[Analysis] US-China New Cold War Era and the Korean Peninsula Peace Process

In the era of the novel coronavirus infection (COVID-19), the security situation on the Korean Peninsula is far from ordinary. The strategic competition between the U.S. and China, intertwined with COVID-19, is leading the U.S. to openly pursue a 'new Cold War' framework. In an effort to overcome the COVID-19 crisis and secure support for the presidential election, the Trump administration's offensive blaming China for COVID-19 is intense. Additionally, sharp strategic confrontations involving diplomatic standoffs and military tensions are emerging over issues such as the South China Sea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. This situation inevitably amplifies the uncertainty of North Korea-U.S. negotiations. The future level of COVID-19 control by the Trump administration and the state of the U.S. economy will be decisive variables in the election. The future of North Korea-U.S. negotiations depends on these outcomes. The U.S. Democratic Party is expected to increase criticism on COVID-19, racial discrimination, the economic situation, and North Korea policy. The worst-case scenario would be North Korea conducting strategic weapons tests. Distrust toward North Korea in the U.S. could peak, and a shift to a hardline approach toward North Korea cannot be ruled out.

North Korea's strategic calculations are also far from ordinary. Since the collapse of the North Korea-U.S. working-level talks in Stockholm last October, changes have been observed in North Korea's approach to the U.S. Previously, North Korea had taken the position of not engaging in denuclearization talks before the withdrawal of hostile policies toward it. This represents a raised 'threshold' from the stance before Hanoi, where partial denuclearization would begin if some sanctions were partially lifted. At the end of last year, North Korea set a policy of 'continuing the development of new strategic weapons,' and at the expanded meeting of the Party Central Military Commission last May, it announced policies to strengthen 'nuclear war deterrence' and maintain a 'state of strategic forces in agitation.'

By publicly establishing the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' 'U.S. Negotiation Bureau' and maintaining the presence of First Vice Minister Choe Son-hui, the practical partner in U.S. negotiations, North Korea shows its intention to continue negotiations with the U.S. North Korean State Affairs Commission Chairman Kim Jong-un is currently maintaining an appropriate balance between the negotiation faction and the strategic weapons development faction, including the military. The calculation is to maintain a transitional balance between negotiations with the U.S. and strategic weapons development until the U.S. presidential election. During this period, disclosures of short-range new weapons and anti-air missiles development, as well as the development process of submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), may occur. In fact, there is no 'safety net' for the uncertainty of the security situation on the Korean Peninsula.

It is necessary to prepare for the uncertainty of the situation in the COVID-19 phase. A strategy is needed to boldly transform the Korean government's 'national capability,' demonstrated through K-quarantine, into a peace process led by South and North Korea. This is a strategy to shift from an approach to inter-Korean relations that relies on alliances or diplomatic relations to one led by South Korea and inter-Korean agreements. Considering geopolitical particularities, the structuring of the Cold War and division, and the new Cold War framework, the existing peace process relying solely on military-centered absolute security, demands for North Korea's denuclearization, and North Korea-U.S. negotiations inevitably has fundamental limitations.

A bold frame shift is needed to approach inter-Korean relations not as subordinate to North Korea-U.S. relations or denuclearization, but in terms of 'mutual security assurance' between South and North Korea. To this end, it is necessary to refine the concept of 'Korean Peninsula-type cooperative security.' The Korean Peninsula issue requires a comprehensive approach in terms of 'mutual security assurance,' and it is a concept that promotes the gradual arms control (disarmament) of nuclear and conventional weapons and cooperative items in non-military fields in a mutually reinforcing manner to cooperatively reduce threats.

Rather than prioritizing 'complete denuclearization,' a realistic approach is to gradually and substantially reduce overall threats, including nuclear threats, and create the conditions for a peace regime. This approach centers on the safety of the Korean Peninsula, the safety of coexistence between South and North Korea, and the safety of the national community. On the 70th anniversary of the Korean War, it is necessary to revive the concept of 'mutual security assurance' between South and North Korea and urge military talks. It is time to break away from a reductionist inter-Korean relations approach that diminishes our role by proposing only peripheral exchanges and cooperation while avoiding the essence. A systematic effort is needed to transform 'COVID leadership' into international support for the peace process.

Hong Min, Director of North Korea Research Division, Korea Institute for National Unification

This content was produced with the assistance of AI translation services.