Supreme Court overturns and remands family’s damages claim in ‘Hangang Torso Corpse’ case... "Wrong deduction of family relief funds"

Deduction Required from the Solely Responsible Portion of the Rescue Fund Offender

The Supreme Court overturned and remanded the ruling that ordered the perpetrator Jang Dae-ho and the motel owner, where Jang worked, to pay billions in damages to the bereaved families in the "Hangang Torso Corpse Case." The reason was that the victim compensation fund received by the bereaved families should have been deducted from the debt amount borne solely by Jang, but it was mistakenly deducted from the debt amount jointly borne by Jang and the motel owner.

According to the legal community on the 10th, the Supreme Court's 2nd Division (Presiding Justice Min Yu-sook) overturned the appellate court's partial ruling in favor of the plaintiffs in the damages claim lawsuit filed by B, the wife of victim A, and their son C, against Jang and the motel owner Lee, where Jang worked, and sent the case back to the Seoul High Court.

The court stated, "The appellate court erred in its understanding of the legal principles regarding the deduction of the crime victim compensation fund when the scope of damages differs between the perpetrator and the employer, which affected the judgment."

Jang was sentenced to life imprisonment in 2020 for the murder, corpse mutilation, and concealment of victim A, whom he killed with a blunt weapon in the motel where he worked in August 2019, after A allegedly caused a dispute and refused to pay the accommodation fee.

The spouse, son, parents, and sister of victim A filed a lawsuit against Jang and his employer, the motel owner, claiming damages based on tort liability. The suit held Jang responsible as the direct perpetrator of the murder and Lee responsible as the employer who hired Jang.

Meanwhile, during the first trial in January 2020, B, the victim’s wife, received approximately 88 million KRW in victim compensation from the prosecution under the Crime Victim Protection Act.

The first trial court ordered Jang and Lee to jointly pay about 319 million KRW to B and about 206 million KRW to their son C. This amount was calculated by deducting the victim compensation fund already paid from the lost future income due to A’s death and adding compensation for the bereaved families’ mental suffering.

Jang and Lee argued for contributory negligence during the trial, but their claims were rejected.

They claimed that victim A had caused severe humiliation to Jang and was the first to assault him, which led to Jang committing the crime. However, the court dismissed this, stating, "The circumstances claimed by the defendants cannot be considered as negligence or carelessness subject to contributory negligence because the victim suffered fatal harm due to Jang’s extreme act of murder and the corpse was cruelly mutilated."

Lee argued that the tort liability borne by Jang and the employer liability he bore were separate debts with different scopes of damages, but the court did not accept this, noting that Lee did not exercise sufficient care in appointing and supervising Jang.

The second trial court also recognized the damages liability of both parties. However, it limited Lee’s contributory negligence to 70% regarding the lost future income due to A’s death.

This was because victim A partly contributed to the cause, and although Jang had a prior fine, it was not related to violent behavior. Moreover, Jang had no prior conflicts with guests or staff, making it practically difficult for Lee to foresee and prevent Jang’s murder.

Ultimately, the second trial court ordered Jang to pay about 333 million KRW to B and about 215 million KRW to C, and Lee to jointly pay with Jang about 243 million KRW to A and about 155 million KRW to C.

However, the Supreme Court pointed out that the second trial court erred in deducting the victim compensation fund from the jointly borne damages. The deduction should have been made first from the amount borne solely by Jang, not from the joint liability with Lee.

This was to prevent B from bearing the risk if Jang lacked the ability to pay the full damages.

Under civil law, an employee who commits a tort and the employer who hires the tortfeasor are each liable for damages to the victim under Articles 750 and 756 of the Civil Act. The relationship between the two debtors toward the creditor (victim) is called a quasi-joint debt. According to precedent, in a quasi-joint debt relationship, the creditor is strongly protected, as set-offs do not affect other joint debtors except for repayment.

The court explained, "When a victim or their heir files a lawsuit claiming intentional tort liability against the perpetrator and employer liability against the employer, and the court orders joint payment of damages while applying contributory negligence only to the employer, resulting in a reduced payment amount, the portion extinguished by the victim compensation fund is the debt borne solely by the perpetrator, who is a large debtor."

It added, "In this case, the debts borne by the perpetrator and the employer are quasi-joint debts with different amounts. Deducting part of the damages from the jointly borne debt portion results in the victim or bereaved family bearing the risk when the large debtor perpetrator is insolvent, weakening the creditor’s position, which contradicts the nature of quasi-joint debts."

A Supreme Court official stated, "This ruling affirms the deduction of the victim compensation fund from damages to prevent double compensation, but considering the purpose of the crime victim protection system, it ensures that those who first receive the compensation fund are not disadvantaged in damages, reflecting faithful protection of crime victims."

This content was produced with the assistance of AI translation services.