[Yang Nak-gyu's Defence Club] Why Are There Differences Between Korea and the US on Wartime Operational Control Transfer?

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[Asia Economy Yang Nak-gyu, Military Specialist Reporter] South Korea and the United States are showing differences of opinion regarding wartime operational control (OPCON). The South Korean government proposes redefining the evaluation method for OPCON transfer, while the U.S. side insists on maintaining the existing principles, leading to a direct clash of views.

On the 14th (local time), the U.S. stated at the 52nd Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) that "while pledging to provide complementary capabilities, it is important to first understand South Korea's acquisition plans when deciding on specific required capabilities (lists) and deployment periods." Additionally, the joint statement released by South Korea and the U.S. confirmed that "the conditions specified in the OPCON transfer plan, based on mutually agreed terms, must be sufficiently met before OPCON is transferred to the future Combined Forces Command."

Although South Korea and the U.S. agreed to verify the Full Operational Capability (FOC), the second phase of the three-stage verification process this year, the scale of training was reduced due to the spread of the novel coronavirus (COVID-19), preventing proper exercises. The joint statement implies that evaluation procedures necessary for OPCON transfer, including FOC verification, will continue, but specific details such as the timing of implementation were not included in the statement.

The South Korean government is reportedly expressing the opinion that the evaluation and verification methods for these conditions are comprehensive and ambiguous, and thus should be clearly redefined. The prevailing view is that if the existing agreed conditions are followed, transfer by 2022, within the Moon Jae-in administration's term, would be impossible. However, the U.S. side strongly demands adherence to the "Basic Plan for Transfer Based on 2015 Conditions" and the "First Revision of the OPCON Transfer Plan Based on 2018 Conditions," showing a difference of opinion.

Furthermore, Secretary Esper has demanded that the "2016 Crisis Management Memorandum of Understanding" be updated by the end of the year. This memorandum, which serves as the highest-level document defining combined crisis management guidelines, reportedly includes wording that limits the scope of combined crisis management to "contingencies on the Korean Peninsula." However, during last year's consultations, the U.S. proposed adding the phrase "contingencies involving the United States" in addition to "contingencies on the Korean Peninsula," aiming to expand the scope of crisis management to areas the U.S. assesses as security threats. Military experts point out that if the scope of combined crisis management is expanded to include "contingencies involving the United States," it would provide grounds for South Korean troops to be dispatched and cooperate in U.S. military operational areas such as the South China Sea.

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