[Exclusive] 112 Situation Room's Order to Mobilize Police Forces Was Merely a 'Formal Authority'... It Fueled the Itaewon Disaster
Duty 112 Situation Room Chief, Provincial Police Chief Authority Delegation 'Confidential Internal Regulation' Exists
Provincial Police 112 Situation Room Dispatch Orders Considered 'Interference' On Site, Rendered Ineffective
On the 2nd, during the national mourning period following the large-scale crush disaster in Itaewon, police forces blocked one lane to secure the memorial space set up near Itaewon Station in Yongsan-gu, Seoul. Photo by Kang Jin-hyung aymsdream@
View original image[Asia Economy Reporter Heo Kyung-jun] Before the Itaewon tragedy occurred, the Seoul Metropolitan Police Agency's 112 Situation Room received dozens of rescue reports but responded complacently, which has led to growing criticism that this negligence worsened the accident. Inside the police force, there are criticisms that although the local police agency's 112 Situation Room has the authority to mobilize police forces, it failed to issue actual deployment orders to units such as the riot police.
According to a comprehensive report by Asia Economy on the 3rd, the police have a "confidential internal regulation" stating that the duty commander of each local police agency's 112 Situation Room is delegated the authority of the agency chief after the chief leaves work, allowing them to command incidents and accidents. Despite this regulation, it is said to be merely a "formal authority" and is not actually applied in the field.
Since the higher authority, the local police agency, operates the organization centered on the 112 Situation Room chief after the agency chief leaves work, the 112 Situation Room chief of the Seoul agency, who holds the rank of Senior Superintendent, is on duty in rotation with department heads of equivalent rank. Accordingly, the 112 Situation Room chief on duty has the structure to exercise the agency chief's authority, such as ordering riot police deployment, based on their own judgment.
The problem is that while the local police agency's 112 Situation Room can issue emergency personnel mobilization orders in cases of unannounced sudden assemblies or violent crimes, it cannot issue additional deployment orders for incidents or accidents already recognized by the jurisdictional police station of the area where the report was received.
Within the police force, there is a prevailing atmosphere that issuing deployment or other orders by the local police agency's 112 Situation Room regarding incidents or accidents already known by the responsible department of the jurisdictional area is considered a form of "interference." For example, if a report is received after 6 p.m., when extended working hours apply, and the relevant police station is already aware of or prepared for the incident related to the report received by the local police agency's 112 Situation Room, the local agency cannot take additional measures such as deploying more personnel.
According to the 112 call recordings released by the National Police Agency before the Itaewon tragedy, the first report was made at 6:34 p.m., which was 3 hours and 41 minutes before the disaster occurred.
A current police officer with experience working as a 112 Situation Room chief said, "If the jurisdictional police station where the report was received was unaware of the incident or accident, the 112 Situation Room chief can command deployments such as riot police, but if the jurisdictional station reports that they are prepared, it is an unwritten rule not to interfere."
On the day of the Itaewon tragedy, the jurisdictional police station, Yongsan Police Station, is known to have deployed its officers near Itaewon and reorganized the jurisdictional areas of nearby district units and police boxes, adjusting personnel deployment to prepare for Halloween Day.
Considering the overall police preparedness for Halloween Day at that time, it is strongly speculated that the Seoul agency, which received the report, transmitted the rescue situation in Itaewon to Yongsan Police Station according to the "112 Comprehensive Situation Room Operation and Report Handling Regulations," and Yongsan Police Station reported to the Seoul agency that personnel were deployed and managing the situation, so no additional personnel deployment or measures were taken.
Due to such internal police practices, voices of criticism have emerged within the police force, stating that the worsening of the situation during the Itaewon tragedy could not be prevented.
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Another current police officer said, "It was not a useless authority, but the authority necessary on the ground was not exercised," adding, "The cost of taking the serious situation lightly resulted in a tragic disaster. We must fully investigate the personnel deployment status of Yongsan Police Station deployed to Itaewon at that time and the reasons for failing to respond to the real-time situation."
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