Will the Wanggeon Be Deployed to the Strait of Hormuz? [Yang Nakgyu's Defence Club]

Security Alert Following Namuho Attack Investigation

Participation Request Likely to Be Discussed at U.S.-Korea Defense Ministers’ Meeting

The Wang Geon ship, deployed to the Strait of Hormuz area as the 31st Cheonghae Unit in January 2020. Photo by Navy Operations Command, Yonhap News Agency

There is growing domestic and international attention on whether the Republic of Korea Navy’s destroyer Wanggeon (4,400-ton class) will be deployed to the Strait of Hormuz.

On May 10 (local time), U.S. President Donald Trump stated that Iran’s response to the U.S. ceasefire proposal was unacceptable. Additionally, after a government investigation found that the explosion on the HMM Namuho was caused by an unidentified flying object, the safety of 26 Korea-related vessels, which have been stranded in the area around the strait for over two months, can no longer be guaranteed.

According to military officials on May 11, the Wanggeon, which is the 48th contingent of the Cheonghae Unit, is scheduled to depart on May 15 to relieve the currently deployed Daejoyeong, the 47th contingent. The Wanggeon has been upgraded with counter-drone systems. It will take approximately three to four weeks to reach the Gulf of Aden.

U.S. President Donald Trump claimed that the Namuho was attacked by Iran because it acted independently, refusing to join the U.S.-led “Liberation Project” to rescue foreign ships trapped in the strait by military force. As ceasefire negotiations continue to stall, pressure on Korea to play a more active role in stabilizing the Strait of Hormuz is likely to intensify.

Attention is now on how this issue will be discussed at the meeting between U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth and South Korean Defense Minister Ahn Kyubaek, which is scheduled to take place in the United States today. The U.S. side may again raise the possibility of Iranian involvement and request more active participation from Korea.

Until now, the South Korean government has cautiously reviewed whether and how to participate in the multinational “Maritime Freedom Coalition” (MFC) proposed by the United States, as well as UK and France-led multinational force concepts premised on a post-ceasefire scenario. Since expanding the Cheonghae Unit’s operational scope is considered a realistically effective contribution, there is speculation that the government could proactively consider seeking National Assembly ratification procedures, depending on how the situation develops. The very act of pursuing such procedures could itself send a message to the international community that Korea is preparing to make a substantive contribution.

However, there are a number of practical constraints to immediately deploying naval assets such as warships to the Strait of Hormuz, including the need to ensure safety and obtain National Assembly approval. For this reason, the government is considering non-combat contributions—such as information sharing or dispatching liaison officers—that could be implemented before the ceasefire for the stabilization of the Strait of Hormuz.

This content was produced with the assistance of AI translation services.