Kim Jong-un Displays ICBM... Will He Even Proceed with a Nuclear Test? [Yang Nak-gyu's Defence Club]

Mobile Launch Vehicle Unveiled Highlighting Mobility
Possibility of Major Provocation Ahead of Next Year's US Presidential Election

Since North Korea declared the termination of the September 19 Inter-Korean Military Agreement, it has been raising the level of military tension on the Korean Peninsula. Following the launch of a military reconnaissance satellite and an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), analysts believe there is a high possibility that it will also launch submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) or new intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs).

[Image source=Yonhap News]

On the 19th, North Korea showcased its mobility by releasing photos of the test launch of the solid-fueled intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) Hwasong-18. According to photos released by the Korean Central News Agency, the transporter erector launcher (TEL) carrying the Hwasong-18 appeared to be emerging from a newly constructed, clean tunnel and moving onto a road.

The TEL stopped on a road adjacent to snow-covered fields, which was identified as being about 16 km southwest of the Kumsusan Sun Palace in central Pyongyang. The road connected to the tunnel was neatly paved with asphalt, but the area near the missile launch site showed patches of ice and uneven road conditions.

By revealing both the departure and arrival points of the mobile launcher, North Korea seems to be emphasizing the mobility of the new ICBM first unveiled in April this year. This was the third launch of the Hwasong-18; the second launch in July took place by the Taedong River. By changing locations and hiding inside tunnels before suddenly emerging to launch, North Korea appears to be demonstrating its ability to evade the South Korea-U.S. kill chain (preemptive strike before launch).

Compared to five months ago when the Hwasong-18 was last test-launched, there is a consensus that there is no significant difference in technical aspects such as maximum peak altitude and flight distance. Experts consider the Hwasong-18 launch as a ‘test launch’ rather than a ‘training launch’ given these factors. However, unlike the first and second launches in April and July where the missile launch tube cover detached and fell to the ground after launch, this time it remained fixed on the launcher.

Hwasong-18 Final Development Incomplete... Likely a Test Launch

▲North Korea may provoke ahead of U.S. presidential election next year= After observing the Hwasong-18 launch training, Chairman Kim said, "This was a clear demonstration that we are swiftly prepared for any action and choice when Washington makes a wrong decision against us." This implies that the Hwasong-18, which can reach the entire U.S. mainland, could be used for a nuclear strike in an emergency.

Especially with the U.S. presidential election scheduled for November next year, there is a possibility of escalating provocations. It is expected that former U.S. President Donald Trump, who is favorable to Kim Jong-un, will run for re-election, and North Korea may try to maximize its nuclear capabilities to gain an advantageous position in potential North Korea-U.S. negotiations if Trump is re-elected. North Korea may also attempt to prove atmospheric re-entry technology through a normal-angle test launch of the Hwasong-18. By demonstrating the capability to strike the entire U.S. mainland unexpectedly, it could try to draw Trump into nuclear arms reduction negotiations.

Senior Researcher Park Yong-han of the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA) stated in a presentation at the ‘KIDA North Korean Military Forum’ held on the 13th, "North Korea may provoke to interfere in the South Korean general election in April and the U.S. presidential election in November next year," adding, "Considering the pros and cons of Donald Trump’s election, North Korea may conduct additional nuclear tests."

Senior Research Fellow Kim Jin-ha of the Korea Institute for National Unification’s North Korea Research Division predicted in the ‘2024 Korean Peninsula Situation Outlook’ released that day that North Korea will continue to advance its nuclear and missile capabilities next year. He also expressed concern that North Korea might attempt military provocations aiming for the election of favorable candidates in the South Korean general election in April and to weaken the South Korean government.

[Image source=Yonhap News]

▲Provocation targeting the U.S. mainland= On the 18th, North Korean State Affairs Commission Chairman Kim Jong-un observed the launch training of the solid-fueled intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) Hwasong-18 and made an explicit nuclear attack threat against the U.S. mainland. With the U.S. presidential election scheduled for November next year, and Kim Jong-un instructing more aggressive actions to counter the U.S. and others, North Korea’s military demonstrations are expected to intensify. Analysts suggest that by raising military tension at the end of the year, Kim Jong-un aims to highlight the completion of key defense tasks as his ‘achievement’ and strengthen regime cohesion.

Accordingly, North Korea is expected to continue large-scale provocations next year. The next cards North Korea might play include SLBMs or IRBMs. Since the 8th Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea in January 2021, North Korea has been focused on completing the ‘five core tasks’ of its five-year defense development plan. It launched its first tactical nuclear attack submarine, the ‘Kim Gun-ok Hero Ship’ (No. 841), in September, and following the successful launch of a reconnaissance satellite, it claimed to have succeeded in testing a solid-fueled engine for a new IRBM in November.

Possibility of SLBM/IRBM Launch or 7th Nuclear Test

After launching the ICBM, North Korea might conduct a 7th nuclear test. The first nuclear test was conducted on October 9, 2006, three months after the launch of the Taepodong-2 missile. The second nuclear test on May 25, 2009, was carried out one month after the launch of the Unha-2 long-range missile carrying the Kwangmyongsong-2 satellite. The third nuclear test was conducted on February 12, 2013, two months after the launch of the Unha-3 carrying the Kwangmyongsong 3-2 satellite in December 2012. The most recent 6th nuclear test was conducted on September 3, 2017, two months after the launch of the Hwasong-14 ICBM in July.

If North Korea proceeds with the 7th nuclear test, it is highly likely to push forward with a nuclear test of the tactical nuclear Hwasan-31. This would be an attempt to demonstrate that nuclear warheads can be mounted on long-range ballistic missiles. Earlier, in March, North Korea revealed scenes of Kim Jong-un’s on-site guidance related to the ‘weaponization of nuclear weapons’ and showcased numerous Hwasan-31 missiles and their launchers.

The National Intelligence Service also reported to the National Assembly Intelligence Committee last month, stating, "Nuclear tests are matters decided by North Korea’s supreme leader," and "In 2024, depending on Kim Jong-un’s decision, a nuclear test could be conducted at any time."

This content was produced with the assistance of AI translation services.