[Opinion] Survival Strategy for North Korean Nuclear Threat

[Asia Economy] There was no provocation from North Korea on the 110th anniversary of Kim Il-sung's birthday (the 15th), which had been a cause for concern.

However, on the following day, the 16th, a new tactical guided missile was launched under the observation of Kim Jong-un, General Secretary of the Workers' Party. Additional provocations are anticipated around the upcoming May 25th Army Foundation Day and May 10th, the inauguration of the Yoon Suk-yeol administration.

Since North Korea broke its moratorium on nuclear tests and intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launches in January, provocations were expected. In particular, observations of restoration work at the Punggye-ri nuclear test site have raised concerns that preparations for a seventh nuclear test or experiments aimed at miniaturizing and lightening nuclear warheads may be underway. The international community, including the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), already recognizes North Korea as a de facto nuclear-armed state.

The Yoon Suk-yeol administration, inaugurated on May 10th, must devise strategies for the survival, prosperity, and prestige of the people and the nation. Here, survival refers to national security, prosperity to the national economy, and prestige to the pride held by the nation and its people.

If national security is threatened, neither prosperity nor national prestige can be maintained. Therefore, it is only natural that survival is more important than prosperity and prestige.

However, we have been intoxicated by the economic disparity between South and North Korea, ignoring the reality of the North Korean nuclear missile threat or neglecting survival strategies. The current reality of the North Korean nuclear threat is the result of disregarding survival strategies. In particular, the North Korean nuclear issue has sometimes been underestimated with the mistaken belief that it can be resolved through dialogue and negotiations, and by justifying the inevitability of North Korea's nuclear program, thereby inviting threats.

The core of survival strategy is self-reliance and alliance (cooperation). Self-reliance means having the capability to independently respond to the North Korean nuclear threat, while alliance is an agreement between countries that complements insufficient self-reliance.

First, the reality and seriousness of the North Korean nuclear threat must be confirmed as the starting point for self-reliance. North Korea argues that nuclear development is inevitable due to threats to its regime.

However, North Korea regards nuclear missiles as an absolute weapon to shift the power landscape on the Korean Peninsula in its favor and continues its nuclear race without pause. In other words, North Korea's nuclear strategy is to maximize counter-deterrence against the U.S. extended deterrence through the threat of "Can you exchange Washington for Seoul?" and ultimately use it as a treasured sword to achieve victory in the reunification war led by North Korea.

This nuclear race has instantly reversed the military balance between South and North Korea. After the fourth nuclear test on January 6, 2016, South Korea's military strength was evaluated at 100, while North Korea's was 221.2. Since then, North Korea's nuclear race has continued, widening the gap further.

Our survival strategy should shift from an "alliance-based self-reliance" to a "self-reliance-based alliance." In other words, the central axis of survival strategy should move from alliance to self-reliance, transitioning national security to a proactive and active response. To actively respond to North Korean nuclear missiles, it is necessary to establish a multi-layered (upper + lower) missile defense system and complete the three-axis system.

In particular, for upper-layer defense, the already deployed Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system must be operated normally, and additional deployments to our military should be made to reinforce the vulnerable defense network. Also, the North Korea nuclear preparedness working-level consultative body (e.g., the 2+2 extended deterrence consultative mechanism), an institutional device to strengthen the South Korea-U.S. alliance, should be activated to guarantee the credibility and certainty of extended deterrence.

By fostering a nuclear development alliance among South Korea, the United States, Japan, and Taiwan, it is necessary to encourage China to actively engage in resolving the North Korean nuclear issue. Expanding diplomatic horizons through value-based diplomacy that actively supports Ukraine and preparing a future joint front in case the North Korean nuclear threat materializes are also essential.

Cho Young-ki, Chairman of the Advanced Unification Research Association, Korea Peninsula Advancement Foundation

This content was produced with the assistance of AI translation services.