Although the 'Minister's Investigation Approval Authority' Was Removed... Concerns Persist Inside and Outside the Prosecution Over the Revised 'Organizational Restructuring Plan'

"Limiting Prosecutors' Investigation Rights by Presidential Decree Violates the Prosecution Service Act or Criminal Procedure Act"
"If Only the Criminal Division Chief at the 'End' Supports, Investigation Control Becomes Possible"
"Institutionalizing Prior Approval for the Chief Will Shrink Investigations of Public Crime Cases"

Minister of Justice Park Beom-gye is arriving at the Ministry of Justice in the Government Complex Gwacheon on the morning of the 24th. [Image source=Yonhap News]

[Asia Economy Reporter Seokjin Choi] “Investigations into crimes affecting the public livelihood will be greatly curtailed.”

“It’s essentially as if the Blue House or the Ministry of Justice can use personnel authority to allow any investigation they want, and prevent any investigation they don’t want.”

Voices of concern are growing both inside and outside the prosecution regarding the Ministry of Justice’s recently announced draft amendment to the “Regulations on the Organization of the Prosecutor’s Office.”

Although Minister of Justice Park Beom-gye removed the clause granting the minister approval authority over the initiation of investigations by frontline local prosecutors’ offices?which had been heavily criticized?only the “Malbu” criminal division can investigate, except for reported economic crime cases among the six major crimes, and even then, investigations require prior approval from the Prosecutor General.

According to the legal community on the 24th, the Ministry of Justice’s proposed organizational reform draft underwent a legislative notice period from the 18th to the 22nd and completed review by the Ministry of Government Legislation the day before. After passing the vice ministerial meeting on the same day, it will go through the Cabinet meeting on the 29th and take effect immediately upon promulgation. The Prosecutor Personnel Committee, which convened the day before amid upcoming mid-level prosecutor personnel appointments, also reviewed personnel plans based on this revised presidential decree.

Because personnel appointments are imminent, prosecutors are not publicly raising issues, but concerns about the problems and side effects of this organizational reform are being expressed both inside and outside the prosecution.

The biggest complaint among prosecutors is that this amendment restricts the prosecution’s investigative authority over the six major crimes that remain under direct prosecution even after the adjustment of investigative authority between the police and prosecution. Notably, neither the amended Prosecutors’ Office Act nor the amended Criminal Procedure Act, which took effect earlier this year, contains any provisions limiting prosecutors’ investigative authority over the six major crimes. Many point out that restricting prosecutors’ investigative authority through subordinate regulations concerning organizational structure may be legally problematic.

Regarding this, Minister Park responded during a National Assembly government questioning session on the 22nd, stating, “Even under the current organizational decree, the Criminal Division 1 of the Seoul Central District Prosecutors’ Office handles certain tasks, and the Anti-Corruption Investigation Division handles others, adjusting various investigative authorities through work assignments. Since the new organizational decree follows this format, I cannot agree with the claim that it violates the law.”

However, Prosecutor A dismissed Minister Park’s remarks as “nonsense.” A said, “Of course, Criminal Division 1 is assigned to handle defamation cases and Criminal Division 2 handles medical cases, but this only means they mainly handle those tasks; it does not mean other divisions cannot investigate defamation or medical cases.”

Another prosecutor, B, also said, “Work assignments are merely internal administrative conveniences. For example, if a bribery case involving a member of the National Assembly occurs at a district prosecutor’s office and the special investigation division is overloaded, but Criminal Division 1 has a sharp prosecutor who is good at investigations, they can investigate it anytime now.”

The provision requiring prior approval from the Prosecutor General to initiate investigations and limiting direct investigations to only the Malbu criminal division except for economic crimes has raised concerns that it could undermine the political neutrality of prosecution investigations.

Attorney C, a former chief prosecutor, expressed concern, saying, “Frankly, if each prosecutors’ office appoints only the chief prosecutor of the division that can investigate corruption or public official misconduct crimes as their ally, it creates a structure where cases can be controlled from the investigation initiation stage. Moreover, institutionalizing the Prosecutor General’s approval authority through explicit regulations could lead to serious problems if the Prosecutor General’s political neutrality cannot be trusted.”

There are also concerns that the system requiring the Prosecutor General’s prior approval for all investigations except reported economic crimes could weaken the response capability to crimes affecting the public livelihood.

Prosecutor D said, “To report the initiation of an investigation, details such as who is the investigation target and where to conduct searches must be disclosed in advance through written reports. In that sense, it is somewhat fortunate that prior reporting or approval to the minister was removed in the amendment, but the problem remains that frontline offices now have to make unnecessary reports.”

D added, “For example, in cases of corruption involving local public officials that the Prosecutor General might not need to know or pay attention to, victims would want a swift investigation, but delays in the Prosecutor General’s approval could postpone the start of the investigation. Furthermore, since approval from the chief prosecutor is required before reporting to the Prosecutor General, prosecutors may become reluctant to initiate investigations.”

There are also voices of dissatisfaction that the system is changing only in a way that effectively reduces the prosecution’s investigative authority under the banner of prosecution reform.

Prosecutor E expressed dissatisfaction, saying, “Since January, the amended Prosecutors’ Office Act has significantly reduced the prosecution’s investigative targets, and now further limiting the divisions that can investigate makes me feel like the prosecution is being told not to investigate at all.”

E continued, “According to the organizational reform plan amended earlier this year, the minister gained approval authority over investigations, and if the Prosecutor General’s prior approval system is added now, prosecution investigations will inevitably be curtailed.”

Former Minister of Justice Chu Mi-ae established Article 21 of the Regulations on the Organization of the Prosecutor’s Office earlier this year, which restricts the establishment of temporary organizations for investigations. Regardless of name or form, establishing a temporary organization for investigations requires approval from the Minister of Justice.

When relatively small local prosecutors’ offices investigate major socially significant cases, such as the “Kim Hak-eui departure-related investigation team” of the Suwon District Prosecutors’ Office, they usually form separate investigation teams due to manpower needs. Since ministerial approval is a prerequisite, ministerial approval authority over major case investigations effectively already exists.

This content was produced with the assistance of AI translation services.