Swimmer's Defection Spotted 10 Times but Missed 8 Times (Summary)

General Park Jung-hwan, Chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, attended the National Defense Committee plenary session at the National Assembly on the 17th and reported on the situation of the defector from the 22nd Division. Photo by Yoon Dong-joo doso7@

[Asia Economy Yang Nak-gyu, Military Specialist Reporter] Regarding the recent incident in which a North Korean man swam across the East Sea for 6 hours to defect to the South, it has been revealed that this man was detected 10 times by our military equipment, but the situation room officers and video surveillance soldiers failed to identify him up to the 8th time.

According to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the 23rd, the unidentified person who crossed from North Korea by swimming was captured 5 times on four coastal surveillance cameras from 1:05 a.m. to around 1:38 a.m. on the 16th. At that time, the situation monitor sounded warning alerts twice, but the soldiers in the situation room did not notice them. This is the result of the military authorities' investigation into the ‘swimming defection’ incident in Goseong, Gangwon Province.

Additionally, the unidentified person was captured 3 times on the Joint Operations Support Center’s fence boundary CCTV from 4:12 a.m. to 4:14 a.m., and 2 times on the Civilian Control Line outpost CCTV from 4:16 a.m. to 4:18 a.m. At this time, the military detected the unidentified person and reported to higher authorities.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff admitted, based on on-site inspection results, that "the situation officers and video surveillance soldiers failed to comply with mission execution procedures and thus could not identify the unidentified person," and "despite instructions to inspect sluices and drainage channels following the Ganghwa Island defection incident, management was inadequate." They added, "Although the unidentified person was first discovered at the Jejin Civilian Control Line outpost, operational execution was insufficient, such as not following the situation response manual."

The Joint Chiefs of Staff stated, "It is estimated that the unidentified person swam across for 6 hours, but the exact route and swimming time are still under investigation," and they could not dismiss the controversy surrounding the series of defection processes.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff said, "The unidentified person (North Korean man) passed through... However, even this has been criticized as a delayed report."

He was identified at the Civilian Control Line outpost around 4:16 a.m., but the high-speed situation dissemination system only transmitted the information to key departments and officials at 4:47 a.m., 31 minutes later. The 22nd Division Commander was informed 34 minutes after identification. Notably, during this on-site investigation, it was revealed that the coastal fence drainage channel (90 cm in diameter, 26 m in length) through which the North Korean man passed between 1:40 a.m. and 1:50 a.m. was installed during the East Sea railway construction, but the relevant unit was unaware of its existence.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff said, "The military recognizes this situation seriously and will vigorously pursue fundamental improvement measures with a determination to reform thoroughly." However, these measures are a rehash of previous follow-up measures such as ‘knock defection,’ ‘fence jump defection,’ and ‘drainage channel defection,’ raising doubts about their effectiveness.

Meanwhile, the Ministry of National Defense is promoting a plan to transfer coastal surveillance duties to the Korea Coast Guard, sparking controversy. The Army conducted a pilot transfer of surveillance duties in the Buan area of Jeonbuk Province in 2014. The results showed that coastal surveillance requires about 8,600 personnel from the 35th Division, but the Coast Guard has only about 50 personnel. This indicates that manpower and equipment are still grossly insufficient to transfer the mission to the Coast Guard, raising concerns about the recurrence of incidents like the recent ‘swimming defection.’

In response to criticism that the Coast Guard’s surveillance capabilities are insufficient, the military is also considering a compromise plan to transfer duties only from Dangjin on the West Coast to Uljin on the East Coast. However, if defection or infiltration incidents occur in rear areas, disputes over responsibility between the military and the Coast Guard are also expected.

This content was produced with the assistance of AI translation services.