[Insight & Opinion] Electoral System Reform Bound by Political Vested Interests

Both the President and the Speaker of the National Assembly have emphasized the need for electoral system reform. However, there has been no concrete progress yet. Reforming the system in line with the election schedule, including the delineation of electoral districts, seems practically difficult. Although there are differing views on the effectiveness of the system, the biggest obstacle is the vested interests of the current party powers and district representatives. The recent extreme polarization between the ruling and opposition camps is also a hindrance to reaching an agreement on system reform. If things continue as they are, there is a possibility that, as always, the election will be hastily patched up through collusion among the established political circles near the end of the election schedule.

Last month, the Speaker’s advisory committee summarized and presented alternative options. The alternatives discussed by the Special Committee on Political Reform are similar. Broadly, there are two main proposals: one is to supplement the current mixed system by increasing proportional representation, and the other is a reform to switch entirely to a mixed urban-rural large multi-member district system. The expansion of proportional representation in the mixed system is planned to be resolved by increasing the total number of National Assembly members. This is the core issue. The public has not agreed to increasing the number of assembly members for a long time due to distrust of the National Assembly. Before any rational discussion, the public is unlikely to agree to increasing the number of such lawmakers.

Of course, when looking at international comparative data that comprehensively considers population and territory, the number of lawmakers in our country is not particularly high. It is generally said that up to around 350 members is possible. However, it is not acceptable to argue for an increase in the total number of members only by increasing proportional representation while maintaining the current electoral districts. There must be a rationale that expanding the number of lawmakers is necessary for the development of our National Assembly and parliamentary politics.

In a National Assembly characterized by polarized camps, there is even an argument that the number of members should be drastically reduced, leaving only enough to represent parties according to their vote share. Despite the National Assembly Act’s free voting provision that “members of the National Assembly shall vote according to their conscience without being bound by their affiliated parties,” terms like “betrayer identification” during votes on arrest consent motions are being used without hesitation. If members represent their parties rather than the people, extreme criticism that the number of members could be as low as 20 to 30 is understandable. If the idea of increasing the number of members is to be raised, it must at least include reform measures for party politics mired in polarized camps. To expand proportional representation, reducing the number of electoral districts must accompany the increase in total members to align with the reform’s purpose of eliminating wasted votes.

Realistically, lawmakers who must pass the reform have their own electoral districts at stake, so reducing districts is said to be difficult. Therefore, the mixed urban-rural large multi-member district system, proposed as a third alternative, is seen as having the advantage of alleviating concerns about reducing electoral districts. However, if the vested interests of established parties are not resolved, the large multi-member district system will become a means for major parties to divide seats among themselves, negating the advantages of the reform and leaving only disadvantages. This is a decisive issue. To expect the reform’s intent from the large multi-member district system, measures such as abolishing the candidate number system and determining candidate order by lottery or limiting the number of candidates recommended by parties must be implemented.

Talking about electoral system reform while protecting one’s own electoral district and the vested interests of the candidate number system is the current reform discourse in Korean politics. Even related scholars describe these vested interests of lawmakers and parties as realistic conditions. They are packaging vested interests as realism. Vested interests are not realistic conditions to be acknowledged but challenges to be overcome in Korean politics. Our Constitution stipulates that the President at the time of constitutional amendment is not subject to the effect of that Constitution. This is a device to prevent abuse of vested interests. When the electoral system was amended, it is not impossible to say that lawmakers cannot run for office under the revised system.

Kim Manheum, Chair Professor at Hansung University, Former Director of the National Assembly Legislative Research Office

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