[Column] Reasons Why the Moon Government's Prosecution Reform Failed

Seokjin Choi, Head of the Legal Affairs Team.

[Asia Economy Reporter Choi Seok-jin] ‘Prosecutorial reform’ has been one of the top national agenda items that President Moon Jae-in prioritized and pursued even before taking office. As such, public expectations were high, and there was a sufficient consensus on the necessity of ‘prosecutorial reform.’

However, now that more than half of the presidential term has passed, observing the current state of the prosecution, it is more fitting to describe it as ‘five minutes before a total mess’ rather than a renewed image through reform.

Through personnel reforms aimed at eliminating so-called ‘Yoon Seok-yeol lines,’ prosecutors who gained the regime’s trust occupied key positions, and a vicious cycle of these prosecutors favoring their followers repeated, forming new mainstream factions within the prosecution such as the ‘Choo line’ and the ‘Lee Seong-yoon line.’

Since the abolition of the Supreme Prosecutors’ Office’s Central Investigation Department, it has long been the case that the head of the Seoul Central District Prosecutors’ Office, responsible for investigating the most important domestic cases, has not reported face-to-face to the Prosecutor General.

Under the pretext of reorganizing the prosecution, personnel in key departments responsible for reporting important cases from prosecutors’ offices nationwide to the Prosecutor General were reduced, and even senior officials at the Supreme Prosecutors’ Office, who could be considered the Prosecutor General’s aides, were directly selected by the Minister of Justice to place their own people. This led to a laughable situation in the National Assembly where the Prosecutor General himself referred to himself as a ‘figurehead prosecutor general.’

Eventually, the Minister of Justice, who should act as a shield protecting the prosecution from political pressure, led multiple investigations against the Prosecutor General, who had fallen out of favor due to investigations such as those involving former Minister of Justice Cho Kuk and the ‘Wolseong Unit 1’ case, requested disciplinary actions, and suspended him from duty, only to be halted by the courts.

As a legal battle akin to a ‘melodrama’ between the Minister and the Prosecutor General unfolded, the investigation into the Lime and Optimus cases, which caused many victims to suffer, bizarrely focused more on ‘political and business lobbying’ and ‘prosecutors’ drinking parties’ rather than the core issues of redemption suspension and fund fraud.

Despite this situation, Minister of Justice Choo Mi-ae and the ruling party seem to dismiss the collective backlash from prosecutors against the Minister’s actions as resistance to ‘prosecutorial reform’ and appear determined to brand Prosecutor General Yoon Seok-yeol as a disciplinary offender to remove him from office.

Park Soon-chul, head of the Seoul Southern District Prosecutors’ Office, who was promoted by Minister Choo and entrusted with leading the ‘Lime’ investigation, resigned saying, “Politics has overwhelmed the prosecution.” Even Cho Nam-gwan, deputy prosecutor general at the Supreme Prosecutors’ Office, who, along with Lee Seong-yoon, was considered the top candidate for the next Prosecutor General and enjoyed the regime’s trust, harshly criticized Minister Choo, asking her to “take a step back for prosecutorial reform.”

Despite the judiciary ruling that the disciplinary request and suspension order against Prosecutor General Yoon did not follow ‘proper procedures,’ Minister Choo pushed forward with the disciplinary committee, leading to opposition. Even Ko Ki-young, Deputy Minister of Justice and a key aide appointed by Minister Choo, resigned. Kim Wook-jun, first deputy chief prosecutor of the Seoul Central District Prosecutors’ Office, who had been favored by Lee Seong-yoon and was guaranteed promotion to chief prosecutor, also resigned, urging an immediate halt to measures threatening the prosecution’s political neutrality and existence.

This is not the disgruntled voice of minor prosecutors who have been sidelined or have no promotion prospects under this administration due to lack of recognition. It is the sincere cry of the highest echelons of the prosecution, who were thriving and considered ‘on the Minister’s side’ after her appointment.

All prosecutors at frontline prosecutors’ offices nationwide issued statements asserting that Minister Choo’s actions were illegal and unjust, from junior prosecutors to high-ranking prosecutors and administrative staff, unanimously requesting reconsideration. Even lawyers, law professor groups, and the pro-government civic group People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy pointed out the unfairness of the Minister’s actions, but Minister Choo, who should be ashamed, shows no sign of listening to their voices.

In particular, Minister Choo stated, “If the Prosecutor General blindly obeys the Minister of Justice’s command and supervision, the independence and political neutrality of prosecutors cannot be maintained. The exercise of specific command and supervision rights by the Minister of Justice over the prosecution, especially the Prosecutor General, should be limited to the minimum necessary to achieve the purposes of upholding legal order, protecting human rights, and democratic control.” Even after the court’s decision to suspend the effect of the Prosecutor General’s suspension order, she has shown no intention of reconsidering her stance.

