The 'Hidden Code' of North Korea's September 9th Military Parade

[Lee Horyeong, Senior Research Fellow at the Korea Defense Research Institute] North Korea's actions during the COVID-19 situation are peculiar. Although it was stated at the 7th Party Congress that the Party Congress would be held every five years, North Korea hastily held the 8th Party Congress in January 2021. Moreover, despite COVID-19 and subsequent sanctions pushing the North Korean economy into its worst state, North Korea held two military parades in 2021, even without any significant anniversary to commemorate. Both the parade commemorating the 8th Party Congress and the September 9th parade showed characteristics different from previous ones.

First, the January parade was unprecedented as a Party Congress commemorative parade. Among the 11 military parades held under Kim Jong-un’s regime, the 9.9 parade this time also differs from the previous anniversary parades held in 2013 (65th anniversary) and 2018 (70th anniversary). The 73rd anniversary in 2021 did not have any particular event worth commemorating. The year 2013 was notable for the declaration of the parallel development of nuclear weapons and economic construction and the 60th anniversary of Victory Day, while 2018 marked the 70th anniversary of the founding of the Korean People's Army and the regime, as well as Kim Jong-un’s debut on the international diplomatic stage with new strategic decisions. However, in 2021, despite all economic indicators being at their worst, two military parades were held.

When considering the characteristics of the 11 military parades held since the 2009 parade where Kim Jong-un was officially designated as successor, some questions become clear. First, Kim Jong-un first appeared at a military parade after being named successor on October 10, 2010, the 65th anniversary of the Party’s founding. The last parade attended by Kim Jong-il was the 63rd anniversary of the regime’s founding on September 9, 2011. Therefore, the 73rd anniversary parade on September 9 is a significant 10-year milestone from Kim Jong-un’s perspective as the leader. Especially considering the emphasis on nationalism and symbolism after the Hanoi summit breakdown, this parade carries substantial political significance.

Second, only the Worker-Peasant Red Guards participated in the 63rd and 65th anniversary September 9 parades. In 2018, the 70th anniversary parade included both regular and irregular forces but did not showcase strategic weapons, similar to previous September 9 parades. The 73rd anniversary parade reflects these characteristics as well. Regular forces did not attend; instead, the Pyongyang Party member division, provincial Worker-Peasant Red Guards, Worker-Peasant Red Guards from economic and science education sectors, the Red Youth Guard, and social safety forces including the Social Safety Special Mobile Unit participated. There was no appearance of strategic weapons, and as in previous September 9 parades, there was no speech by Kim Jong-un.

Lastly, during Kim Il-sung’s rule, military parades were held by joint decision of the Party Central Committee and the Party Central Military Commission; later, they were held by order of Kim Jong-il as Chairman of the National Defense Commission. However, under Kim Jong-un, the decision to hold parades is made by the Political Bureau meeting of the Party Central Committee, indicating a change in decision-making processes. This change adds various meanings to the background of parade organization. Among the 11 parades held under Kim Jong-un’s leadership, except for the February 2018 Army Foundation Day parade, there were two commemorations of the Day of the Sun, two Victory Day commemorations, three regime founding day commemorations, two Party founding commemorations, and one Party Congress commemoration. These largely served to consolidate internal regime unity and demonstrate military power externally, conveying political messages domestically and internationally. However, with the 75th Party founding anniversary parade as a peak, North Korea has been using military parades more as a means to strengthen internal regime cohesion rather than to showcase military capabilities. The two parades in 2021 ultimately aimed to encourage loyalty based on national defense through unity between the military and the people.

North Korea must now face reality. The advancement of nuclear missile capabilities, touted as the achievements of Kim Jong-un’s 10-year rule, was not resolved by the slogans ‘Imminwi Cheon’ (Putting People First) and ‘Bugang’ (Prosperity) displayed at the September 9 parade. ‘Imminwi Cheon’ and ‘Bugang’ are not realized by closing doors and calling for self-reliance but become possible when North Korea comes to the negotiation table for denuclearization talks and actively accepts reform and opening measures.

This content was produced with the assistance of AI translation services.