"North America Negotiations - Separation of Extended Deterrence... Visible Deterrence Capability Must Be Demonstrated"

Amid expectations of significant changes in the security landscape following the inauguration of the second Trump administration in the United States, an analysis has been raised that in order to further develop the South Korea-U.S. Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG), North Korea-U.S. negotiations and extended deterrence should be separated and the visibility of operational capability should be strengthened. According to the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA) on the 22nd, Lee Sang-gyu, head of the Nuclear Security Research Office, stated this in a report titled "The Necessity of Preparing NCG 2.0 in Response to the New U.S. Administration and Key Tasks," which was released the previous day.

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The NCG is a high-level standing consultative body established according to the "Washington Declaration" adopted at the 2023 South Korea-U.S. summit. Its goal is to strengthen extended deterrence against North Korea's nuclear threats. Extended deterrence refers to various means to prevent nuclear attacks on U.S. allies such as South Korea. Lee evaluated the NCG during the Joe Biden administration as having "prepared an important turning point by expanding cooperation centered on conventional forces to integrated nuclear and conventional operations (CNI)."

The issue is that the security landscape on the Korean Peninsula is shaking due to the inauguration of the second Trump administration. The Trump side had called for an increase in defense cost-sharing for U.S. forces stationed in South Korea and strengthening the autonomous defense capabilities of allies since his candidacy. However, considering the pragmatic attitude of the Trump administration and the nuclear stance of the U.S. Republican Party, Lee explained that this could be another opportunity for South Korea.

Therefore, he believed that under the Trump administration, the NCG should set a goal to expand the visible operational capability of extended deterrence. For example, deploying strategic assets during South Korea-U.S. CNI training exercises, regularly disclosing major achievements of extended deterrence, and concretizing integrated operations are representative measures.

This is also an important task in terms of managing the uncertainty of extended deterrence. Lee pointed out, "If North Korea overestimates the benefits of nuclear use, the deterrence of South Korea-U.S. extended deterrence may not function sufficiently, increasing the risk of provocation," and added, "Within South Korea, if extended deterrence cooperation does not lead to alliance assurance and public reassurance, uncertainty may deepen or calls for independent nuclear armament may arise."

He stated, "Although future North Korea-U.S. negotiations may temporarily ease tensions on the Korean Peninsula, if mismanaged, there is a concern that South Korea-U.S. extended deterrence cooperation and credibility could weaken," and added, "To prevent this, it is important to separate North Korea-U.S. negotiations from South Korea-U.S. extended deterrence cooperation and continuously demonstrate visible deterrence capability."

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