[The Editors' Verdict] The Strategic Status of the Declaration of the End of War at This Juncture

Hong Min, Director of the North Korea Research Office at the Korea Institute for National Unification

On September 23, President Moon Jae-in once again proposed a 'Declaration of the End of War' in his virtual keynote speech at the 75th United Nations (UN) General Assembly, aiming to completely end the war on the Korean Peninsula and open the door to a permanent peace regime. However, there has been considerable opposition to the declaration raised that day.

First, the Declaration of the End of War is known to be part of the implementation measures in both the April 27 Panmunjom Declaration and the June 12 North Korea?U.S. summit verbal agreement. The 'Declaration of the End of War' is an implementation item that spans both inter-Korean and North Korea?U.S. agreements. It is possible that North Korea views the failure to take this initial step as the point where all matters began to unravel.

So why does North Korea see the Declaration of the End of War as a symbol of 'trust'? Through the declaration, North Korea wants to inform the international community symbolically that the North and the U.S. have agreed to end hostile relations. This is to confirm the cessation of hostile acts by the U.S. through a 'declarative mechanism' and to create conditions for lifting sanctions against North Korea. At the same time, it serves as a safeguard for the phased progress of denuclearization.

Our government seems to believe that it is necessary to firmly drive denuclearization through the 'Declaration of the End of War,' which covers both North Korea?U.S. and inter-Korean agreements. When North Korea's demand for the declaration was not met, it shifted to demanding the lifting of sanctions, and when even that was rejected at the Hanoi North Korea?U.S. summit, it raised the bar for negotiations by insisting on the withdrawal of hostile policies toward North Korea. As the first step in the 'withdrawal of hostile policies toward North Korea' demanded by North Korea, the declaration holds significance in eliciting a firm commitment and implementation of denuclearization.

However, proposing the Declaration of the End of War requires several strategic attitudes. First, it is necessary to clarify the strategic status of the proposal in the current situation. It should be made clear whether this proposal is intended as a tool for managing the situation and a bridging agenda to continuously draw North Korea and the U.S. into negotiations with the next U.S. administration in mind, or if it is aimed at immediate implementation. In other words, the purpose, audience, and timing must be clearly presented. If the intent, timing, and message effect are ambiguous, there could be significant opposition and misunderstanding. After the UN General Assembly speech, it is necessary to provide a more systematic background explanation to rationally explain the strategic status.

Second, it is necessary to more actively explain the meaning of the declaration in creating a compromise point of 'trust' between the North and the U.S. The two sides have appeared to hold different positions on trust. North Korea views the declaration and the suspension of South Korea?U.S. joint military exercises as the first steps toward trust, while the U.S. sees trust as a comprehensive promise regarding the concept, scope, and practice of denuclearization. It is necessary to make clear that the declaration is not a separate measure given without the premise of denuclearization but is linked to confirming the will and practice of denuclearization. It should be firmly established as the 'entry point' for restarting the denuclearization and peace process. The 'flexibility' revealed by the U.S. and South Korea during U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Stephen Biegun's visit to Korea this year can be understood in this context.

Finally, phase management is needed in line with the strategic status of the declaration. The Declaration of the End of War is necessary to enable the next U.S. administration to inherit the existing North Korea?U.S. agreements and negotiation framework and to resolve issues through dialogue. It can also play a role in reminding North Korea of the essential issues so that it reaffirms its commitment to denuclearization and actively participates in negotiations rather than withdrawing. It has a strong character of managing uncertainties over the next six to eight months. In accordance with this strategic status, it seems necessary for government ministries to present consistent and coordinated voices. At the same time, during the U.S. administration transition period, it is important to emphasize the importance and value of the South Korea?U.S. alliance as much as possible and to convey that the declaration aligns with such values.

Hong Min, Director of North Korea Research Division, Korea Institute for National Unification

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