[The Editors' Verdict] What Biden's Practical North Korea Policy Intends to Convey

[Asia Economy] The outline of the Biden administration's North Korea policy is emerging. No previous U.S. administration has declared the completion of its North Korea policy and even attempted a friendly explanation to North Korea within just three months of taking office.

This is evidence that it is regarded as a diplomatic issue requiring careful and proactive engagement. As expected, the goal is "complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula." The previously inconsistent term "denuclearization" has been clarified.

By using expressions from existing agreements as they are to avoid confusion, the message inherits the Singapore North Korea-U.S. agreement. The approach is to reduce the nuclear threat through a "calibrated, practical, and cautious approach."

"Calibrated" and "practical" imply a proportional reciprocity and phased approach?doing what is possible first and matching the other side's actions. The emphasis is on practical measures to reduce the North Korean nuclear threat through diplomatic means.

This North Korea policy is said to be based on the 2018 Singapore North Korea-U.S. agreement and previous agreements. The existing North Korea-U.S. agreements include the Geneva North Korea-U.S. Basic Agreement (1994), the North Korea-U.S. Joint Communiqu? (2000), and the Singapore Joint Declaration (2018).

The common content includes "denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula" and "improvement of North Korea-U.S. relations." It also contains "comprehensive improvement of North Korea-U.S. relations," "transition from the armistice agreement to a peace regime," "official end of the Korean War," and "promotion of inter-Korean dialogue, cooperation, and reconciliation." It can be seen as not only inheriting the Singapore agreement but also considering the existing agreements as "practical measures."

The basic framework of the North Korea policy consists of a triangular axis of deterrence, diplomacy, and denuclearization. "Deterrence" has multiple meanings, including strengthening deterrence with allies, dispelling security concerns of allies, and deterring North Korean provocations, as emphasized in the "Interim Guidelines for National Security Strategy" released last March.

It can also be seen as a safety net to respond to criticism of weakening deterrence on the Korean Peninsula when North Korea's phased threat reduction begins in earnest.

The emphasis on "diplomacy" seems to mean more than just resolving issues through dialogue. "Diplomatic openness with North Korea" and "opportunities for diplomatic engagement" can be read as an intention to use "improvement of relations" as a key means.

Finally, the emphasis on "complete denuclearization" can be seen as an effort to dispel concerns about the so-called "nuclear arms reduction" approach of phased threat reduction and to remove North Korea's misperceptions.

The method of implementation may be to seek a first-stage denuclearization agreement through "improvement of relations." This is an approach that induces denuclearization through North Korea-related relationship improvement measures based on strong deterrence.

Then, what means can be used to induce North Korea to negotiate? Lifting North Korea sanctions is difficult to offer initially. There are practical constraints due to the burden of neutralizing major pressure tools, domestic and international criticism, and legal and institutional restrictions.

On the other hand, relationship improvement is less burdensome and can be implemented quickly. So, what possible relationship improvement measures are there? The "end-of-war declaration" was the first confidence-building measure North Korea demanded since the Singapore agreement.

The U.S.'s passive attitude caused negotiation deadlock. The "end-of-war declaration" satisfies the confidence-building measures demanded by North Korea.

Also, the end-of-war declaration is included not only in North Korea-U.S. agreements but also in inter-Korean agreements, allowing the formation of a framework led by South Korea, North Korea, and the U.S. The end-of-war declaration and the establishment of liaison offices can be pursued without congressional approval.

This reduces the burden of lifting North Korea sanctions and secures North Korea's trust and momentum for denuclearization implementation. Such measures have the advantage of drawing out a comprehensive freeze of North Korea's nuclear program, checking North Korea-China closeness, respecting South Korea's position, and not undermining alliance strengthening.

Hong Min, Director of the North Korea Research Office at the Korea Institute for National Unification

Hong Min, Research Fellow, Korea Institute for National Unification

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