NIRS Fire Exposes Flaws in Design and Operation of the National IT Network

The direct cause of the fire at the National Information Resources Service (NIRS) has been identified as a 'thermal runaway' phenomenon in the lithium-ion batteries used for the uninterruptible power supply (UPS) system.

Lithium batteries can rapidly generate heat if control fails during charging or discharging, and they produce their own oxygen, making it difficult to extinguish the flames. Although the gas-based fire suppression system was activated, it was ineffective, and water spraying could not be actively used due to concerns about damaging IT equipment, which delayed the firefighting efforts.

On the 28th, fire, police, and National Forensic Service officials are moving to the joint inspection at the fire site of the National Information Resources Service in Yuseong District, Daejeon. Photo by Yonhap News

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The delayed timing of the battery replacement also emerged as an issue. The batteries were manufactured by LG Energy Solution, the UPS was produced by another company, and the NIRS was responsible for operation and inspection, forming a three-party structure. During the regular inspection last year, a 'replacement recommendation' was issued, but this year’s inspection concluded with 'no issues.' However, the actual period of use reached 11 years, exceeding the global recommended cycle of 7 to 10 years. Experts point out that the separation of inspection and replacement management created a gray area of responsibility.

Deficiencies in facility design and redundancy systems were also revealed. The distance between the batteries and servers was only 60 centimeters, and there was inadequate partitioning between the power room and the server room. Since the building was a converted telephone exchange, it did not meet international data center standards. The government stated that the centers are operated in a distributed manner across Daejeon, Gwangju, and Gongju, allowing for rapid switchover in the event of a failure. However, during the actual fire, many administrative services were paralyzed for an extended period. Data replication alone was insufficient, and immediate failover did not occur.

Operational shortcomings have also been pointed out. The fire reportedly broke out during battery relocation work due to a spark. It is highly likely that basic procedures such as charge control, use of insulation equipment, and safety supervision were not properly followed. Technical vulnerabilities and poor management combined to bring the entire national IT network to a halt.

Experts classify this incident as a 'man-made disaster.' Choi Woonho, a professor at Sogang University and director of the Meta Innovation Center, emphasized, "The disaster was already foretold by the expedient operation of converting a telephone exchange. Safety must not be neglected for the sake of cost reduction."

Immediately after the incident, the Ministry of Science and ICT announced, "We will re-examine the disaster and crisis response manual for the administrative information system and strengthen cooperation with related agencies." However, critics argue that this is merely a declarative measure repeated after every incident. Similar manual improvements were proposed after the Kakao data center fire in 2022, but the same issues recurred in this incident.

Experts point out that the Ministry of Science and ICT’s response focused on post-incident inspection rather than addressing the fundamental causes. Professor Choi stated, "To avoid repeating failures, a comprehensive redesign of core facilities that store key national data is necessary. All data centers should immediately relocate fire-prone facilities such as UPS and batteries to separate spaces away from server rooms."

Yonhap News

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Due to this fire, not only major administrative services such as resident registration and passport issuance, as well as Government24, but also the financial payment network and Korea Post services experienced disruptions. However, from the afternoon of the 28th, major financial services, including the financial payment network, were restored to normal. As check card payments, internet banking, ATM transactions, and insurance applications and claims resumed, the confusion in the financial sector gradually subsided.

Korea Post also began server and network inspections on the morning of the same day and resumed financial services around 9 p.m. Postal savings and insurance transactions returned to normal, and the agency announced that it would implement special measures to prevent customer losses due to delayed insurance premium payments or loan repayments. However, postal and parcel delivery services are recovering more slowly, with inspections ongoing as of the morning of the 29th, aiming for resumption.

Kwak Byungjin, acting head of Korea Post, said, "We will make every effort to restore postal services as quickly as possible and ensure that all mail, including parcels, is delivered smoothly ahead of the Chuseok holiday."

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