[Full Text] Oh Se-hoon "1 Trillion Won Support to Civic Groups Over 10 Years... Seoul City Turned into an ATM"

Statement on Seoul City Reform

[Image source=Yonhap News]

[Asia Economy Reporter Lim Cheol-young] On the 13th, Seoul Mayor Oh Se-hoon announced that the subsidies and private consignment funds provided by the Seoul Metropolitan Government to civic groups over the past 10 years during the tenure of the late former Mayor Park Won-soon amount to nearly 1 trillion won, and stated his intention to correct the misadministration.

Below is the full text of Mayor Oh’s statement on "Restoring Seoul."

Restoring Seoul

?Normalization of Abnormalities-

Over the past 10 years, Seoul City

has provided support to civil society and civic groups

either directly or through autonomous districts under the name of private subsidies or private consignment funds.

Not only in areas such as villages, urban regeneration, social economy, resident autonomy, and cooperation,

but also in traditionally recognized domains of the central government and private sectors such as housing, youth, labor, urban agriculture, environment, energy, and inter-Korean exchanges,

and even in fields still unfamiliar in administration,

large-scale support has been provided.

The total amount supported through private subsidies and private consignment funds over the past 10 years

reaches nearly 1 trillion won.

Of course, this does not mean all of it was wasted,

but upon reviewing some of the expenditure details, it is truly regrettable.

Originally, subsidies to the private sector

are provided to encourage autonomous activities of the private sector that greatly contribute to the public interest,

and private consignment should only be implemented when it is recognized that utilizing the autonomy and expertise of the private sector is more efficient than public institutions performing the tasks themselves.

Were the subsidies and private consignment funds provided by Seoul City over the past decade

really used properly in such areas?

Subsidies and private consignment, carried out under the pretext of expanding private participation and utilizing expertise,

may have actually lowered accountability and publicness compared to when public officials perform the work directly,

and by concentrating support on specific civic groups,

may have undermined fairness in our society.

Returning to Seoul after 10 years and visiting various sites,

sometimes discussing work with staff,

I could not shake off these doubts.

I heard from employees who felt a sense of self-disgust after preparing and executing inappropriate budgets under pressure from civic groups and senior city officials who came from civic groups,

and I also saw public facilities entrusted to unverified organizations and the work conducted there

that failed to meet citizens’ expectations,

being neglected and operated inefficiently.

Whether subsidies or private consignment,

I want to believe they were started with good intentions.

They were intended to expand private participation in city administration,

and to combine knowledge and experience that the public official organization lacked

to provide better administration.

However, upon examining the structure of private subsidies and private consignment projects in the civil society sector,

the project selection process, and budget execution details one by one,

the reality was different.

The private consignment projects in the civil society sector

created ‘intermediary offices’ that served as middle-support organizations for certain civic groups.

Specific civic groups became intermediary organizations

that distributed subsidies to other civic groups.

According to city ordinances, the tasks subject to private consignment

are limited to tasks that do not directly relate to citizens’ rights and obligations,

such as those requiring special knowledge and skills or simple execution tasks like facility management.

Does distributing budgets raised from citizens’ taxes to specific organizations fall under such tasks?

If the mayor entrusted the execution of subsidy budgets, which should be carried out under his own responsibility and through city officials following strict procedures, entirely to civic groups,

this is an abandonment of responsibility to the citizens.

What is even more surprising is that this support for civic groups

was operated within what can be called their own exclusive league.

Personnel from civic groups were positioned as fixed-term public officials throughout Seoul City,

overseeing the entire related projects from selecting consignment companies to guidance and supervision.

They created their own villages and ecosystems by financially supporting the civic groups they belonged to.

Not only that, intermediary organizations were also established in each autonomous district,

and these were again consigned to other civic groups for operation.

Isn’t this the pyramid of civic groups,

a multi-level marketing structure of civic groups?

Instead of having city and district officials execute and settle accounts directly from the start,

entrusting intermediary organizations created a clever project structure where consignment funds are paid out,

and entrusted organizations distribute subsidies from city budgets and take credit.

The same applies to private subsidy projects.

There were many cases of overlapping support to specific civic groups,

and performance evaluations were very inadequate compared to excessive budget execution.

There were even cases where settlement reports transparently disclosing expenses used for subsidy projects as required by law were not properly submitted.

Because of these problems,

the city council has continuously raised issues regarding financial support in the civil society sector,

and I have also sounded warnings several times before taking office.

For example, in village community projects, more than half of the budget is spent on personnel expenses.

The annual salary of the heads of resident autonomy project teams established by autonomous districts

exceeds 50 million won.

Regarding youth projects,

personnel from civic groups came to lead the relevant departments in Seoul City

and blatantly concentrated support on specific civic groups.

These groups then became financial channels again,

establishing a structure that concentrated research service orders to other civic groups.

The Seoul City treasury, maintained with citizens’ hard-earned taxes,

ultimately degenerated into an ATM exclusively for civic groups.

Regarding the Social Investment Fund, about 4 billion won was paid as consignment funds

while entrusting fund management to a specific organization.

This was also citizens’ taxes that could have been saved if Seoul City had operated it directly through a public institution.

The NPO Support Center, a cooperative project,

provided preferential support such as ordering services to related civic groups.

There was even a case where a civic group that conducted services related to the establishment of the center

was entrusted with operating the center after its establishment.

In the case of social housing, although SH could have handled it,

an organization called a socio-economic entity intervened,

with Seoul City lending land, supporting interest, and even providing business fund loans.

The source of the business funds they used was citizens’ taxes.

However, these socio-economic entities repeatedly postponed, delayed, and deferred repayment of loans received from Seoul City,

and failed to return rental deposits,

causing direct harm to tenants.

Although it is said that the debts of insolvent social housing operators were assumed,

that money was also covered by citizens’ taxes.

Are these examples of expanding citizen participation and utilizing private expertise to improve administrative efficiency?

Every single penny of citizens’ taxes must be used properly and meaningfully.

Private subsidy or private consignment projects are not profit-seeking businesses,

but should aim to realize the public interest.

If private companies and civic groups perform public duties with city budgets,

they must bear strict responsibilities no different from public institutions.

Therefore, I intend to correct the deeply rooted wrong practices

that have developed over the past 10 years in private subsidies and private consignment projects in the civil society sector,

and to normalize all abnormalities.

I will eliminate behaviors that treat citizens’ taxes as personal petty cash,

and pursue private interests under the name of ‘citizens.’

I do not understand why this should be slandered as ‘erasing the traces of former Mayor Park Won-soon.’

Correcting misadministration is a duty entrusted to me as the head of Seoul City.

Pointing out the problems of private subsidies and private consignment projects in the civil society sector, which have expanded unchecked over the past decade,

and leading them on the right path is not only my responsibility but also the mission of checks and balances given to the city council.

I believe we will cooperate.

If organizations that have long conducted private subsidies or consignment projects feel threatened by the disappearance of privileges they have taken for granted and resist collectively,

this is by no means the right path.

At this moment, we all must calmly reflect on what is truly for the citizens and for Seoul City.

The owners of Seoul are the citizens of Seoul.

Therefore, the Seoul City budget belongs entirely to the citizens of Seoul.

I promise to make every effort to ensure that not a single penny of the budget is wasted in the future.

Thank you.

This content was produced with the assistance of AI translation services.