Supreme Court: Defendants Sentenced to Imprisonment and Detained in Court Are Also Subjects of Escape Crime

Fugitive Defendant Caught While Escaping Detention Waiting Room
Second Trial Overturned and Remanded After Acquittal... Guilty Verdict for 'Attempted Escape' Affirmed

The Supreme Court has ruled that a defendant who was sentenced to imprisonment, detained in the detention waiting room for defendants, and physically restrained can also be considered the subject of the crime of escape.

According to the legal community on the 19th, the Supreme Court's Third Division (Presiding Justice Lee Heung-gu) overturned the original acquittal verdict for Hong Mo (41), a private academy instructor indicted for attempted escape, and remanded the case to the Seoul Southern District Court with a verdict of guilt.

The court stated, "The original court's judgment misunderstood the legal principles regarding the execution of an arrest warrant under Article 81, Paragraph 1 of the Criminal Procedure Act, failed to conduct necessary hearings, and violated logic and common experience, exceeding the limits of free evaluation of evidence, which constitutes illegality," as the reason for the reversal and remand.

Supreme Court, Seocho-dong, Seoul.

On May 3, 2018, Hong was sentenced to 1 year and 6 months imprisonment for quasi-forcible molestation and other charges at the Seoul Southern District Court and was detained in court pursuant to an arrest warrant issued by the judge.

Subsequently, Hong, who was taken to the detention waiting room connected to the courtroom, attempted to escape while prison officers were verifying his personal information. Hong opened the waiting room door and ran into the courtroom, then tried to flee through the space between the judge's bench and the audience seats toward the opposite courtroom exit, but was caught by prison officers who were guarding other detainees inside the courtroom.

The prosecution indicted Hong for attempted escape.

The trial focused on whether Hong could be considered a "person arrested or detained according to law," the subject of the crime of escape.

The first and second instance courts acquitted him. They reasoned that under the Criminal Procedure Act, an arrest warrant is executed by judicial police officers under the direction of the prosecutor, and since Hong attempted to escape before meeting the judicial police officers, he could not be considered detained under the execution of the arrest warrant.

The time when the Seoul Southern District Prosecutors' Office investigator executed the arrest warrant at the Seoul Southern District Court under the prosecutor's direction was 2:20 p.m. on May 3, 2018, after Hong's escape attempt.

The second trial court judged that since the situation was not an "urgent case" requiring the presiding judge to direct the execution of the arrest warrant instead of the prosecutor, Hong, who was detained in the detention waiting room by prison officers rather than judicial police officers, was not the subject of the crime of escape.

Article 81 (Execution of Arrest Warrants) Paragraph 1 of the Criminal Procedure Act states, "An arrest warrant shall be executed by a judicial police officer under the direction of the prosecutor. However, in urgent cases, the presiding judge, a commissioned judge, or a delegated judge may direct the execution."

Paragraph 2 of the same article states, "In the case of the proviso of Paragraph 1, the court clerk or similar official may be ordered to execute it. In this case, the court clerk or similar official may request assistance from judicial police officers, prison officers, or court security officers when necessary and may execute it outside the jurisdiction."

Ultimately, since it was not an urgent case where the presiding judge ordered the court clerk to execute and the court clerk requested assistance from prison officers, the second trial court concluded that Hong was not "a person detained according to law" at that time.

The court explained, "The 'urgent case' in the proviso of Article 81, Paragraph 1 of the Criminal Procedure Act refers to cases where the principal procedure of executing an arrest warrant under the prosecutor's direction is impossible. In this case, since the court issued an arrest warrant while sentencing the defendant to imprisonment on the sentencing date and the prosecutor was present in court, it is difficult to consider this situation as an 'urgent case.'"

Additionally, the court added, "Article 60 of the Regulations on the Handling of Personal Detention Affairs also stipulates that the execution of an arrest warrant is principally carried out by the prosecutor, and if the prosecutor does not execute it, the presiding judge or others must directly order the court clerk to execute it according to the proviso of Article 81, Paragraph 1 of the Criminal Procedure Act."

The court further pointed out, "Since Article 81, Paragraph 1 of the Criminal Procedure Act stipulates that an arrest warrant shall be executed by a judicial police officer under the prosecutor's direction, and there is no explicit provision like Paragraph 2 of the same article allowing assistance from prison officers or court security officers, including a defendant who temporarily entered the detention waiting room under the guidance of prison officers or court security officers, rather than judicial police officers, as a 'person lawfully arrested or detained' under the crime of escape excessively expands the interpretation of the Criminal Procedure Act."

However, the Supreme Court's judgment differed.

The court stated, "When the court issues an arrest warrant while sentencing the defendant to imprisonment on the sentencing date, and the prosecutor is present in court to receive the arrest warrant from the court and directs its execution, and the defendant is detained in the detention waiting room accordingly, unless there are special circumstances, the defendant falls under 'a person arrested or detained according to law' under Article 145, Paragraph 1 of the Criminal Act," overturning the second trial court's conclusion.

The court explained, "The Criminal Procedure Act stipulates that, except when the court or judge directs the execution due to the nature of the trial, the prosecutor corresponding to the court that conducted the trial directs the execution of the trial in general, including the execution of arrest warrants, detention warrants, and search and seizure warrants. Therefore, if the prosecutor receives the arrest warrant from the court in the courtroom and orders prison officers to detain the defendant, the execution procedure can be considered lawfully initiated."

Furthermore, the court stated, "If the prison officers who ultimately take custody of the defendant through the execution of the arrest warrant secure the defendant's custody immediately in the courtroom, the purpose of detention can be considered lawfully achieved."

Finally, the court added, "If the issuance of the arrest warrant, its execution, and detention all occur openly in court and in front of the judge, unless there are special circumstances, it is difficult to evaluate that the defendant's right to defense, procedural rights, or physical liberty have been violated."

In essence, if the prison officers who ultimately take custody of the detained defendant secure Hong's custody under the lawful execution direction of the prosecutor present in court, Hong can be considered a person lawfully detained.

This content was produced with the assistance of AI translation services.