Technology, Control, and Money: Why South Korea and the U.S. Can't Compromise on the Nuclear Submarine Construction Site

South Korea and the United States are showing clear differences over the location for constructing nuclear-powered submarines and the reprocessing of nuclear fuel, making it difficult to coordinate tariffs and security fact sheets. While technology transfer and security regulations appear to be the main issues on the surface, underlying factors such as 'control over nuclear technology,' 'economic impact worth trillions of won,' and 'long-term operational systems' are intricately intertwined. As both countries are finding it hard to make concessions, the signing of the memorandum of understanding (MOU) on nuclear submarine cooperation and the joint fact sheet announcement are also being delayed.

Differences Over Spent Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing and Uranium Enrichment

According to government officials on November 14, the MOU on nuclear submarine cooperation and the joint fact sheet, which were initially expected to be announced right after the summit, are facing prolonged coordination due to disagreements between the two governments. Not only is there a strategic conflict of interest over the construction site, but strong opposition has also emerged within the United States regarding sensitive nuclear-related language, such as spent nuclear fuel reprocessing and uranium enrichment, causing the announcement schedule itself to be postponed.

In particular, it has been reported that U.S. Secretary of Commerce Howard Lutnick is strongly insisting on removing references to "South Korea's spent nuclear fuel reprocessing" and "uranium enrichment" from the draft of the joint explanatory materials. Secretary Lutnick is demanding their removal on the grounds that these issues "have not been sufficiently discussed between the two leaders," and the term "the Secretary's obstinacy" has even been used in South Korean political circles. Some analysts point to the interests of the U.S. commercial nuclear power and fuel cycle industries as the underlying reason.

However, Secretary Lutnick has reportedly not raised objections to the core framework of nuclear submarine cooperation, such as "hull and reactor manufacturing in South Korea" and "the U.S. providing sealed nuclear fuel." The problem is concentrated on the highly sensitive language regarding reprocessing and enrichment, and the government explains that this is delaying the overall release of the documents. The South Korean government has reportedly conveyed its concerns to the U.S. regarding the current situation, which has even led to delays in the announcement of the joint statement from the South Korea-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting (SCM).

South Korea or the United States? ... What Changes Depending on the Construction Site

The gap between the two countries over the construction site also remains unbridged. The South Korean government and industry are firmly convinced that domestic construction is the most rational option. South Korea already has world-class infrastructure in shipbuilding, nuclear power, machinery, and materials, and submarine construction requires advanced system engineering, including design, hull manufacturing, reactor installation, and integrated testing. Domestic shipyards and research institutes are considered to have sufficient capabilities. Building the submarines in South Korea offers significant advantages in terms of shortening the schedule, controlling costs, and establishing an independent long-term maintenance system. In fact, the government is currently finalizing the basic design of the nuclear submarine, and once the reactor to be installed is decided, it will begin detailed design work.

Moon Juhyun, Professor of Energy Engineering at Dankook University, explained, "While our nuclear power plant design technology is world-class, submarine reactors operate in different environments. They need to function reliably even under shaking and tilting conditions, so further verification is necessary," but also predicted, "If sufficient funding and manpower are invested, it could be possible within five years."

The economic ripple effect is also enormous. Nuclear submarine construction is a project worth from several trillion won to tens of trillions of won, and when considering not only the construction process but also maintenance, localization of parts, and operational support, the impact on the entire industry becomes even greater. As sales will occur throughout the domestic supply chain, including high-performance steel, special materials, measuring instruments, and electronic equipment, the government considers "domesticating the economic benefits" a core strategic element.

However, the U.S. position is different. Recently, the U.S. shipbuilding industry has been facing delays in the delivery of warships and submarines due to labor shortages and reduced production capacity, but at the same time, "securing orders" is seen as a key element in rebuilding the industry. If nuclear submarine construction is carried out in the United States, thousands of jobs will be created and long-term defense industry revenues secured, but if construction is handed over to South Korea, those benefits will flow abroad. This is why the United States is reluctant to agree to South Korea as the construction site.

The issue of technology control further widens the gap between the two countries. Nuclear submarines are strategic weapons that concentrate sensitive technologies such as nuclear fuel, propulsion reactors, and fuel cycle management. The United States is extremely cautious about transferring nuclear propulsion system technology, and providing highly enriched uranium (HEU) requires approval from the U.S. Congress and a separate agreement. Professor Moon explained, "The United States considers even 19.75% enrichment to be a weapons proliferation risk if the quantity is large," adding, "This issue is structurally bound to require lengthy internal coordination within the U.S."

Professor Moon also pointed to the practical limitations of the U.S. shipbuilding industry as a key variable. He said, "The United States currently lacks the manpower and capability to build submarines. It is unclear when they could be built and delivered to us, and even AUKUS (the trilateral security partnership between the U.S., U.K., and Australia) continues to be delayed." He continued, "Building a nuclear submarine is not the end. Repairs and new builds will be needed later, and without direct construction experience, dependence on the U.S. for maintenance will become entrenched."

Similar concerns have been raised in the National Assembly. Kang Sunyoung, a lawmaker from the People Power Party, said, "Nuclear submarines require major overhauls every five to ten years, and if they are built in the United States, they will have to remain in U.S. shipyards for more than two years each time for maintenance. Such a structure will inevitably lead to operational gaps."

Ultimately, there are concerns that discussions between South Korea and the United States on nuclear submarines are so entangled with technical, control, and industrial interests that a short-term conclusion is unlikely. As U.S. industrial interests and adjustments to nuclear-related language have emerged as variables, there is a growing call for the South Korean government to set clearer negotiation goals and priorities.

Professor Moon said, "Ultimately, what matters most is the target timeline set by the government. If rapid deployment is the goal, there is an appropriate choice for that, but if the aim is to build independent capabilities, a different roadmap is needed."

This content was produced with the assistance of AI translation services.