Supreme Court: "Sexual Self-Determination Is Not an Absolute Standard in the Crime of Quasi-Rape of Disabled Persons"

Supreme Court, Seocho-dong, Seoul.

[Asia Economy Reporter Choi Seok-jin, Legal Affairs Specialist] The Supreme Court has ruled that for the crime of quasi-rape of a disabled person under the Sexual Violence Punishment Act to be established, the victim's mental disability does not necessarily have to reach the extent that they are unable to exercise their sexual self-determination rights.

The ruling means that when determining whether a mentally disabled victim was in a state of inability or difficulty to resist or oppose sexual self-determination rights, the absolute standard is not whether they were completely unable to exercise those rights, but rather a comprehensive judgment must be made considering the degree of the victim's disability along with various other circumstances.

The Supreme Court's 2nd Division (Presiding Justice Min Yoo-sook) announced on the 23rd that it dismissed the prosecutor's appeal and upheld the lower court's acquittal in the final appeal of Mr. A (81), who was indicted for violating the Sexual Violence Punishment Act (quasi-rape of a disabled person) and luring for the purpose of sexual intercourse.

Under the Criminal Act, quasi-rape is a crime punished the same as rape committed by using violence or threats, but it applies when the victim is already in a state of inability to resist, such as being completely intoxicated or in a deep sleep, and is sexually assaulted.

Article 6, Paragraph 4 of the Sexual Violence Punishment Act stipulates that "A person who sexually assaults or molests a person by taking advantage of their physical or mental disability causing inability or difficulty to resist shall be punished according to the provisions of Paragraphs 1 to 3," thereby imposing aggravated punishment for quasi-rape against persons with physical or mental disabilities.

Mr. A was indicted on charges of luring and raping Ms. B (48, female), who has an intellectual disability level 3, whom he met at a free meal service center in 2018, by luring her to his home five times from February 19 to 28 the following year.

Ms. B, who had no additional education or social experience after graduating elementary school, had married and given birth to a daughter but soon divorced and sent her daughter away. She lived with her younger brother, who also has an intellectual disability level 3, and sustained her livelihood with basic living subsidies.

Each time, Mr. A lured Ms. B to his home by saying, "Let's go clean the house a bit." He actually made her clean and paid her 10,000 to 30,000 won as a reward before sexually assaulting her.

The prosecution argued that Mr. A took advantage of Ms. B's difficulty in normal communication and reasoning to lure and rape her at his home and brought him to trial.

In the first trial, the court found Mr. A guilty of both quasi-rape of a disabled person under the Sexual Violence Punishment Act and luring for sexual intercourse under the Criminal Act, sentencing him to four years in prison. The court also ordered him to complete an 80-hour sexual violence treatment program.

The court stated, "At the time of each offense, the victim was in a state of intellectual disability with insufficient communication ability, social life skills, problem-solving ability, and judgment in daily life, making it significantly difficult to exercise sexual self-determination rights or express resistance or refusal to unwanted sexual relations. It is also sufficiently recognized that the defendant was aware of the victim's condition."

However, the second trial reversed the outcome. The appellate court accepted Mr. A's appeal, overturned the first trial's verdict, and acquitted him.

The appellate court stated, "It is acknowledged that the victim, Ms. B, as a disabled person, was somewhat weak in fully exercising sexual self-determination rights. However, for the crime of quasi-rape of a disabled person to be established, the victim's mental disability must reach the extent that they cannot exercise sexual self-determination rights, but at the time of the incident, the victim's mental disability did not reach that level."

It added, "Even if the victim had such a degree of mental disability, the defendant did not recognize it, so the defendant's sexual relations with the victim as described in the indictment cannot be considered quasi-rape of a disabled person."

In other words, ▲ for the crime of quasi-rape of a disabled person under the Sexual Violence Punishment Act to be established, the victim's mental disability must reach the extent of being unable to exercise sexual self-determination rights, which was not the case for Ms. B, and ▲ the defendant Mr. A did not have intent regarding Ms. B's mental disability to that extent.

The court also acquitted Mr. A of the charge of luring for sexual intercourse.

The court reasoned that ▲ although the indictment states that Mr. A actually intended to have sexual relations but hid this by luring Ms. B to clean his house, Ms. B did clean the house and received 10,000 to 30,000 won each time ▲ Ms. B went to Mr. A's house three more times even after initially reporting to the police ▲ there was no evidence of coercion, threatening words or actions, deception, or sweet talk used by Mr. A to lure Ms. B, and rather there seemed to be a relationship of friendship, affection, or trust between them ▲ Ms. B ate ramen at Mr. A's house, had considerable conversations, and had sexual relations, and during this process, she could leave at any time according to her will, making it difficult to assess that Mr. A had physical or authoritative control over Ms. B.

The Supreme Court agreed with the second trial's conclusion to acquit Mr. A but found the second trial's judgment on the 'mental disability' required for quasi-rape of a disabled person to be incorrect.

The court stated, "Whether the victim was in a state of inability or difficulty to resist or exercise sexual self-determination rights against the defendant must be judged comprehensively based on the degree of the victim's disability and various other circumstances at the time of the crime. It is not an absolute standard whether the victim's disability completely prevents exercising sexual self-determination rights."

It added, "In making this judgment, the victim's condition related to the disability must be sufficiently considered based on an understanding that the appearance and degree of disability vary individually, and it should not be easily concluded from a non-disabled perspective that the victim's state does not correspond to 'inability or difficulty to resist due to disability.'"

In other words, even if the victim's mental disability does not reach the extent of being unable to exercise sexual self-determination rights, quasi-rape of a disabled person can be established by comprehensively considering various other circumstances.

On this premise, the court recognized that "the victim was a person with a 'mental disability' as referred to in Article 6, Paragraph 4 of the Sexual Violence Punishment Act and was in a state where the mental disability was the main cause of being unable to properly express or exercise sexual self-determination rights regarding unwanted sexual relations with the defendant, that is, a state where resistance was impossible or difficult," and pointed out that "the lower court's ruling denying this constitutes a legal error regarding the 'inability or difficulty to resist due to mental disability' under Article 6, Paragraph 4 of the Sexual Violence Punishment Act."

However, the court stated, "It appears that the defendant may not have recognized that the victim was in a state of inability or difficulty to resist due to disability, and the prosecutor's proof on this point is insufficient. Therefore, the lower court's acquittal on this part of the indictment is ultimately acceptable," explaining the reason for dismissing the appeal.

Thus, although the second trial's acquittal of the quasi-rape charge based on the victim not being in a mental disability state to the extent of being unable to exercise sexual self-determination rights was incorrect, the lack of proof of the defendant's intent by the prosecution led to the final acquittal.

Regarding the charge of luring for sexual intercourse, the court stated, "Although there are inappropriate parts in the lower court's reasoning on this point, there is no error in logic, violation of the rules of experience, or misapplication of related laws that would affect the judgment by exceeding the limits of free evaluation of evidence."

A Supreme Court official said, "This ruling clarifies that the mental disability under the Sexual Violence Punishment Act is not limited to 'disability to the extent of being unable to exercise sexual self-determination rights,' resolving confusion in lower courts. It also emphasizes that whether the victim was in a state of inability or difficulty to resist due to mental disability should be judged comprehensively considering the degree of disability and various circumstances based on the situation with the defendant at the time, which is expected to serve as a guideline for similar cases in the future."

This content was produced with the assistance of AI translation services.