Supreme Court Overturns and Remands Case of Former Colonel Hwang, Forced to Discharge During 'Yun Pil-yong Incident'... Different View on Starting Point of Statute of Limitations
'Lower Court Overturned: No Obstacle to Claiming Damages for Forced Detention Without Court Guilty Verdict'
'Date of Knowing Damage and Perpetrator' Is When the Facts of the Illegal Act Were Realistically and Specifically Recognized
[Asia Economy Reporter Choi Seok-jin, Legal Affairs Specialist] The Supreme Court overturned a second-instance ruling that dismissed a damages claim lawsuit filed by a former army colonel and his family, who were tortured and forcibly discharged during the Park Chung-hee Yushin regime in connection with the 'Yun Pil-yong Incident,' 44 years ago.
On the 7th, the Supreme Court's Second Division (Presiding Justice Cho Jae-yeon) overturned the lower court's ruling that had ruled against Hwang, who had endured torture and assault by investigators from the Army Security Command during the 1973 'Yun Pil-yong Incident' and had written a discharge application, as well as Hwang's wife and daughter, in their appeal for damages against the Republic of Korea. The case was remanded to the Seoul High Court.
Previously, the first and second trials judged that, unlike cases where a person was illegally detained without a court ruling and later convicted and imprisoned, there was no obstacle to claiming damages even before the invalidity of the discharge was confirmed, so the statute of limitations had expired.
However, the Supreme Court stated, "It should be recognized that the plaintiffs could not have been aware that they could claim state compensation on the same grounds before the confirmation of the invalidity of the discharge through the lawsuit to confirm the invalidity of the discharge, which included confirmation of the facts of torture, assault, and other harsh acts related to the discharge," and explained the reason for the reversal and remand: "The short statute of limitations for the state compensation claim due to harsh acts and discharge begins to run only when the victory judgment in the lawsuit confirming the invalidity of the discharge is finalized."
The 'Yun Pil-yong Incident' occurred in April 1973 when Yun Pil-yong, then Commander of the Capital Security Command (Major General), reportedly said at a drinking party to Lee Hu-rak, then Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, "President Park Chung-hee is aging, so you, brother, should be the successor." This led to the arrest of about 10 military officers, including Commander Yun, on charges of plotting a coup, and about 30 soldiers were discharged.
As a result, former Commander Yun was sentenced to 15 years in prison, demoted to private, and imprisoned until his release in 1975 under a suspension of sentence. Many officers close to him were also forced out of the military.
Hwang, who was serving as a personnel staff officer (colonel) in the Army's 3rd Division at the time, was implicated in this incident and was subjected to electric torture, water torture, and beatings while being interrogated by the Army Security Unit about "what orders he received from former Commander Yun." He wrote a discharge application under the threat that "you cannot leave here unless you write the discharge application," and the Minister of National Defense at the time approved the discharge (voluntary discharge). Around the time of the discharge, he was illegally detained again, tortured, assaulted, and forced to falsely confess to bribery.
More than 40 years later, victims who had been convicted in the 'Yun Pil-yong Incident' were acquitted through retrials and won damages claims against the state. Hwang also filed a lawsuit with the Seoul Administrative Court in 2016, arguing that "the discharge was invalid because the discharge application was written under deprivation of freedom of decision," and won a final judgment in 2017.
After winning the administrative lawsuit, Hwang and his wife and daughter filed lawsuits against the state, claiming damages of 300 million KRW, 100 million KRW, and 40 million KRW respectively, stating that they suffered mental damages due to illegal acts by state officials.
However, the first-instance court dismissed Hwang's claims.
The trial focused on whether ▲ the statute of limitations for Hwang's damages claims against the state had expired and ▲ whether the state's defense of 'statute of limitations expiration' constituted an abuse of rights contrary to the principle of good faith.
The court first stated, "The harsh acts by the Security Command investigators against Hwang at the time were intentional illegal acts carried out under the appearance of official investigation duties," and "unless there are special circumstances, the defendant is liable to compensate for damages under Article 2, Paragraph 1 of the State Compensation Act."
Although the court acknowledged the state's liability for damages, it accepted the government's argument that "the statute of limitations had already expired."
Claims for damages due to illegal acts expire if three years have passed since the victim became aware of the damage and the perpetrator, or ten years since the illegal act occurred. Since Hwang filed the lawsuit 44 years after the state's illegal acts ended, the court ruled that the statute of limitations had expired.
Regarding the government's defense of 'statute of limitations expiration,' Hwang argued that victims who had been convicted in the 'Yun Pil-yong Incident' could not exercise their right to claim damages until they won a final judgment confirming their innocence through retrials and until he won a final judgment confirming the invalidity of his discharge in an administrative lawsuit, but this was rejected.
Hwang also argued that other victims of the 'Yun Pil-yong Incident' all received state compensation, and considering the great social necessity to compensate for damages caused by deprivation of fundamental rights by state power, the government's statute of limitations defense was an abuse of rights contrary to the principle of good faith. However, the court rejected this, stating, "The mere fact that the state has an obligation to protect its citizens does not mean that the state's assertion of the expiration of the statute of limitations constitutes an abuse of rights contrary to the principle of good faith."
In particular, regarding the starting point of the statute of limitations for damages claims due to illegal acts, the court stated, "In cases where a public prosecution is initiated and a guilty verdict is confirmed based on evidence collected through illegal acts by state agencies during investigations, but a retrial reveals the existence of grounds for retrial and a not guilty verdict is confirmed, the creditor could not have expected to claim damages until the not guilty verdict was finalized in the retrial. However, since the plaintiff was illegally detained and released without a court ruling, this case does not fall under the category of victims of the Yun Pil-yong Incident who could only receive damages through retrials," and dismissed Hwang's claims.
However, on this day, the Supreme Court stated, "Article 766, Paragraph 1 of the Civil Act (Statute of Limitations for Damages Claims) defines 'the day the damage and the perpetrator are known' as the day when the plaintiff realistically and specifically recognizes the existence of the unlawful act, the occurrence of damage, and the causal relationship between the act and the damage, and also knows that they can claim damages through a lawsuit based on this. The judgment should reasonably consider various objective circumstances of each case and the situation in which the damages claim becomes practically possible."
The court stated, "Since the discharge based on the discharge application written by the plaintiff appeared to exist on the surface, it is considered difficult for the plaintiffs to have recognized that they could claim state compensation on the same grounds before the final judgment confirming the invalidity of the discharge and the facts of torture, assault, and other harsh acts related to the discharge through the lawsuit confirming the invalidity of the discharge."
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It continued, "It is reasonable to consider that the plaintiffs realistically and specifically recognized the facts constituting the unlawful acts of harsh acts and invalid discharge related to the discharge only when the final judgment confirming the plaintiffs' victory in the lawsuit confirming the invalidity of the discharge was finalized, so the short statute of limitations for the state compensation claim due to harsh acts and discharge begins to run from that time," the court ruled.
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