North Korea Drone Response Situation Communication, Power Operation, and Training 'Overall Inadequate'

Wired Transmission Instead of 'Gosoksanghwang Jeonpa Chegye'

[Asia Economy Reporter Oh Su-yeon] It has been revealed that the situation transmission, power operation, and training were inadequate during the North Korean drone airspace intrusion incident that occurred on the 26th of last month.

According to the National Assembly Defense Committee and military authorities, on the 25th, the Joint Chiefs of Staff Readiness Inspection Office explained the "Inspection Results Related to North Korean Small Drone Provocation Response" to the Defense Committee one day before the full meeting of the Defense Committee.

Photo of North Korean drone flight path data submitted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the National Assembly. [Photo provided by the National Defense Committee of the National Assembly] [Image source=Yonhap News]

According to the report, the drone response situation transmission system did not function properly during the operation. The air defense unit under the 1st Corps recognized the North Korean drone's flight path around 10:19 a.m. and identified it as a drone around 10:25 a.m. However, since the situation transmission system did not operate, the Army Capital Defense Command recognized the drone around 10:50 a.m. During this process, the situation was transmitted via wired telephone.

The "High-Speed Situation Transmission System," which is primarily used for operational transmission, was reportedly not utilized.

Additionally, it was pointed out that the threat perception of North Korean small drones was insufficient compared to nuclear weapons and missiles, and that the current drone operation system "Durumi" is not effective in responding to small drones.

Considering the size and speed of North Korea's small drones, surveillance and strike assets must be deployed simultaneously. However, it is evaluated that such a response is limited under the current Durumi system.

The cause of the inadequate response was attributed to the lack of "substantial air defense training" under the control of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff also mentioned practical difficulties. Thousands of flight paths of civilian aircraft, birds, drones, etc., are detected by radar daily, which poses realistic limitations on response. With the currently possessed equipment, timely detection is difficult, and striking with short-range air defense weapons is also not easy.

Based on these results, the military proposed alternatives such as ▲establishing an operational system suitable for small drones ▲conducting practical joint air defense training on a quarterly basis ▲adjusting and deploying response forces.

It is known that the Joint Chiefs of Staff's report did not mention specific disciplinary targets, procedures, or accountability plans.

The National Assembly Defense Committee will hold a full meeting on the 26th to receive a report on the North Korean small drone airspace intrusion incident.

This content was produced with the assistance of AI translation services.