It seems that Minister Choo’s mind is filled with thoughts like, “I am the Minister, the Prosecutor General is my subordinate, so why complain and resist when I tell you to conduct investigations?”

Especially, on the 3rd, two days after the court’s decision, Minister Choo posted on her Facebook her determination to push forward with the disciplinary committee against Prosecutor General Yoon, along with a photo of the late President Roh Moo-hyun, who she had supported the impeachment of in 2004. This appears to be a ‘political show’ conscious of public opinion. Unless she thinks, “As long as I remove Prosecutor General Yoon, my role as Minister of Justice is fulfilled regardless of the process,” she would not behave this way.

There are several reasons why the Moon Jae-in administration’s prosecutorial reform has failed.

First, the belief that ‘weakening the prosecution’s power’ equates to ‘prosecutorial reform.’

It is true that the prosecution has exercised ‘omnipotent’ power due to the concentration of investigative and prosecutorial authority. No one can deny that dispersing concentrated power through institutional reform is an important means of prosecutorial reform.

However, the direction of ‘reform,’ which means ‘to renovate or overhaul institutions or organizations,’ must be for better outcomes to have legitimacy.

Unfortunately, the ‘prosecutorial reform’ pursued by the Moon administration was not so. Focusing solely on weakening the prosecution’s power, there was insufficient consideration of the consequences.

Although the law was amended to drastically reduce the prosecution’s investigative authority, transferring it to the police and abolishing prosecutors’ investigative command rights, serious consideration on how to control the police, which has a far larger organization than the prosecution, still seems lacking.

President Moon appointed legal theorists such as Professors Park Sang-ki and Cho Kuk, who taught students at universities, as Ministers of Justice to achieve the ‘de-prosecution’ of the Ministry of Justice, followed by appointing Choo Mi-ae, who, although a former judge, spent several times longer in politics than on the bench.

Avoiding appointing former prosecutors was an inevitable choice, but it is clear that one of the biggest reasons for the failure of the Moon administration’s prosecutorial reform was that those entrusted with this important task knew too little about the prosecution.

Just as the phrase ‘learned love from books’ is used to tease ‘love novices,’ no matter how long one has studied and lectured on law or participated in revising criminal law or criminal procedure law, it cannot replace or compare to the experience of directly investigating criminals.

Those who majored in law at universities or graduate schools can clearly feel the difference in lectures between professors who have passed the bar and worked as prosecutors, judges, or lawyers and those who have not.

In this regard, it is worrisome that the significant task of drastically amending the Criminal Procedure Act, enacted in 1954, after 66 years to change the framework of investigations, was led by the Minister of Justice and the Minister of the Interior and Safety, neither of whom had any investigative experience.

No matter how theoretically knowledgeable a professor is, if someone who has never operated in an operating room and lacks surgical qualifications is tasked with creating a ‘surgical manual,’ can patients trust that manual? This is why many prosecutorial reform measures pursued by the government have struggled to gain sympathy from frontline prosecutors.

Personnel management in the prosecution was also problematic. The prosecution is more sensitive to personnel matters than any other organization.

Under the banner of prosecutorial reform, departments where so-called successful prosecutors from special investigation units and public security units were assigned were abolished or renamed as criminal departments, and prosecutors in criminal and trial departments were favored with unprecedented personnel moves. However, this resulted in the side effect of an ‘incompetent prosecution.’

Under the pretext of ‘prosecutorial reform,’ prosecutors who were excellent and skilled in investigations were pushed to remote, insignificant posts, while those few pro-government prosecutors and their chosen ‘specific line’ prosecutors occupied those positions.

Of course, there was agreement that the personnel pattern where only special investigation unit prosecutors were favored and others only moved within criminal departments needed change. But such change should reject appointments based on political leanings or so-called ‘lines’ and provide fair opportunities to prosecutors, not ignore ability or promote incompetence.

Unfortunately, since Minister Choo’s appointment, personnel decisions have often been divided based on whether one is ‘on my side’ or a ‘special investigation unit’ aligned with Prosecutor General Yoon, rather than merit.

Among prosecutors, especially those who graduated from the Judicial Research and Training Institute together, there are recognized frontrunners in each class. These are prosecutors who stand out in terms of ability and investigative achievements. Until now, such prosecutors were selected for special investigation units and promoted to chief prosecutors.

Although there were cases of over-promotion due to political considerations or connections with the Minister or Prosecutor General, most appointments were met with consensus that ‘that person deserves that position.’

Evaluations of prosecutors, which serve as criteria for such appointments, were based not on which university they graduated from or their ranking in the Judicial Research and Training Institute, but on senior prosecutors’ assessments of their performance as prosecutors.

