[The Editors' Verdict] The National Assembly Advancement Act Rendered Powerless in the Face of Political Maneuvering

In December 2014, the so-called “National Assembly Advancement Act,” introduced by the National Assembly to prevent physical altercations, was praised for fulfilling its role. The following year, in 2015, when the National Assembly passed a budget worth 375 trillion won within the legal deadline without major disruptions, positive evaluations poured in, saying it was the first time in 12 years and that the National Assembly Advancement Act had done its part.

The Act’s effectiveness was largely due to the automatic submission clause for the budget bill, applied from that year according to the supplementary provisions. Article 85 of the National Assembly Act states that if the ruling and opposition parties fail to complete the budget review by November 30, the government’s budget bill and related bills are automatically submitted to the plenary session of the National Assembly on December 1. The Constitution specifies that “the National Assembly shall pass it at least 30 days before the start of the fiscal year.” Counting backward, this means the plenary session must be held by December 2 each year to process the budget, but since this deadline was never met, the National Assembly Act established a regulation to enforce processing.

The National Assembly Advancement Act was born out of the ruling and opposition parties’ need to prevent physical fights within the Assembly. The direct trigger was a bloody brawl between lawmakers following the forcible passage of the Four Major Rivers-related bills and the New Year budget bill in April 2010. After further discussions, it was implemented with the start of the 19th National Assembly’s term in May 2012.

The core of the Advancement Act is the establishment of various measures to protect the legislative rights of minority parties. From the agenda submission stage, it made the bill processing requirements stringent to prevent the majority party from forcibly passing bills. If one-third of the total committee members agree, a joint committee with equal numbers from ruling and opposition parties can be formed; contentious bills require the consent of at least three-fifths of the total committee members to be designated as fast-track bills. The Speaker’s authority to submit bills on their own initiative was limited to natural disasters, wartime, etc., and unlimited debate was introduced in the plenary session.

As a result, the bill processing period somewhat increased. The Korea Development Institute (KDI) evaluated in its 2015 report “Study on the Effects of the 2012 National Assembly Act Amendment” that the likelihood of bill passage in the 19th National Assembly decreased by about 11% compared to the 18th National Assembly. In particular, it noted that the introduction of the agenda adjustment committee reduced the possibility of forcible bill passage. The KDI report stated, “Opposition members effectively exercise gatekeeping power as committee chairs affiliated with the ruling party, rendering the distribution of committee chairs between ruling and opposition parties meaningless,” adding, “It has the same effect as all committee chairs being held by the opposition.”

However, recent observations of the ruling Democratic Party’s handling of the “complete removal of prosecutorial investigation rights” (Geomsu Wanbak) bill process have shown that such evaluations no longer hold. The agenda adjustment committee convened immediately after the bill was forcibly passed in the Legislation and Judiciary Committee’s subcommittee became a mere formality, led by the ruling party’s committee chair and including an independent member with ruling party leanings. During this process, physical fights?the decisive trigger for the introduction of the Advancement Act?also broke out. The plenary session’s unlimited debate (filibuster) also failed to exert significant influence due to tactics like splitting sessions.

This month marks exactly 10 years since the National Assembly Advancement Act came into effect. How would the lawmakers who expressed strong concerns at the time, saying “a plant National Assembly will appear instead of an animal National Assembly,” evaluate the current situation? Could they have imagined the emergence of a giant party with seats exceeding a majority and approaching three-fifths at the time the Advancement Act was created?

The animal National Assembly has reappeared, and sufficient discussion on agendas has disappeared. It fails to play a gatekeeping role in enforcing the legislative objectives desired by the giant party. If political trickery runs rampant, no matter how advanced the laws are, they will be useless.

This content was produced with the assistance of AI translation services.