[The Editors' Verdict] Declaration of Nuclear Weapons Advancement: North Korea's Intentions

Hong Min, Director of the North Korea Research Division at the Korea Institute for National Unification

North Korea prominently emphasized strengthening its defense capabilities throughout the 8th Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea. The military parade clearly indicated that its message to the United States was for external audiences. The congress aimed to convey to the new U.S. administration that the enhancement of nuclear capabilities will continue until the U.S. withdraws its hostile policy toward North Korea. Of course, the message is not solely about aggressive nuclear weapons advancement. By mentioning the "key to establishing a new North Korea-U.S. relationship," it stated that it would engage the U.S. based on the principle of "strength for strength, preemptive for preemptive," leaving room for negotiation.

However, the public declaration of nuclear weapons advancement may raise negative perceptions among related countries. Chairman Kim Jong Un revealed in his business report that even after the declaration of "completion of nuclear force" on November 30, 2017, North Korea persistently continued nuclear weapons development. Some members of the newly formed Biden administration's diplomatic and security team carry a deep-seated "distrust" toward North Korea based on experiences during the Obama administration. How will they view North Korea, which continued nuclear weapons advancement even during the 2018 North Korea-U.S. talks?

North Korea's declaration of nuclear weapons advancement could become a trigger for future North Korea-U.S. confrontation. Since the Hanoi North Korea-U.S. summit, North Korea has indirectly expressed its intention to continue developing strategic weapons through the term "nuclear war deterrent." However, this time, the public declaration of nuclear weapons advancement sends a clear message to the Biden administration. First, it serves to remind of its "strategic status" by showcasing world-class nuclear capabilities to enhance its negotiating power. Second, it strengthens the justification for nuclear development by riding on the nuclear arms race among the U.S., China, and Russia. Third, by listing strategic and tactical nuclear weapons under development, it aims to neutralize any strategic patience or unilateral denuclearization demands the Biden administration might consider. Lastly, it serves as groundwork to steer future North Korean nuclear discussions toward a "North Korean-style nuclear arms reduction."

The multiple warhead missiles, hypersonic missiles, nuclear submarines, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), and military reconnaissance satellites mentioned by Chairman Kim in his business report are "problematic weapons" in the global nuclear arms race. However, it is rare for any country to publicly announce the development of strategic or tactical nuclear weapons before the final testing phase. This can be seen as a deliberate move. It is a step beyond the de facto recognition of nuclear possession toward an approach of "nuclear arms reduction or nuclear arms control." It is likely that this was made with the current Biden camp's tendency to apply nuclear arms reduction approaches to the North Korean nuclear issue in mind.

President-elect Biden has pledged to strengthen the NPT regime, renegotiate the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, restore the Iran nuclear deal, reduce the role of nuclear weapons in military strategy and diplomacy, decrease nuclear stockpiles, and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). The core is the reconfiguration of nuclear arms reduction or nuclear arms control regimes. In other words, it aims to refine the nuclear arms reduction system to calm and correct the international nuclear weapons order, which is heading toward competition. Of course, the reality is not easy for these pledges to be fully implemented. It is difficult to curb China's military expansion plans and ambitions, as well as Russia's moves to regain its past glory as a military power. Nevertheless, the Biden administration is likely to be interested in reorganizing the current international nuclear order under new leadership. Nuclear arms reduction approaches may be attempted on various scales. How the North Korean nuclear issue will be linked to this framework is a matter of interest.

Hong Min, Director of North Korea Research Division, Korea Institute for National Unification

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