Why North Korea Fired a Fake ICBM Hwasong-17

[Image source=Yonhap News]

[Asia Economy Yang Nak-gyu, Military Specialist Reporter] The Ministry of National Defense reported to the National Assembly on the 24th that the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launched by North Korea was not a new model but the existing 'Hwasong-15' type.

In the briefing materials submitted to the National Assembly's National Defense Committee plenary session on the 29th, the Ministry of National Defense stated, "North Korea launched an ICBM at a high angle from Pyongyang Sunan Airport on the 24th and announced the next day that it was a new Hwasong-17 type, but this is not true. The South Korean and U.S. military authorities assess that North Korea deceived by firing the 'Hwasong-15' while claiming to have launched the 'Hwasong-17'."

The Ministry of National Defense analyzes that since Pyongyang residents witnessed the failed launch of the (Hwasong-17) on the 16th, North Korea needed to deliver a 'success message' in the shortest time to block rumors and stabilize the regime, so it launched the Hwasong-15, which had already succeeded in 2017 and has high reliability, instead. Ballistic missiles have unique flight characteristics (ascent acceleration, combustion and stage separation time) depending on the type, and a precise analysis of the detected flight characteristics shows similarity to the Hwasong-15 rather than the Hwasong-17.

The basis for the Ministry of National Defense's evaluation of this missile as 'Hwasong-15' includes flight characteristics, shadows in the video, weather, technical factors, and consistency between South Korean and U.S. assessments.

The shadow of Chairman Kim Jong-un in the publicly released video by North Korea appears to be cast westward, suggesting it was filmed between 8 and 10 a.m. However, the actual launch time was in the afternoon. Also, the weather at Sunan on the day of the launch was mostly cloudy, but the video clearly shows clear weather.

In particular, the Hwasong-17 uses a cluster of four liquid-fuel engines, requiring more complex technology than the Hwasong-14 and 15, which have two engines. The re-launch eight days after the failure on the 16th is considered too short a time to analyze the cause of the failure.

In a closed meeting, military authorities are expected to explain detailed information obtained through South Korean and U.S. intelligence assets, such as confirmation that the engine nozzles (exhaust ports) of this ICBM are two, the same as the Hwasong-15. The military authorities analyzed that if the Hwasong-15 launched on the 24th were fired at a normal angle, its range would be over 13,000 km.

This content was produced with the assistance of AI translation services.