[War & Business] Why the Release of Oppenheimer Is Uncomfortable for Japan

"I named 12 cities in Japan. No, 11 places excluding Kyoto, which holds great cultural significance for the Japanese. Kyoto is also the place where my wife and I went on our honeymoon."

This is a line from the movie Oppenheimer, which depicts the life of Dr. Julius Robert Oppenheimer, the father of the atomic bomb. It is a scene explaining why Henry Stimson, the U.S. Secretary of War overseeing the operation to use nuclear weapons against Japan in 1945, excluded Kyoto from the list of Japanese cities targeted for atomic bombing.

[Image source=Oppenheimer movie poster]

In actual history, many U.S. military planners argued that devastating Kyoto, a city considered the spiritual pillar of Japan, would force Japan to surrender immediately. However, Secretary Stimson ultimately refused to approve the atomic bombing of Kyoto. It is said that he personally liked Kyoto and had visited it several times.

Of course, the U.S. government did not refrain from bombing Kyoto solely because of Stimson’s insistence. In fact, Kyoto was one of the major cities that had already suffered considerable air raids by U.S. bombers before the decision to drop the atomic bomb. Kyoto housed the Institute of Physical and Chemical Research, Japan’s largest chemical research institute at the time, equipped with essential facilities for nuclear weapons development such as uranium extraction and particle accelerators, making several of its facilities bombing targets.

Not only Kyoto but also Tokyo and other major cities had already had most of their key facilities destroyed by U.S. bombers, so there was reportedly no pressing need to drop atomic bombs there. Rather, the actual target areas for atomic bombings in August 1945 were mainly small and medium-sized cities in the rear areas, where many Japanese military facilities were hidden under the guise of civilian enterprises.

At that time, Japan had lost over 7,000 fighter planes due to suicide attacks by the “Kamikaze Special Attack Units,” and had lost all its skilled pilots, leaving its air defense network virtually nonexistent. It is widely believed that if Japan had retained even a minimal number of fighters capable of defending the home islands, it would have been much harder for the U.S. to easily decide to drop atomic bombs.

Given these historical defeats, even if the movie Oppenheimer does not directly depict the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, it inevitably causes discomfort among Japanese netizens as well as the Japanese government. This is especially sensitive at a time when Japan is about to release contaminated water from the Fukushima nuclear power plant, making the word “nuclear” itself a sensitive issue. Moreover, from Japan’s perspective, the release of Oppenheimer in Korea on August 15, the anniversary of Japan’s defeat, is a subject that can easily stir anti-American sentiment within Japan.

There is also analysis that the film is uncomfortable for Fumio Kishida, Japan’s Prime Minister and a prominent anti-nuclear politician within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party. Kishida’s electoral district is Hiroshima, the city where the atomic bomb developed by Oppenheimer was first dropped. The Kishida family has maintained a three-generation political dynasty in the Hiroshima area and has been one of the few voices within Japan’s right wing strongly opposing nuclear weapons development.

The reason the Group of Seven (G7) summit was held in Hiroshima in May is also related to this. It is analyzed that by emphasizing denuclearization and peace both domestically and internationally, the government sought to caution against proposals within the LDP advocating for the development of nuclear weapons for self-defense.

Due to these circumstances, there are even talks within Japan that the official release of Oppenheimer may be difficult. The level of discomfort is too high to simply dismiss it as just another Hollywood commercial film.

This content was produced with the assistance of AI translation services.