[The Editors' Verdict] May to September Is the Golden Time for the Korean Peninsula Situation

Hong Min, Director of the North Korea Research Division at the Korea Institute for National Unification

The North Korea policy of the newly inaugurated Biden administration in the United States is a matter of intense interest. The Biden administration has harshly criticized former President Donald Trump's North Korea policy. It emphasizes differentiation and tangible results. How should the 'clumsy North Korea strategy' based on Trump's 'personal relationship' be overcome? First, it requires enhanced communication on North Korea policy. This includes communication among Congress, government departments, and allies including South Korea. In particular, communication with South Korea can play a crucial foundational role in shaping the North Korea policy. Next, it involves moving away from the unrealistic illusion of a 'big deal' and adopting an approach grounded in 'reality.' This means finding a realistic 'middle ground' where North Korea and the U.S. can meet. In summary, 'communication' and 'realism' are likely to be the fundamental attitudes.

Underlying this attitude is a fundamental reflection on the 'approach to North Korea's nuclear issue.' Over the past 30 years, the U.S. approach to North Korea's nuclear issue has been to prevent 'proliferation,' applying diplomatic pressure to abandon nuclear weapons and materials, demanding a denuclearization roadmap, and offering incentives. This is within the framework of so-called 'non-proliferation' and 'rewards for denuclearization.' However, North Korea has advanced its nuclear and missile capabilities and secured a range capable of striking the U.S. mainland. The lesson is that achieving 'complete denuclearization' through coercive diplomacy is difficult. This marks the rise of the 'realism of denuclearization.' While the ultimate goal remains North Korea's denuclearization, the approach must be broadly flexible. Achievable policy goals within Biden's term, realistic approaches, and tangible results are the core of this 'realism.'

In summary, it will be 'gradual threat reduction through active engagement.' Although the immediate focus after the administration's inauguration will be on managing North Korea's actions and formulating North Korea policy, the realistic goal is to establish a framework for nuclear arms reduction negotiations within the term and to achieve gradual substantive measures.

Then, can the North Korea issue rise to a foreign policy priority? If North Korea-U.S. relations shift from a negotiation phase to a confrontation and tension phase, it would be a significant political burden. Moreover, if North Korea resumes nuclear and missile tests, it can only be seen as a 'setback.' Falling into the quagmire of North Korea-U.S. confrontation means spending the short four-year term on unintended 'patience.' South Korea's 'peace process' plans and demands must also be considered. If the North Korea issue is postponed and a tense situation arises, the stance of respecting allies and forming multilateral consensus will be rendered meaningless. Late interest will manifest as lost timing, wasted time, North Korean backlash, and justification for North Korea's strategic weapons development.

So, what should our government do? First, it must enable the Biden administration to send a message that it will inherit existing North Korea-U.S. agreements. Second, urgent efforts are needed to persuade the U.S. to accept our peace process plan. A comprehensive and inclusive blueprint must be provided. Consultations with the U.S. government must occur before the U.S. presidential inauguration. A draft North Korea policy should be ready by late spring next year. The 'golden time' is from May to September. It is the right time for South Korea, North Korea, and the U.S. to resume 'peace negotiations' and reach agreements. The 'Tokyo Olympics' will also take place during this period. A 'cessation of hostilities declaration' or 'peace declaration' can also be pursued here. All efforts must be devoted to managing and designing this golden time.

Third, to this end, the South Korea-U.S. joint military exercise season in March-April must be wisely managed. North Korea may judge that the Biden administration lacks the will to implement North Korea-U.S. agreements if the exercises proceed as planned, and may claim it has no obligation to uphold its promise to suspend nuclear and missile tests. Fourth, a venue for inter-Korean dialogue should be arranged at the end of 2020 or early 2021. North Korea may also strategically create a certain dialogue mood in 2021 for management purposes. It may propose talks on inter-Korean military issues. This approach uses inter-Korean relations as a 'stepping stone' toward North Korea-U.S. relations. Ultimately, our government's diplomacy toward the U.S. regarding the peace process should be based on (agreement) 'inheritance,' (policy) 'interest,' and (prompt) 'negotiation.'

Hong Min, Director of North Korea Research Division, Korea Institute for National Unification

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