Constitutional Court Dismisses Referral for Unconstitutionality Challenging Supreme Court's Legal Interpretation

Interpretation of Article 2, Paragraph 1 of the State Compensation Act
Supreme Court Presents Heightened Requirements for Establishing Judicial Misconduct
Constitutional Court Judges "Beyond Scope of Norm Control" Decision

The constitutional review petition challenging the constitutionality of a legal provision, which was submitted on the grounds that the provision is unconstitutional when interpreted as the Supreme Court does, was dismissed by the Constitutional Court.

The reason is that the Supreme Court's legal interpretation merely presents the standard for interpreting the law in specific individual cases and cannot be regarded as a claim challenging the unconstitutionality of the law itself.

Constitutional Court of Korea, Jaedong, Jongno-gu, Seoul.

According to the legal community on the 7th, the Constitutional Court recently dismissed the constitutional review petition regarding Article 2, Paragraph 1, main text of the State Compensation Act, which was referred by Chief Judge Seo Young-hyo of Civil Division 211 at the Seoul Central District Court, with a vote of 5 (dismissal) to 4 (rejection).

Dismissal is a procedure that concludes the case without substantive examination when the requirements for constitutional review are not met.

Attorney Jeon Sang-hwa, who applied for the constitutional review petition at the court, filed a state compensation claim, alleging damages caused by a first-instance court's erroneous application of the law in a lawsuit he previously handled. During the first trial, he requested the court to refer the constitutional review petition regarding Article 2, Paragraph 1, main text of the State Compensation Act.

Attorney Jeon argued in his petition that "the Supreme Court's inclusion of aggravated requirements, unlike other public officials, when determining the state's liability for damages due to intentional or negligent illegal acts related to judges' judicial duties violates the principle of equality."

Article 2, Paragraph 1 of the State Compensation Act stipulates that when a public official or a person entrusted with public duties causes damage to others by intentionally or negligently violating laws during the execution of their duties, the state or local government shall compensate for the damage.

However, in cases concerning state compensation liability related to judges' judicial acts, the Supreme Court has repeatedly presented the standard for determining whether the requirement of "intentionally or negligently violating laws" under the State Compensation Act is met, by assessing whether "the judge acted with an illegal or improper purpose, or significantly violated the standards required by law in performing their duties, or whether there are special circumstances indicating that the judge exercised the authority granted to them in a manner clearly contrary to its purpose."

Attorney Jeon claimed that interpreting the State Compensation Act as requiring aggravated conditions only for judges constitutes discriminatory treatment against other public officials, violating the constitutional principle of equality, and that such interpretation is possible because the legal provision is ambiguous. He thus applied for a constitutional review petition at the court.

The court that received Attorney Jeon's petition also found such issues in the provision and referred the constitutional review to the Constitutional Court.

In its referral, the court stated, "The Supreme Court consistently interprets that, unlike the execution of duties by general public officials, only for judges' judicial acts does the establishment of state compensation liability require aggravated conditions such as 'illegal or improper purpose' or 'significant violation of standards,' thereby excessively restricting the constitutional right of citizens to claim state compensation," and added, "Such legal interpretation grants a kind of privilege only to judges' judicial acts compared to general public officials, thus violating the principle of equality."

At the Constitutional Court, the substantive examination on whether Article 2, Paragraph 1, main text of the State Compensation Act is unconstitutional?specifically, whether the provision violates the principles of equality or clarity?did not proceed. The majority of five out of nine constitutional justices judged that the petition did not meet the requirements for constitutional review because it did not challenge the unconstitutionality of the law itself.

The five justices who issued the dismissal opinion defined the subject of review as "whether including aggravated requirements such as 'illegal or improper purpose' or 'significant violation of standards' in the phrase 'intentionally or negligently violating laws' in Article 2, Paragraph 1, main text of the State Compensation Act, in the case of judges' judicial acts, violates the Constitution."

They stated, "The referring court claims that the Supreme Court, through interpretation, created aggravated requirements such as 'illegal or improper purpose' or 'significant violation of standards'?which are not stipulated in the legal provision?for state compensation liability arising from judges' judicial acts, thereby concretizing the establishment requirements for such liability. However, the legal provision requires 'intentionally or negligently violating laws' as the establishment requirement for state compensation liability for all public officials, including judges, and does not treat judges' judicial acts differently from other public officials' duties."

They continued, "The Supreme Court, in specific cases concerning state compensation liability arising from public officials' acts, considers the content, form, and particularity of the acts to present the criteria for determining whether the establishment requirements under the legal provision are met," and added, "It presents specific criteria in each case, such as those involving state compensation liability due to judicial errors by judges."

