76% Success Rate North Missile... Where Did It Get the Technology From?

Kim Il-sung Established Precision Research Institute After Korean War, Developed New Weapons
Transferred Technology from China, Produced and Sold to Pakistan, Possessing Nuclear Technology

[Image source=Yonhap News]

[Asia Economy Yang Nak-gyu, Military Specialist Reporter] What is the success rate of North Korean missiles? Recently, statistics showing that 3 out of 4 missiles tested by North Korea since 1984 were successful have drawn attention to the history of missile development.

According to a report by Radio Free Asia (RFA), the U.S. nonprofit organization “Nuclear Threat Initiative” (NTI) analyzed North Korea’s test-fired missiles from 1984 to the present and found that out of 204 missiles, 156 were successful, resulting in a 76% success rate.

NTI’s investigation shows that North Korea launched 10 missiles between 1984 and 1992, with only 5 successes. However, the success rate dramatically increased with 6 out of 7 missiles in 2006 and 7 out of 8 in 2009 succeeding. All 6 missiles fired in 2013 and all 19 launched in 2014 were successful. This year, North Korea launched 44 missiles with only 4 failures; 27 were confirmed successful, and 13 were classified as unconfirmed. Notably, the success rate of the three types of short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM) recently launched by North Korea was very high.

North Korea began developing missiles after the Korean War. Chairman Kim Il-sung established the defense science research institute “Precision Research Institute” in 1952 and started developing new weapons. However, the Soviet Union did not transfer weapon technology. The first step in weapons production was the 107mm multiple rocket launcher imported from China. In the early 1970s, China introduced the Silkworm missile, reverse-engineered from the Soviet Styx missile. North Korea did not stop there. It participated in the development of China’s DF (Dongfeng)-61 ballistic missile and obtained other technologies from Middle Eastern countries. During the Fourth Middle East War, North Korea sent pilots to Egypt to strengthen cooperation and began reverse-engineering the Scud missile. This led to the creation of the Scud-B replica short-range ballistic missile “Hwasong-5” in 1984. North Korea also signed a “Ballistic Missile Development Agreement” with Iran in 1985, resulting in the Scud-C type (Hwasong-6) with a warhead weight of 700 kg and a range of 500 km.

After the death of Chairman Kim Il-sung and the rise of Kim Jong-il as the National Defense Commission Chairman in the 1990s, missile development accelerated with increased warhead weight and range. With the development of the Scud series, North Korea produced the Nodong-1, a medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) with a range of 1,300 km. North Korea transferred Nodong-1 technology to Pakistan and secured nuclear fusion technology and centrifuge design technology. They earned money by selling missiles and imported nuclear weapon technology. Subsequently, in 1993, North Korea launched the Nodong-1 with a 1,300 km range capable of striking U.S. bases in Japan, and in 1998, it test-fired the Taepodong-1 with a range of 2,500 km. In December 2012, North Korea succeeded in launching the Unha-3.

Under Kim Jong-un’s leadership in the 2010s, North Korea approached completion of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) technologies, excluding strategic bombers among the three major strategic nuclear forces. In February last year, North Korea launched the long-range missile Kwangmyongsong, which had improved payload capacity and engine propulsion compared to the Unha-3, successfully entering orbit. In May, it launched the Hwasong-12, estimated to have a range of 5,000 km, and was evaluated to have succeeded in atmospheric re-entry. Moreover, in August last year, North Korea succeeded in test-firing the solid-fuel-based SLBM Pukguksong, actualizing the SLBM threat.

The military and defense research institutions currently classify deployed North Korean missile lines into three belts for convenience.

The 1st belt is located 50 to 90 km north of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), where Scud brigades are stationed. With a range of 300 to 700 km, these missiles can target the entire South Korean territory. Approximately 400 Scud missiles are deployed, with around 40 transporter erector launchers (TELs) estimated.

The 2nd belt is established 90 to 120 km north of the DMZ and is managed by Nodong missile brigades. More than 300 Nodong missiles with a range of 1,200 km are deployed, capable of striking U.S. forces in Japan. The number of Nodong missile TELs is estimated to be around 30.

The 3rd belt is a rear area based on Cholsan in North Pyongan Province, Geomdeok Mountain in South Hamgyong Province, and Junggang in Jagang Province. Located 175 km north of the DMZ, it is estimated to house 30 to 50 Musudan missiles. These can be launched while moving on about 30 TELs and can strike bases in Guam. If ICBM-class KN-08 missiles are also deployed in the 3rd belt, it would threaten not only Hawaii but also the U.S. mainland.

According to a joint report by South Korean and U.S. military authorities, North Korea is believed to possess up to 900 ballistic missiles, including a maximum of about 440 Scud missiles. North Korea owns 108 transporter erector launchers (TELs). By missile type, the number of Scud missiles and TELs capable of carrying Scud missiles is the highest. The number of Scud missiles is estimated at up to 430 (36 TELs). Following are 27 Musudan missiles (27 TELs), about 330 Nodong missiles (27 TELs), about 100 KN-02 missiles (12 TELs), and a total of 12 KN-08 and KN-14 missiles (6 TELs).

This content was produced with the assistance of AI translation services.