However, in personnel decisions made by Minister Choo, even this minimum standard was broken. Factors other than ability became reasons for promotion or demotion. Reactions from prosecution-experienced lawyers noting surprise that several little-known prosecutors with over ten years of service were appointed to department chief positions at the Seoul Central District Prosecutors’ Office, where frontrunners of each class were usually assigned, should not be dismissed lightly.

With Minister Choo backing them, Lee Seong-yoon, who enjoys her full trust, did not even consider it problematic not to report to the Prosecutor General, his direct superior within the prosecution. Han Dong-soo, head of the Supreme Prosecutors’ Office’s Inspection Department, appointed by former Minister Cho and supported by Minister Choo, seems to have forgotten his affiliation and acts more as Minister Choo’s vanguard investigating Prosecutor General Yoon than as Yoon’s aide. Attempting to reform the prosecution has turned it into a ‘dysfunctional family.’ Under these circumstances, proper investigations cannot proceed.

The Ministry of Justice is also ‘five minutes before a total mess,’ just like the prosecution. The important official document requesting disciplinary action and suspension against the Prosecutor General was sent to the Supreme Prosecutors’ Office without the approval of Shim Woo-jung, head of the Ministry of Justice’s Planning and Coordination Office, who has the authority to approve it. In the Ministry’s Inspection Department, which investigates Prosecutor General Yoon under Minister Choo’s orders, Park Eun-jung, the inspection officer who has risen as Minister Choo’s right hand, bypassed her superior Ryu Hyuk and even omitted reporting. This is tolerated because both Shim and Ryu oppose the Minister’s actions.

Above all, the biggest reason for the failure of the Moon administration’s prosecutorial reform is the inability to resist the temptation to control the prosecution.

The pure intention of ‘reforming the prosecution to restore normalcy’ has turned into the greed of ‘making the prosecution my side,’ and when that did not go as planned, it has come to the abnormal situation of attacking Prosecutor General Yoon, who turned his blade against ‘my side.’

Especially, when Yoon, who was sidelined and left the prosecution due to fearless investigations into the previous administration’s National Intelligence Service and others, was drafted into the special prosecution team for Choi Seo-won’s ‘state manipulation’ scandal and actively worked, and when he investigated ‘judicial manipulation’ as head of the Seoul Central District Prosecutors’ Office, the Moon administration cheered and applauded. Yet, after the investigation into former Minister Cho Kuk, the administration’s attitude toward Prosecutor General Yoon changed 180 degrees, causing great disappointment among the public and casting doubt on the sincerity of the government’s ‘prosecutorial reform.’

President Moon and the ruling party surely knew Prosecutor General Yoon’s style of not looking back once an investigation starts when appointing him. In fact, they highly valued this and entrusted him with the important roles of head of the Seoul Central District Prosecutors’ Office and then Prosecutor General through unprecedented appointments.

However, using the investigation into former Minister Cho Kuk, whose multiple misconducts were revealed before his appointment, as a reason to attack Prosecutor General Yoon, and labeling investigations into clear criminal allegations such as the ‘Yoo Jae-soo inspection cover-up’ case and the recent ‘Wolseong Unit 1 nuclear power plant economic evaluation manipulation suspicion’ case as ‘politically motivated investigations’ and ‘abuse of prosecutorial power’ simply because they target ‘our side’?which citizen could reasonably accept this?

Among the allegations Minister Choo recently cited as grounds for disciplinary requests and suspension against Prosecutor General Yoon are suspicions that ruling party members of the Democratic Party of Korea loudly declared ‘already cleared’ during Yoon’s confirmation hearing just over a year ago. It is natural that people cannot sympathize with the shifting narrative that turns ‘no problem at all’ into ‘a tremendous reason for dismissal from office’ depending on the situation.

The prosecution’s ‘investigative authority’ and ‘prosecutorial authority’ are powerful powers legally authorized to infringe on the fundamental right of ‘personal liberty.’ Especially from the perspective of those in power, there is no better means than prosecution investigations to eliminate political opponents or discipline large corporations that do not comply. Also, the prosecution’s help is necessary to cover up the wrongdoings of one’s own side.

For these reasons, those in power have never been able to resist the temptation to make the prosecution their side. The repeated investigations into the previous administration’s personnel whenever the government changes are also due to this nature.

However, the Moon administration emphasized ‘prosecutorial reform’ more than any previous government. The core of prosecutorial reform is to guarantee ‘political neutrality of the prosecution’ and ‘fair investigations.’ Minister Choo is currently undermining this core of prosecutorial reform. There may be concerns that dismissing Minister Choo would stall the prosecutorial reform drive or accelerate a lame-duck period, but if her reckless actions are left unchecked, even greater losses may occur.

This content was produced with the assistance of AI translation services.