Attorney Jeon and the court that referred the constitutional review argue that the provision is unconstitutional if the Supreme Court's consistent interpretation is followed, but the Supreme Court's rulings do not imply that the establishment requirements of the provision have been aggravated.

Ultimately, the majority of justices concluded, "The content disputed by the referring court is merely that the Supreme Court presented criteria for determining the establishment of state compensation liability for judges' judicial acts in specific cases, not that new or aggravated establishment requirements were created. Therefore, the dispute cannot be regarded as a claim challenging the norm itself, and this constitutional review petition is inconsistent with the current norm control system and cannot be accepted."

This case relates to the Constitutional Court's past decisions on 'limited unconstitutionality' rulings regarding laws, which was one of the forms of constitutional rulings.

A 'limited unconstitutionality' ruling refers to a decision stating that a legal provision is unconstitutional only insofar as it is interpreted in a certain way. The Constitutional Court issued many such rulings in its early years, reasoning that since it has the authority to declare laws unconstitutional in whole, it can also recognize partial quantitative or qualitative unconstitutionality in specific applications.

However, the Supreme Court did not accept such limited unconstitutionality rulings as a form of constitutional ruling, leading to severe conflicts between the two institutions. The Supreme Court rejected the Constitutional Court's limited unconstitutionality rulings on the grounds that the Supreme Court is the final authority on legal interpretation and that the Constitutional Court cannot interfere with the Supreme Court's interpretation of laws. Consequently, the Constitutional Court ceased issuing such limited unconstitutionality rulings at some point.

Therefore, the Constitutional Court's dismissal opinion in this case can be interpreted as meaning that the referring court's petition cannot be seen as challenging the unconstitutionality of the law itself, but rather as seeking a limited unconstitutionality ruling by questioning the Supreme Court's legal interpretation, which is beyond the Constitutional Court's norm control authority.

On the other hand, four constitutional justices dissented, stating that while the constitutional review petition is proper, the provision does not violate the Constitution.

Justices Lee Seon-ae, Lee Eun-ae, and Lee Jong-seok, among others, held that the subject of review in this case is the phrase "intentionally or negligently violating laws" in Article 2, Paragraph 1, main text of the State Compensation Act, and thus the court's constitutional review petition is proper and substantive judgment should be made.

The three justices stated, "Although the referring court requested a limited unconstitutionality ruling, the overall content indicates that the petition challenges the unconstitutionality of the legal provision itself, arguing that the phrase 'intentionally or negligently violating laws' in Article 2, Paragraph 1, main text of the State Compensation Act violates the principles of clarity and equality."

However, they judged, "It is difficult to find that the provision is excessively vague, allowing arbitrary interpretation by law enforcement agencies or undermining the predictability for subjects, so the provision does not violate the principle of clarity."

They also concluded, "The provision requires all public officials, including judges, to intentionally or negligently violate laws as the establishment requirement for state compensation liability, so the legislature essentially treats the same matters equally, and no discriminatory treatment exists. Therefore, the provision does not violate the principle of equality."

Finally, Justice Moon Hyung-bae stated, "Contrary to the court's opinion, I believe the subject of review should be the part concerning 'judges' judicial acts' in Article 2, Paragraph 1, main text of the State Compensation Act, and that this constitutional review petition is a proper limited unconstitutionality claim requiring substantive judgment." He judged the petition as proper but found that the provision does not violate the principle of equality.

Meanwhile, Justice Moon elaborated on his stance regarding limited unconstitutionality claims in this decision.

He stated, "The Constitutional Court has traditionally regarded limited unconstitutionality claims as generally improper, except in three cases: ① when the claim can be seen as challenging the vagueness of the legal provision itself; ② when a certain interpretation of the provision has been formed and accumulated over a considerable period, and the concretized provision through judicial interpretation is unconstitutional; and ③ when the claim can be regarded as challenging the unconstitutionality of the legal provision itself, even if the first two cases do not apply."

He continued, "Subsequently, the Constitutional Court changed its precedent on the propriety of limited unconstitutionality claims, deciding that such claims are generally proper when the referring court or constitutional petitioners argue the unconstitutionality of specific interpretations or applications of the legal provision in concrete norm control procedures. Accordingly, limited unconstitutionality claims that point out and seek to eliminate unconstitutionality in certain normative areas extracted from social relations included in the legal provision?as described in the second type of limited unconstitutionality claims in the previous precedent?are proper."

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