[Yang Nak-gyu's Defence Club] Did the North Imitate Naroho Launch Vehicle?

Newly Developed Stage 1 Propulsion Uses Petroleum Fuel
Naroho Jointly Developed with Russia... Possibility of Technology Transfer to Bukhan

North Korea appears to be developing a launch vehicle using the same method as Naroho (KSLV-1). The Naroho launch vehicle was jointly developed with Russia and successfully launched in January 2013. It is highly likely that North Korea also received technology transfer from Russia.

[Image source=Yonhap News]

On the 28th, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated, “At around 10:44 PM the previous day, a trajectory presumed to be a military reconnaissance satellite launch vehicle was detected heading southward over the West Sea from the area around Dongchang-ri, Pyonganbuk-do, North Korea,” and “This trajectory was detected as multiple fragments in North Korean waters at around 10:46 PM, two minutes later.”

North Korea also acknowledged this. The Korean Central News Agency reported that the initial investigation analysis pointed to a problem with the “reliability of the newly developed liquid oxygen + petroleum engine.” North Korea’s satellite launch vehicle is divided into stages 1, 2, and 3. The first attempt in May last year failed due to issues with the 2nd stage engine, and the second attempt in August failed due to problems with the 3rd stage engine. This time, the problem was with the 1st stage engine.

North Korea’s launch vehicle engine, the Baekdusan engine, is known to use red fuming nitric acid as the oxidizer and unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine (UDMH) as the fuel. However, the engine revealed this time uses liquid oxygen as the oxidizer and petroleum (presumed kerosene) as the fuel. This is the same method as South Korea’s successfully launched Naroho 1st stage and Nuriho stages 1 through 3. It involves a liquid engine that combusts liquid fuel combining kerosene and liquid oxygen to generate thrust. Liquid launch vehicles require engine technologies such as turbopumps, combustors, and gas generators, as well as precise liquid fuel combustion technology to accurately deliver satellites to the intended orbit.

There are also speculations that the launch was forced prematurely without sufficient verification of the new engine to coincide with the Korea-China-Japan summit. If North Korea received technology transfer from Russia in exchange for supplying weapons but still failed, it could lead to subtle changes in the relationship between North Korea and Russia. There were also suggestions that Russian technicians might have helped improve not only the launch vehicle engine but also the satellite body’s performance, but the launch failure eliminated the opportunity to verify this.

If our military can recover North Korean launch vehicle debris as they did last year, further analysis would be possible. However, since the launch vehicle disintegrated over North Korean waters early in the launch, the possibility of recovery is low. In May last year, North Korea launched a long-range ballistic missile carrying the Manriki-1 satellite from Dongchang-ri, Pyonganbuk-do. However, this launch vehicle failed to ignite the 2nd stage after the 1st stage separation and crashed into the sea about 200 km west of Eocheongdo, Gunsan, Jeonbuk. At that time, the military found floating debris presumed to be from the Cheollima-1 type about 1 hour and 30 minutes after the launch, and on June 15, they recovered the 2nd stage of the 3-stage Cheollima-1 rocket.

Through analysis of the debris, the military assessed that the resolution of the camera mounted on North Korea’s reconnaissance satellite was about 3 meters. During the second launch in August, the propulsion system and satellite were shattered into fragments due to an explosion, resulting in failure to recover debris.

This content was produced with the assistance of AI translation services.