment.
On the 30th (local time), Defense Minister Kim Yong-hyun, during a joint press conference with U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin at the U.S. Department of Defense near Washington DC after the South Korea-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting (SCM), emphasized that sending observers or battlefield analysis teams to Ukraine is "the military's natural duty" and stated, "Failing to do so would be neglect of duty," in response to related questions.
If North Korean soldiers surrender or are captured as prisoners of war, they could also be of use to us. According to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, North Korean soldiers classified as "prisoners of war" should, in principle, be repatriated to North Korea after the war ends. However, if a North Korean soldier wishes to go to South Korea, they can be recognized as refugees rather than prisoners. Prisoners can be persuaded and utilized in psychological warfare against North Korea.
However, the government has drawn a line at troop deployment. According to Article 60, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution, troop deployment requires the approval of the National Assembly. Opposition party backlash is expected.
Weapon support is expected to prioritize defensive weapons. Although President Yoon Suk-yeol mentioned "effective, phased response measures according to battlefield conditions" regarding North Korean troop deployment to Russia, immediate decisions are difficult as it is expected to significantly impact diplomacy on the Korean Peninsula.
Nonetheless, predictions suggest a scenario progressing from "diplomatic measures → defensive weapon support → lethal weapon support." Defensive weapons under consideration include Cheongung I, capable of intercepting fighter jets; Cheongung II, capable of intercepting ballistic missiles; and jamming drones and jamming-resistant drones, which Ukraine has requested support for from South Korea. Although these are defensive interceptor missiles, they can also be converted for offensive use.
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The government denies reports of indirect support of 155mm artillery shells mentioned by some. A presidential office official stated, "It is incorrect that we are directly supplying 155mm artillery shells to Ukraine," and emphasized, "Even if weapon support is discussed, it is common sense to first discuss defensive weapon support."
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