[Defense Commentary] China's Confidence and Growing National Defense Capabilities

[Professor Kim Hoseong, Department of Business Administration, Korea Army Academy at Yeongcheon] Last month, U.S. President Joe Biden held his first summit with Chinese President Xi Jinping 10 months after taking office. Although there had been two phone calls in the interim, none reached the level of a summit. During this meeting, the two leaders clashed head-on over the Taiwan issue.

President Biden emphasized peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and the region, while President Xi stated, “Taiwan is attempting independence by relying on the United States, and the U.S. intends to control China through Taiwan,” stressing the phrase “Wanhuozhe bi zifen (玩火者必自焚).” This means “Those who play with fire will perish in their own flames,” which is a very strong expression considering the possibility of military conflict with Taiwan. Where does China’s confidence toward the global hegemon, the United States, come from? Does China possess defense capabilities that can surpass the U.S. in a conflict over Taiwan? It is necessary to examine the level of China’s defense capabilities that may underlie its recent posture.

About 20 years ago, at the dawn of the 21st century, China’s military strength was insignificant compared to the United States. Although the army was large, it was outdated, and equipment was severely aged. The troop structure and capabilities were mainly focused on large-scale ground warfare along China’s borders. Conventional missiles generally had short ranges and low accuracy. Cyber warfare capabilities were rudimentary, and the use of information technology lagged far behind. Although China showed interest in space capabilities, it was based on outdated technology at the time. Additionally, China’s defense industry was underdeveloped and unable to produce high-performance weapon systems.

Even if China could produce or acquire modern weapons at that time, it lacked the joint operational organizations and training necessary for effective deployment. A U.S. defense report at the time assessed that the organizational obstacles within the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) were so severe that they were unsuitable for the Chinese Communist Party’s long-term ambitions. In other words, the PLA was evaluated as lacking the capabilities and organizational readiness for modern warfare. However, understanding these shortcomings, the Chinese Communist Party set long-term goals aligned with its desire to strengthen and transform the military, leading to the present situation.

Approximately 20 years later, 2020 was a significant year when President Xi showcased the results of the first long-term military construction goals. This is because 2021 marked the centennial of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party and the year when China aimed to transition to a “Xiaokang society (小康社會),” a moderately prosperous society, with broad goals set by the Party. Thus, 2020 was the final year to achieve the important goal of military modernization supporting this transition.

At the March 2019 annual session of the National People’s Congress (NPC), President Xi stated, “This year is an important year for our military to implement the development and construction of the 13th Five-Year Plan to achieve the 2020 national defense and military construction goals.” For this reason, 2020 offers a unique opportunity to evaluate both the continuity and changes in China’s military strategy and the PLA over the past 20 years. The primary goal of this initial phase of military construction was to achieve the PLA’s “mechanization” and make significant progress toward “informatization and greatly enhanced strategic capabilities.”

The results of this first phase of military construction aligned with President Xi’s will were revealed during the National Day military parade on October 1, 2019, celebrating the 70th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China. Various weapon systems were displayed, showcasing the breadth of China’s defense modernization. These included the DF-41 intercontinental ballistic missile, DF-17 hypersonic glide vehicle, WZ-8 high-speed reconnaissance unmanned aerial vehicle, and HSU001 unmanned submarine. Through this, China demonstrated to the world the extent of its progress in advanced weapon development, operational deployment, and defense construction. It was a moment confirming that China’s military had transformed completely from the level shown at the beginning of the 21st century.

At the end of last October, General Mark A. Milley, Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, described China’s recent hypersonic glide vehicle DF-ZF (WU-14) tests as “very concerning.” The threat posed by this hypersonic glide vehicle lies in its extremely high speed and irregular ballistic flight path, making it very difficult to intercept with existing air defense missile algorithms. He further stated that as China rapidly expands its military power, the current situation is “very close” to a Sputnik moment.

Sputnik refers to the Soviet Union’s space development program that launched the world’s first artificial satellite. Sputnik 1 was launched in October 1957, followed by Sputnik 2 and 3. The Soviet Union’s successful satellite launches at the time shocked the United States, which had assumed it was ahead in advanced weapon technologies such as long-range missiles. This event later became known in the U.S. as the “Sputnik Shock.”

In the 21st century, a similar shock experienced by the Soviet Union last century has been recreated by China. The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman’s reaction can be seen as an acknowledgment that the U.S. currently lags behind China in hypersonic weapons. With this sense of crisis, the U.S. recently signed contracts with the world’s largest defense contractors, Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman, to develop hypersonic interception systems, indicating that future global arms competition will center on hypersonic glide vehicles.

China, which has rapidly become a global military power in a short period, superficially surpasses the U.S. in some areas of military strength. A representative sector is missile and naval weapon systems such as hypersonic glide vehicles. The Chinese navy is the largest in the world, consisting of about 350 vessels and submarines, including more than 130 major surface combatants. In comparison, the U.S. Navy had about 293 vessels as of early 2020. Nevertheless, China’s weaknesses are identifiable in various areas.

For example, according to China’s most recent Defense White Paper released in July 2019, China is engaged in a long-term military technology competition with the U.S., and “the PLA still lags far behind the world’s best militaries.” The white paper warns that the PLA “must invest more in military modernization to meet national requirements,” emphasizing key weapon acquisition programs such as ballistic missiles, fighter jets, and destroyers. Considering this and President Xi’s statements comprehensively, despite the PLA’s development over the past 20 years, significant gaps and internal issues remain compared to the U.S. military.

After 2021, the centennial of the Chinese Communist Party’s founding and the transition to a new “Xiaokang society,” the PLA’s major modernization goals will follow the Party’s two-stage national development approach to achieve national rejuvenation by the 100th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 2049. The first stage, from 2021 to 2035, aims to address uneven economic development and inequality, strengthen technological capabilities, and become a “global leader in innovation.” To support these goals, the PLA is expected to further intensify military modernization by supplementing lacking military capabilities.

From 2035 to 2049, the second stage aims for the PLA to complete its transformation into a world-class military to support the Party’s goal of fully realizing the rejuvenation of a socialist modernized power. Within this, it is essential for China to establish a fully self-reliant defense industry sector integrated with a strong civilian industrial and technological base capable of meeting military demands as a foundation for global hegemony. The key technological focus areas targeted by China’s defense industrial base are expected to include aerospace engines such as turbofan technology and gas turbines, quantum communication and computing, innovative electronics and software, automation and robotics, special materials and applications, nanotechnology, neuroscience, neural research and artificial intelligence (AI), deep space exploration, and maintenance systems.

The direction of China’s national strategy and military aspirations over the past 20 years provides insight into its future trajectory, considering the continuity of strategic objectives. Many directions of change have been determined in this process. What is certain is that the Chinese Communist Party has a strategic end state targeted for 2049. Military construction to support this will undoubtedly undergo significant changes aimed at the two milestones of 2035 and 2049 through national-level technology imports, foreign industrial transfers, foreign direct investment, talent recruitment programs such as the Thousand Talents Plan (千人計劃), research and development, and academic cooperation.

This content was produced with the assistance of AI translation services.