BAI Finds "Structural Safety Deficiencies in Muan Airport Berms"...30 Vulnerabilities Identified at Airports and Airlines Nationwide

Audit Reveals Vulnerabilities in Aviation Safety
"14 Structures at 8 Airports Improperly Installed"
Widespread Issues Include Outdated Bird Activity Data, Lack of Safety Equipment, and Inadequate Pilot Qualification Management

The Board of Audit and Inspection (BAI) conducted a review of vulnerable areas in aviation safety following the Jeju Air passenger plane disaster at Muan Airport on December 29, 2024. The BAI determined that the problems at Muan Airport were linked to structural deficiencies across all aspects, including airport facility installation, aircraft maintenance, personnel management, and bird strike response. In particular, the concrete berm structure identified as a cause of the accident was installed without thorough review, with cost reduction as the priority.

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In its audit results on the "Management Status of Vulnerable Areas in Aviation Safety," released on March 10, the BAI revealed that it had identified a total of 30 violations, unfair practices, and institutional improvement needs involving the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport (MOLIT), Korea Airports Corporation (KAC), and the Busan Regional Office of Aviation. Disciplinary measures recommended included 3 cases of disciplinary action, 7 warnings, 18 notifications, and 2 exemplary cases.

The most critical issue highlighted was the problem with the localizer (LLZ) foundation structure, which was directly linked to the disaster. According to the BAI, unlike regulations, MOLIT and regional aviation offices had installed 14 localizers at 8 airports, including Muan, as protruding concrete berms or foundation structures that are difficult to break. At Muan Airport, the berm was 2.4 meters high, and at Jeju Airport, it reached 5.1 meters.

The problem was not limited to the design and construction stages; approval for these structures was repeatedly granted during operation and improvement processes. After transferring the facility to Korea Airports Corporation, MOLIT wrongly approved the facility's safety during airport operation certification and regular inspections for up to 22 years. Furthermore, during modernization projects from 2019 to 2024, Korea Airports Corporation reinforced, rather than improved, the vulnerabilities of seven localizers at five airports, including Muan. The BAI also confirmed that during the Muan Airport improvement project, those in charge of design and construction approved the cutting and reinforcement of damaged sections and additional reinforcement of exterior walls without reviewing vulnerabilities.

The BAI pointed out that follow-up actions after the accident were also inadequate. Although MOLIT announced in January this year, through a special safety inspection and the "Aviation Safety Innovation Plan" in April, that it would improve localizer vulnerabilities by year-end, one lightweight steel structure at Yeosu Airport was excluded from the improvement list without expert review. The plan to replace seven facilities at five airports, including Muan, with lightweight steel structures was also found by the BAI to fall short of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) vulnerability standards.

Runway end safety area management was also found lacking. MOLIT left the end safety areas at 16 runways across 9 airports either not extended to the localizer or even shortened them, and abolished the "easily frangible structure" manual, which should have been developed and operated in line with international standards, only three years after its introduction. Detailed standards for the Engineered Materials Arrestor System (EMAS), which minimizes damage during runway overruns, were only drafted after the Muan Airport accident.

Deficiencies in air traffic control and surveillance equipment were also revealed. The Busan Regional Office of Aviation accepted the substandard multilateration surveillance system (MLAT) at Muan and Uljin airports, completed in 2022, despite its inability to properly detect aircraft at the Muan Airport apron, approving completion after a poor inspection. As of June 2024, the BAI found that the Muan Airport MLAT failed to meet standards, with the positions of 16 out of 27 aircraft not matching their actual locations. The Busan Regional Office of Aviation also imposed only 75 million won in delay penalties on the contractor—5.5 billion won less than the proper amount.

The standards for equipping aircraft with safety devices lagged behind those overseas, and some have still not been incorporated into domestic regulations. The BAI found that four types of equipment were only reflected in domestic standards 4 to 13 years after being adopted in the United States. The latest ADS-B (DO-260B), required on all aircraft since 2020, has not yet been included in domestic standards, meaning 69 out of 422 Korean-registered aircraft have not been equipped. The BAI also pointed out that 136 aircraft are operating without cockpit voice recorder (CVR) alternate power sources, as retroactive application has not been implemented.

Fact-finding investigations into engine defects were also virtually nonexistent. Of the 59 aviation safety incidents involving CFM-56 engines—the most widely used by Korean airlines over the past five years—only two were investigated. The other 57 cases were not examined, and even cases where engines were replaced due to serious defects were left unaddressed. The BAI revealed that, with only two dedicated staff handling both safety supervision and fact-finding, 33 out of 82 cases reported in the past five years remain unresolved.

Management of pilots and air traffic controllers was also severely lacking. The BAI confirmed that, of 22 pilots whose aviation English proficiency certificates expired over the past three years, one falsified the validity period and flew international routes 110 times. Additionally, cross-checking with National Health Insurance Service data revealed that 62 pilots with records of treatment for severe depression or other mental illnesses concealed this information, passed medical examinations, and flew 12,097 times over three years; 35 air traffic controllers also failed to disclose mental health information and worked a total of 23,744 days. Pilot training was also inadequate. Among the main accident types over the past decade, four abnormal scenarios—belly landings, total engine failure, and bird strikes—were not properly included as required training subjects, with eight Korean airlines averaging only a 14.4% implementation rate over the past five years. None of the airlines conducted belly landing training even once.

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Bird strike response has also reemerged as a vulnerable area following the disaster. The BAI found that airport operators only included birds that were captured or dispersed within the airport, or those that actually struck aircraft, in their risk assessments—failing to account for potential hazards such as large flocks of migratory birds quickly passing through airspace near the airport. At Muan Airport, for example, Baikal teals, of which 35,000 were observed during the environmental impact assessment, were excluded from risk management because there were no records of capturing, dispersing, or colliding with them. Upon re-evaluation of data from the past four years, 27 species—including Baikal teal, greater white-fronted goose, and bean goose—were identified as having a high risk of collision.

The bird activity information provided to pilots was also found to be ineffective. Fourteen airports, excluding Jeju, failed to update bird activity information in the Aeronautical Information Publication (AIP) for between 3 and 10 years, and an inspection of ATIS operations over the past year revealed that Gwangju, Daegu, and Pohang airports did not transmit bird information even once. Four airports, including Incheon, repeated the same phrase, while Gimhae, Daegu, and Sacheon airports operated the service only formally from approach control centers with no direct view of the runway.

The BAI notified MOLIT to develop measures to secure safety at nine airports, including Muan, by extending the runway end safety area to the localizer, and recommended disciplinary action for three officials who mishandled the approval process for the Muan Airport localizer improvement project. Korea Airports Corporation was instructed to improve 14 localizer foundation structures at eight airports, as well as facilities at Yeosu and Gimpo airports that were excluded from improvement projects, making them easily frangible, and to take appropriate action against design, construction, and supervision companies in accordance with national contract law.

This content was produced with the assistance of AI translation services.